

CIRO DI MARTINO

Historical-Military Essays





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On May 15, 1987, General Di Martino has been appointed Chief of the Army General Staff.

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
CONTENTS



Special
Edition

The aim of Rivista Militare is to broaden and update the technical and vocational training of Army Officers and NCOs. To this end it functions as a vehicle for the dissemination of military thinking and as a forum of study and debate. Rivista Militare is also intended to be a means of informing the general public about the Army and military matters through the publication of articles of current technical and scientific interest.

- 2 The Concept of Democracy from the XIX to XX Century.
- 13 The Young and the Crisis of the Certainty of Values.
- 21 Random Thoughts on the Military Art in Modern Warfare.
- 30 The United States and Russia in the Last Century.
- 50 Notes on the Study of Public Opinion.
- 58 Ethics and Militariness.
- 68 British Tanks at Cambrai.
- 80 Notes on the Social Problem. Genesis and Developments.
- 90 The Eastern Question since 1878.
- 100 Characters and Aspects of Publicity.
- 112 The Concept of Subversion.
- 120 Evolution of the Concept of Imperialism from the 19th Century to this Day.
- 130 Notes on Terrorism.
- 138 Logistics and its Evolution.
- 148 Strategy and High Command.



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THE CONCEPT FROM THE XIX


RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARMY



Man's universal desire for liberty has never had more impact on world history than in the XIX Century.

Brought to the forefront by the French Revolution, it inspired trends in the thoughts and actions of men from all nations, resulted in wars for independence and constitutional debates and has erected modern democracy, piece by piece, on the ruins of absolutism, sweeping away the old privileges of class and wealth and replacing them with equality for all before the law and governments based on the free expression of the public will.

OF DEMOCRACY TO XX CENTURY



The growth of democracy has not been a smooth process, nor has its realization been possible everywhere at the same time or in the same form. In every country it has been influenced by preexisting conditions and historical and cultural traditions. The development of democratic institutions has been easier in countries where a strong tradition of local autonomy was already present, such as Switzerland, which has the oldest tradition of self-government in the world and where a deeply rooted system of civic and democratic education makes possible a form of government which has had the most success in the struggle

for true democracy.

Democracy has also met with favorable conditions in England where there exists a long-established parliamentary tradition which dates back to the "Magna Charta" and has inspired constitutional charters in many other parts of the world. Nevertheless, it is the United States which is generally considered as having the ideal form of democracy. It was here that democracy expressed itself in the famous "declaration of the rights of man" which, after gaining momentum as a result of the French Revolution, became the credo of liberty and provided the base for all constitutions formulated in the 1800's. In America the divisions of class and religious faith did not constitute insurmountable barriers. Here equality was something presupposed in the life of the colonists, while elsewhere it was only an object of aspiration and a cause for which political struggles were waged. In addition, economic well-being had created an atmosphere of spontaneous abundance by the laws, which were viewed as guaranteeing common interests. The United State's constitution basically developed the same principles which had been formulated in England, but in a more relaxed and liberal form, taking advantage of the potential for new growth in a virgin territory.

Countries with long-established democratic traditions have provided inspiration for other parts of the world where democracy has come to affirm itself.

The countries of Central and South America have taken the government of the United States as their model and have formed a series of united or federal republics. Their governments, however, lacking the preliminary necessity of civil progress, have often degenerated into dictatorships or have been shaken by revolution. Only slowly, with the gradual progress of civilization as a whole, are these republics acquiring a political climate of greater discipline and a sense of law and order where, until just recently, the only thing respected was the sword.

The English constitution has born its best fruit in Canada, Australia and New Zealand where government, from its very conception, has been based on democracy and where free institutions have made more rapid and bolder advances than anywhere else. The constitution of these nations does not permit an authority like that conceded to the president of the United States through "veto". Australia and New Zealand, furthermore,



have adopted a very progressive stance regarding the development of the workers' movement and have welcomed this new social force into the government structure, giving rise to forms of union-based socialistic democracy.

On the other hand, in countries with a more complex historical and political background, such

as France and Italy, progress for democracy has been slow and difficult. In France democracy made its incursion all in one strike. The revolution, with one clean yet bloody sweep, was intended to eliminate absolutism and establish democracy in its place. As a result the government has almost always been unstable and precarious. Three monarchies and an equal number of republics have come and gone, and France's political life has been encumbered by deep institutional, religious and social divisions. The singular merit of the third republic was the preservation of the constitution of 1875 until after World War II. The crisis which arose following the war brought the constitutional dilemma back into the limelight. The work of two assemblies gave birth to a fourth, and later, a fifth republic which leads a complex parliamentary life based on the precarious balance of power existing among the various parties.

The democratic life of Italy is not much different.

The administrative unification established after 1861 did not provide for the possibility of a regional self-government which could instruct the public on political life. The diverse levels of economic and civil development rendered even more difficult the government's effectiveness and made a constitution modelled on those of wealthier and more advanced nations, such as France and Belgium, appear, to the eyes of many, unsuitable for our country. The extension of suffrage did not do much to change the situation, since it was not enough to make up for the lack of a true democratic consciousness. Italian democracy, dragging itself along through conflicting programs of the Right and Left, did not know how to affront the crisis which came about following the socialistic and syndicalistic movements, nor did it know how to oppose fascism, a development resulting from the confusion and political regression which had grown unchecked through improper action into monstrous proportions.

The institutional referendum of June 2nd, 1946 provided Italy with a republican form of government and a constitution which was placed into effect on January 1st, 1948. The new government is based on labour, as the constitution emphatically states, and on the sovereignty of the people, voiced through the elections and the referendum.

After the Second World War other republics also sanctioned governments of the people (q.v. Yugoslavia and Albania), and various countries which before had been under totalitarian regimes have now returned to a system of free institutions. One cannot forget the great advances made in self-government in the countries of Asia and Africa.

The triumph of democratic institutions in the African nations has been unique in many aspects, for here are still felt even today the effects of an authoritative colonialism which has become consolidated in the course of time.

The penetration into Africa by the European powers during the last century has resulted in a true division of the continent, unacceptable in human terms. Nevertheless, it has also accelerated



Lower left: "The Spirit of 1776", a painting familiar to all Americans, done by A. M. Willard a century after the signing of the declaration of independence.

Left: The marquis of Lafayette wounded in the battle of Brandywine, on January 2nd, 1777. Lafayette went to America to fight when he was 19 and immediately won the admiration of Washington, who wanted him as his aid. He held an autonomous command in the south during the campaign of 1781. After returning to France, he became deputy of the General Estates and commander of the national guard.

Below: The painting of Emanuel Leutze, known as the "portrait of patriotism", shows Washington crossing the Delaware. He succeeded in transporting 18 cannons to the opposite bank of the river, which was held by Hessian troops under the command of the English Army.




the slow civilizing process of peoples who, for the most part, were still living in the stone age.

Colonial rule has offered an obvious exception to the Latin maxim "Natura non facit saltus". It has forced, in a positive sense, the natural evolution of primitive societies, guiding them to advanced forms of civic organizations and thus helping them acquire a full and deserved dignity on the international level.

The very work of the colonizers, however, has sown the seeds of rebellion, since the advancement of the people has inevitably been accompanied by their fuller awareness of the right to

self-government. But the yearning for independence has assumed concrete forms only in our century, when the ferments of autonomy give rise to ever more outward manifestations of intolerance which before went unexpressed.

England has been one of the first countries which have perceived the broad backing of these movements growing within their own colonies. Her colonial policy has become progressively softened, creating the preliminaries for the establishment of autonomy for the populations under her power. A chain reaction has begun, set into motion by Egypt's winning of independence in 1922.



The decolonization of a people goes hand in hand with the democratic growth which occurs when it becomes aware of its rights and duties. With the participation of Africa in the Second World War, the new civic attitude of the African nations has found implicit recognition, which acts as a catalysis in the up-hill struggle for independence. The events following the war constitute milestones in the new history of Africa.

They signal the affirmation of an emerging reality, one which is capable of offering its own autonomous and original contribution to civilization.

Asia, too, has undergone massive European infiltration. Beginning in the XVI Century, it reached its peak in the 1800's with the colonial subjugation of two thirds of the continent.

The commercial interests of the vast European powers, joined by the United States, stimulates the growth and solidification of colonization.

The XX Century, however, has brought, along with victories on the social front, a re-awakening of the aspirations for independence.

This phenomenon, although comparable to the movements in Africa, presents substantial differences.


The Asian peoples subjected to colonization are — unlike those of the African nations — the descendants of great civilizations with thousands of years of history and deeply rooted ethnic and political traditions. This heritage serves as a moral glue and nourishes the ferment of self-government. Movements in this part of the globe have, in fact, been inspired by strong nationalistic feelings and the desire for the revival of past splendors. These sentiments, already unifying in themselves, are linked with various political ideologies which, although differing in persuasion, all focus on the rebirth of the dignity of the race and a return to the honor of the culturally rich past of a people proud of its once independent status. For this reason the colonizers are experiencing a progressive demise both of their power and the commercial systems and social institutions which they have established. The initial economic infiltration launched by the United States is finding no further openings, and the Americans are yielding their position to more prominent Japanese and Chinese enterprises. For the Asiatics, constricted for centuries by the European West, it is the first sign of an imminent restitution of their rights to autonomy.

The subsequent stages of democratic progress in Asia have unfortunately been, for the most part, a series of traumatic episodes caused by the explosive outbursts of opposing forces repressed for too long. Disturbing examples include Viet Nam, Cambodia and Thailand, to name only a few of the more recent tragedies. This inevitable chain of painful events is part of the price that democracy must pay in order to materialize in an environment of permanent social flux.

If we compare the political climate of a century ago with that of today, the progress which democracy has made becomes clear. Beginning with the very first constitutional advances, true equality in political rights has become more and more a reality. The right to vote, once limited

only to a few economic and social classes, has been expanded through an ever-broadening electoral base; the results have been universal suffrage and the women's vote.

An almost complete turn-around has been made from when executive power in many countries prevailed over legislative power. The exclusive life-long political offices handed down from one generation to the next are becoming more and more a thing of the past. Even in the Upper House in tradition-bound England the bourgeoisie and aristocratic elites have been yielding the way for newcomers as the positions in that branch of the government become more elective in character.



Left: The declaration of July 4th, 1776 for the proclamation of independence of the United States. It would exert notable influence on the developments that led to the French Revolution. "We hold these truths to be self evident: that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness".

Above: The famous Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, approved by the French Constitutional Assembly on August 26th, 1789 and notably influenced by the American Declaration of Independence, embodied the principles of political and civil freedom which layed the foundations of a new constitutional order opposed to the absolute monarchy.

All the political offices today consist of temporary elected posts, and the will of the people is continually acquiring greater forms of autonomy through the referendum and the "initiative", which, already enacted in some countries, constitute for others the latest conquest for democracy.

Looking into the future, the growth which we wish for democracy, especially in the countries where it has not yet sufficiently consolidated its positions, lies in the realm of greater discipline and greater subordination of the parties to the supreme interests of the States. In order to arrive at this goal, however, it is necessary that modern democracies concern themselves with promoting in the general public a more even economic and social balance and a broader and further-reaching civil education. With a willingness on the part of all for moral perseverance, active involvement, industriousness and sobriety, political democracy must become also social democracy and, further still, "moral democracy", i.e., each and everyone must assume his own responsibilities as defined by his own attributes.

Following this line of action, the democratic institutions in Italy have pursued, from the very beginning, the realization of such socio-ethical principles, chosen as the foundation and guidelines for the structure and organization of the State.

This is the main avenue on which Italian democracy, apart from the inevitable deviations due to its young history, is proceeding, with a well delineated policy of progressiveness and openness to new and expansive developments.

This pluralistic evolution, characteristic of diverse elements clashing in perpetual motion, is a fact. It tolerates all the irregularities and degeneracy inherent in a social substratum devoid of age-old democratic traditions and thus makes Italy a vanguard of the future. This is not a bold statement, for democracy today is the political system best suited for human coexistence in a pluralistic society and it would be difficult to find anywhere else the total acceptance of diverse experiences and contrastive civic outlooks which is found in Italy's present day socio-political climate.

Even crime, which, according to the disturbing statistics of the last few decades, has been on a sharp upswing, is paradoxically an outgrowth of liberty, which at times stretches beyond the fine line that distinguishes the bounds of legality.

The requests of social classes, labourers and businessmen are openly expressed and directly received by the organs of the parliament and by the executive branch. At times this process is not strictly in line with official praxis or legislative precepts, but it is certainly carried out with an effectiveness which a few decades ago would have been unimaginable.

The risks that this system involves are various and, unfortunately, all very real.

The civic climate which we are living in today offers full proof of this with the events which fill the daily headlines, even if these misdeeds are counterbalanced by positive actions accordant with human dignity.

The extremes of some sectors, although they may have their base in legitimate claims, are nothing more than the consequences of forced policies justified in the name of an alleged democratic freedom which instead, exposes itself as false through its own manifestations.

It is a phenomenon, nonetheless, which forms part of that process of thesis – antithesis – synthesis dear to philosophical idealism, and, as such, its presence has to be accepted as an unavoidable stage in the infancy of every democracy.

The very evolution of idealism had demonstrated that the succession of these three phases must follow a proper and natural order, subject to precise rules, otherwise one runs the risk of setting up from the very beginning the instruments of the decay of freedom on the political level.

Surely such an eventuality bears no relation to the current evolutive stage of Italian democracy, but, without a doubt, it serves as a constant reminder that civic growth must be the product of a conscious effort on the part of all, not something left to chance, but a means to a definite end.

The necessity for order does not lead to excessive regulations or impositions unacceptable on the human or social level, since one of the





Above: A painting by Michel Garnier depicting a dragoon's departure for war. The Army was the most significant factor which united the people under the new State.

Below: The scene of the oath at the "hand-ball court" of Versailles. Here gathered the representatives of the Third Estate after the morning of July 20, 1789, when they found closed, by order of King Louis XVI, the hall which had served as their meeting place from the very beginning of their work on the General Estates. On that same day they took the famous oath not to adjourn until they had produced a constitution for France.



characteristics of true democracy is that of finding within its own institutions the coercive force capable of correcting possible deviations from the general directives freely chosen by the greater part of the public will.

The existence of obligatory norms is not a denial of liberty but its most solid affirmation. It is the mark of democratic self-regulation which, limiting the sphere of action of the individual, protects the individual's right of enjoying the benefits accorded to all citizens.

If this is true for the laws already in act for a long time (which still, however, contain noticeable imbalances and irregularities stemming from what, in some cases, have been tumultuous origins), it is even more evident in their applicative forms of recent constitution, which have arisen, backed up by the experience of their predecessors and with a carefully meditated, and not "spontaneous", "ad hoc" normative apparatus worked out with rigour and competence and not the make-shift product of emotional and contingent incentives.

This is also the case with the "Norms of Principle on Military Discipline" which the Armed Forces have adopted. In doing so, they have provided themselves with a regulatory code which far surpasses similar codes found abroad, both for its modernism of regulatory concepts and for its fidelity to the principles inspired by the needs of a truly democratic society.

In effect, law no. 382/1978 has done nothing more than sanction and publicize a reality which has been in practice for a long time, having evolved from the reciprocal influences which exist between the life of the Armed Forces and society.

This exchange of appeals and experiences testifies to the role that the military plays in the modification of the customs and outlooks of the people.

The only innovation, in short, has been the issue of a law which is meant to give formal sanction to the ethical principle which the "military" has always practiced: the performance of one's duty for the good of others as the noblest concept of democracy. The law, then, was rendered necessary not so much for effecting modifications inside the structure, as it was for demonstrating to those on the outside that the supposed "evil militarism" does not exist.

This is particularly true for the Army, which, making up more than 50% of the military organization, and being its most extensively diffused branch, is more subject to public opinion. In its sphere of application, the new law complements every aspect of that essential feature of the "military", i.e., the hierarchical rapport.

A more modern outlook, in fact, of this rapport has been affirmed which, without taking away from any of its perennial and fundamental value but, on the contrary, effecting its internalization, reinforces, on the one hand, the figure of the superior and his capacity to command, and, on the other, inspires self-discipline in the subordinate who is made conscious of the necessity of its function through intense training and participation in quarters life.

The result is an atmosphere of healthy emulation which leads to the heightening of

efficiency, the strengthening of the operative will and the elevation of civil coexistence, with no confusion of roles, no disorder, but vivid and controlled tension and great moral and human effort.

In addition, the free expression of individual potentials is fostered, giving proof that the deep-seated feeling of democracy is not an abstract principle, but an everyday reality, manifested as the recovery of ethics based on the "space of man".

The superior, in performing his part, must strive to maintain a constant dialogue with his subordinates, taking advantage of every occasion.

The purpose of this is not only to come to know them better, but also to assure them that they are considered as individuals and form part of a whole in which individual and general problems are viewed as one and the same.

From this are born the free expression of thought and the defining of requirements, with promptness and a straightforwardness worthy of the military. This grants to the superior the ability to perceive the morale of his subordinates and examine the possibilities of satisfying the more common requests which would not exceed the normative.

It is a further demonstration of democratic order, of "moral democracy", which has a direct effect on the well-being of the soldiers and, in turn, affects their operative efficiency.

The evolution of this reality has, in a short time, made notable advances. Its catalysis, and at the same time, testing ground, have, unfortunately, been the tragic events which have befallen Italy: the earthquakes in Friuli, Valnerina and Meridione, the floods in the Marche and other regions, along with the other catastrophes which often occur.

In all these tragic events, the Army has been the main element in the organization of relief operations.

The Cadres and troops, in an exalted test of solidarity and harmonious blend of action and duty, have offered proof of the capabilities which have been developed, by in large, as a result of a preexisting democratic-hierarchical rapport of loyalty, marked by a mutual respect which enhances subordination, rather than denying it.

But outside of these extraordinary events, the Army offers a day-to-day demonstration of sensitivity to modern democratic principles, both through its availability to the outside, and – together with the other services of the Armed Forces – through the implements which guarantee, on the administrative-disciplinary level, the protection of the individual.

The frequent contacts with the population, opening of the quarters to the public on various occasions, and constant rapport with the media render the Army's activities increasingly visible.

The stance which Army policy has adopted is therefore certainly no less advanced democratically than that of any institution of the State.

The possibility accorded to every serviceman of explaining personal problems to his own hierarchical peak through a simple presentation of request, constitutes an exemplary landmark. In not all civil organizations, in fact, can this be realized with such ease and without a lot of haggling.

Notwithstanding the statued limitations defining his particular "status", the serviceman can address an appeal – with absolute freedom and no adverse consequence – to the administrative and ordinary Magistrature, and can even forward an extraordinary appeal to the Head of State. Only a few years ago the Cadres would have automatically rejected such a possibility, perhaps through a distorted interpretation of the true meaning of discipline if not of the military ethic.



Upper left: Rousseau in an allegorical print; upper right: the frontispiece of the Encyclopédie, a work which helped to break down the old order "with Royal approval". Below: Voltaire and Frederick II of Prussia, one of the most famous "enlightened despots". Voltaire advocated freedom of conscience and the abolition of privilege, and had a stimulating and innovating influence over the culture of his day.

The awareness that all possess rights guaranteed by the law creates an atmosphere of increased mutual respect among the personnel which transcends the bounds of rank, and instills in them a better understanding of how each individual fits into the overall scheme.

Blind obedience has never been as far reaching as that which is conscious and motivated, just as imposed discipline is only the semblance of that which results from conviction.

The Army has no need to back up this claim.

The whole world has seen television footage of Italian soldiers in war-torn Lebanon, their efforts to preserve peace, their unparalleled spirit of sacrifice and their ability to maintain a lively moral under every circumstance.

Such character is obviously not attained through constrictions or impositions, but through a willing acceptance of duty as something lived out in day-to-day reality, and not as a mere topic of rhetoric.

Such convincing proof puts to rest all doubts caused by the fear of the breakdown of discipline due to a more flexible hierarchical rapport. Those who have had such doubts evidently have not taken into account that the young men of today are more socially mature than those of the past, despite their contradictions which are, at times, quite disturbing and, often, dramatic.

The spirit of solidarity and collaboration which they possess, when convinced of the necessity and equity of the ends, is manifested in the desire for dialogue and encounter, and a sense of readiness, and creates the ferment of action and genuine "achievements" in the highest sense.

Young men, upon their enlistment, remain favorably impressed with the overwhelming sense of loyalty and propriety which characterizes the life of servicemen of all ranks.

Once inserted into the mechanism of the organization, they contribute, without their knowing, to the promotion of the democratic structure in the hierarchical system, indirectly offering to their superiors a picture of the changing demands of society which the Army must reckon with.


Collaboration, therefore, is not just a matter of "technics" but also morale, since the wealth of experiences which young men carry with them to the Quarters brings about, in the hierarchy of command, a greater sensitivity and openness to the different kinds of problems which plague the life of the soldier and subordinate of various levels.

This reality has been institutionalized in "Organs of Military Representation", a democratic instrument "par excellence", whose quality is even more heightened by compulsory norms which enhance its function of contributing to the solution of problems through an orderly and truly constructive process contained within the limits of proper and productive dialectic.

The mechanisms which ensure its functional structure are based on the most comprehensive democratic context, starting with the essentially elective configuration of the "Organs" at their various levels.

The right to vote belongs to all servicemen, and there are no limitations restricting individuals from running for office. The only existing prohibitions are for those in the top positions in the Boards and units to ensure that, for the protection of democratic liberties, the roles of command and representation are not concentrated upon the same person.

The figure of the military delegate is totally new. He is in charge of facilitating the job of the Commanders and of guaranteeing to the representatives the acknowledgment of their requests made to those higher up on the hierarchical ladder.




The institution of representation, enacted in Italy in 1978 under the law entitled "Norms of Principle on Military Discipline", enhances the sense of responsibility and conscious participation, and formalizes legal and disciplinary instruction - elements which were already fully present in the hierarchical system. Its aim is to produce, in the individual, a firm and conscientious dedication to the livelihood and growth of the Armed Forces. Italian servicemen, called to the exercise of the vote in order to elect members to the councils of representation, have participated with great civil and democratic commitment.

In regard to the above, it must be emphasized that those at the top levels of the Representative Board have the prerogative of requiring themselves to be consulted during the prelegislative phase of those provisions which concern the career, well-being and retribution of servicemen.

As with all human achievements, the system is by no means perfect, but the fact remains that an initial step has been made toward the practice of the genuine values of democracy. In the Army, democracy is practiced on a day-to-day basis in the faithfulness to traditions, the defense of liberty through an inspired respect for the sacredness of the law, and the ever-present and ready mutual solidarity which only an orderly democratic structure can realize and put into action.



The background of the entire page is a reproduction of Plato's 'The School of Athens' fresco. It depicts various ancient Greek philosophers in a grand architectural setting. Plato is on the left, pointing upwards, and Aristotle is next to him, gesturing towards the earth. Other figures include Pythagoras, Euclid, Ptolemy, and various students. The architecture features arches, columns, and a large statue of Athena in the background.

THE YOUNG AND THE CRISIS OF THE CERTAINTY OF VALUES

CONSIDERATIONS
OF AN INSPECTOR
OF THE
ARMY SCHOOLS

The crisis of values in the present social dynamics

The persistent crisis of values, though on a slow-down course, affects the young generations, who have difficulty in finding a firm identity and certainties in the contradictory context of a hasty and tumultuous social evolution.

The old solidity of convictions, based on postulates that had dogmatic aspects but were verified in everyday experience, has been crumbling, little by little, under the attacks of real or supposed modernistic instances, sometimes founded on assumptions reaching the limits of utopia and not rarely supported by remarkable movements of opinion, which have had disruptive effects without having adequate positive compensations.



On the wave of an excessive progressivism, an attack has been brought against the traditional "leading lines" by the subverters of the social functions which had been consolidating through an age-old process. The landmarks of the civil tissue, and first among them the cohesion of the family, have suffered from the confrontation with the emerging reality – though not clearly defined and lacking a limpid theoretical substratum – and have been replaced by "consumer" models that were even transferred on the moral level.

Nevertheless, the original order, damaged but not totally overcome, has not been replaced by a model with a well defined character and sufficiently outlined features.

Improvisation and pragmatism have identified the innovative "system", with an inevitable disorientation of conscience, of relations between generations and of the serene acceptance of a hierarchy which had never been put down in writing but has had timeless recognition.

Owing to the lack of pre-established principles, one witnesses a feverish quest for well-grounded postulates, in an everlasting tension which leaves no space to stable positions, for it is fed by permanent uncertainty.

These are not, unfortunately, constructive Socratic dilemmas, which, through the maieutic method, led to the truth. They are, on the contrary, dramatic, sometimes contradictory, attitudes, typical of those who believe that the acceptance of all trends, no matter where they come from, sooner or later will find its ultimate synthesis in ethical concepts capable of gradually becoming the foundation of a new sense of existence.

This is an interesting concept not devoid of some fundamental truth, which, if accepted with the necessary prudence and caution, could bring about a real regenerative process that could certainly have the young among its followers. In the enthusiasms that spring from it, which are more widespread than is commonly believed, one can foresee a change of customs and views also among the adult generations, whose refusal is progressively weakening, even though it does not assume aspects of passivity and inertia. Some resistances, often manifested in forms of open reaction, have the flavour of a dutiful respect of tradition. But there is no doubt that everybody feels the inevitable changes vis-à-vis the more and more urgent instances of a "civilization" that solicits new times.

A return to the past is impossible at the moment, for, besides being anachronistic, it would not find a soil that would be receptive and capable of stirring up and nourishing ferments of evolution. It is more realistic instead to try to find out which of the old values still conform to the present historical and cultural "moment", in order to give a true sense to the commitment of the young, avoiding vague horizons and hypothetical goals.

This is, now as before, the adults' task: if one wants to prevent this widespread confusion from degenerating into manifestations of moral disorder or, worse still, into a rejection of all forms of social order.

It is essentially a matter of acknowledging – with courage, honesty and without prejudice – the new reality that has been consolidating within the civil, ethic and cultural tissue of our time.

The astonishing dynamics of scientific and technical evolution of the last decades – which exalts human intelligence – is obscured by undeniably suggestive mechanistic conceptions and by an exasperate positivism.

Some see in the rule of technology the triumph of naturalistic and neo-illuminist theories, in the belief that the clear supremacy of reason will exclude any other moral or spiritual intervention.

In this view, ethic would be an ideological superstructure, unnecessary, and indeed, under



certain aspects, against a free technical-scientific evolution.

Religion would be considered a detrimental form of rejecting certain experimentations which constitute the essential conditions of scientific research.

The fundamental unity of the world of technology and the world of the spirit

The alleged separation between the spiritual and technological spheres appears as a fictitious and unsustainable position, because one should assume that man can be divided in Leibnizian monads – isolate and having no reciprocal relations – each one complete in its own ambit and autonomously efficient.

It is an attempt at vivisection that does not consider the fundamental unity of psyche, intellect and morals which – as a synthesis of moments which are different but originated from the same irrepressible impulse – is peculiar to man.

It is therefore unthinkable that a real progress could be foretold and preached without a firm ethical substratum, based on principles firmly anchored as irrepressible realities to the very essence of mankind.

Enhanced by the progress of civilization, these hinges of existence and society have undergone changes only in the way in which they have been put into practice and not in their substance. No historical era could do without them and no human group could afford to ignore them.



Even the primordial tribes felt the need to single out permanent values, on which they organized their social structure.

The present civilization would have therefore scarce significance if it were to reject the certitudes of a spiritual reality from which the very spur to scientific-technical progress is born.

The presumed dichotomy between morals and knowledge appears unrealistic and just a pretext, also in the light of the philosophical thought of all ages, and it is even disavowed by the present civil condition itself.

It is not suitable here to dwell upon virtue's and knowledge's identity of purpose, as theorized by Socrates, for instance, or by St. Thomas Aquinas and even by Kant, just to name a few land-

edification, otherwise it sinks to the level of an arid technicality.

The irrepressible impulse that urges the mind on the scientific path is in itself a moral value, which is more near to virtue than to rationality. Without this unceasing yearning, which is powerfully symbolized in Dante's Ulysses ("Fatti non foste a viver come bruti - ma per seguir virtute e conoscenza" - "You were not made to live like brutes - but to pursue virtue and knowledge"), one loses sight of the finalities of thought, which cannot be reduced to a mere vegetative expression.

Research and achievement, therefore, are both intellectual and spiritual travail. Human values, reinvigorated and enriched in their contents and



marks on the path of the philosophical speculation that is meant to prove the indivisible link between reason and spirit.

It is instead appropriate to observe how, today, the scientific achievements result in a moral enrichment.

Man recognizes himself in his ability to rise above matter when his intelligence achieves daring victories over the objective world. That is to say that progress can hardly be called that if the mechanisms of selfconsciousness do not intervene in defining its validity.

It is therefore a mere ethical phenomenon that which produces scientific verification, which is trustworthy only if it contributes to human

functions, must correspond to the exciting scientific progress. In their contents, for they constitute the ethical substance of science, which adds to every advancement the consciousness of a higher civil dignity. In their functions, so that their efficacy as permanent incentives be adequate to the increasingly arduous obligations of learning. Therefore, a considerable reevaluation of the ethical-spiritual concepts is needed, in order to allow our thought to reach more and more significant goals.

Science means truth, truth means certitudes

In the light of this, science tends to acquire irrefutable truths. Their certainty is cause for

moral edification which, in its turn, induces the intellect to renew its efforts, and these have an epic aura.

It is an osmosis which confirms the inexistence of contrasts between science and spiritual values when both are meant and applied in a correct relationship of mutual support, excluding anomalous interpretations or interested distortions.

The "unfailing truths" acquired by the scientific thought lead to reflection and meditation upon the universal concept of "good". They let one perceive the supreme finalities of life's self-discovery. Consequently they give the certitude that moral values are a permanent reality.

The supremacy of human dignity as compared with the rest of creation and man's capability of conveying to posterity the true meanings of the everlasting speculative tension – which give him a breath of the divine – are the signs of knowledge's self-awareness. We confront an irrefutable equation, the elements of which are: Science, as investigation of the truth, Truth, as an accessible form of good, and Good as the purpose of moral virtue and spiritual certitude.

The continuity in time of this process, which is an immanent reality, manifests itself in the perennial dissatisfaction of man vis-à-vis his gradual advancements.

The acknowledged "truths" are necessarily partial, presuppose a widening of horizons and exclude any possibility of pre-establishing definitive limits and anchorages.

The precariousness of science, which proceeds through trials and subsequent corrections, derives from this. What seems today a firm acquisition might be only a reference point for tomorrow.

Every new achievement does not deny the preceding one but sets it at the edges of a wider angle of perspective, opened laboriously on the unknown.

Sometimes the previous truths are cracked – if not shattered – by the blows of revolutionary discoveries, which can upset the foundation of whole scientific systems.

In our era this phenomenon has gathered remarkable speed, thanks to unrestrainable technological-experimental dynamics which, in the light of a realistic sense of doubt, excludes all possibilities of building on granitic pillars. Today, science does not rest on solid rock, but rather on a pilework set in the uncertain waters of the indefinite.

From the quiet and reserved workroom of the Renaissance alchemist we have proceeded to a programmed research, open to the widest forms of cooperation.

The exchange of information promotes intuitions and discoveries but it causes also their quick obsolescence.

Thus, a kind of relativity of science takes shape, which is a toll that must be paid to avoid interrupting the flow of evolution in whose crucible the various "moments" of truth dissolve but do not lose their validity, for they branch out in the structures of the ultimate conquest.

Although science presents such "relative" aspects, the ethic answer that stems from it cannot be equally "relative".

Spiritual values receive their nourishment from thought's activity, which must be dynamic and changing in order to have its fulfillment in the form of progress. Nevertheless they are neither damaged nor do they undergo contingent modifications, similar to Plato's idea, which remains immovable, even though it expresses itself in the multiform aspects of the objective world.

Such values are not set – as it is with Plato's – in a hyperuranian dimension. They dwell in everyday reality, in which they intensely and



incisively participate. From them derives the awareness of the temporariness of knowledge to which they confer its just function in the context of existence.

The "answer" of the philosophical conceptions preaching moral relativism as the expression of scientific relativism is therefore insufficient.

Ethic as categorical imperative

Ethic, as such, cannot conform to habits, fashions, or to the vicissitudes of knowledge, exciting as they may be, for its fundamental presupposition is that the norms in which it identifies itself are "categorical".

The spiritual pragmatism manifests itself in man's docility vis-à-vis the contingent "attitudes" of scientific thought, while man's awareness dominates them and makes them cause of human enrichment.

If, on one side, science offers its relative certitudes, ethic, on the other, turns them to its own advantage, for it confers them a fundamental unity, revealing their hidden universal significance.

Virtue and good are not to be set on the same level and in the same dimension of each single stage of thought, for then they would be reduced to utilitarian adaptations of the spirit to reality. The moral imperative, thus perceived, would substantially be suggested by interest, and would receive more or less intense – and always different – external impulse, thus becoming deprived of the indispensable autonomy.

The ethical choices stem instead from deep convictions, meditated and ripened within the painful dialectics of doubt. The interrogatives of science are also those of moral knowledge, set in a rational dimension that leads to discriminate "good" – as the purpose of behaviour – from the "relative", as a form of the constant modifications of the spiritual course.

It is therefore a matter of making an autonomous choice, i.e. separated from the contingent reality, and, at the same time, a genuine one, suggested exclusively by the ability to overcome the temptations of selfishness, convenience and external influence.

To identify oneself in this self-determination is perhaps not too arduous a task on the theoretical level but, concretely, it is an incessant and difficulty-ridden labour.

The forces of spirit and reason are sorely tried by the unavoidable influence of the conventions and customs of a society which, drunk with the myths of science and technology, makes more and more harassing attacks on the liberty of conscience.

He who wins the struggle imposes on himself a behaviour consistent with the choice that he has been able to make prevail.

This does not lead to reasons or forms of social isolation because the inner law thus determined necessarily coincides with the values that each individual and all of society ought to pursue.

What remains to be seen are the aspects of such a categorical imperative when they become part of the structures of the impetuous and not always orderly civil dynamics.

This means that the problems regarding the duties and functions connected with the moral choice remain unsolved, and indeed assume a particular force.

It must be said, first of all, that ethic, to be truly that, must be a vehicle of human edification through the guiding force of the example.

This postulate gives rise to vehement dialectics regarding the most effective courses and methods to achieve the educational aims.



Ethic of understanding or ethic of force?


In this regard, the various trends can be summed up in the dilemma "ethic of understanding or ethic of force?".

It is an ancient problem, which has engaged the philosophical and pedagogical speculation of every epoch.

Authority and freedom are its natural opposite poles, and, at the same time, its poles of attraction. They also define the everlasting generations gap – authority/adults – freedom/young – and the main interrogative of education in its widest meaning.

Whether the teacher's authority can be transformed into an imposition, whether the pupil's freedom ought to be restricted without been changed in its substance, these are the dilemmas that go beyond the limited school sphere and concern society as a whole.

The attempts at finding effective answers have produced remarkable achievements of thought, but the human reality, along its painful



road, has always offered partial solutions which, on the civil plane, have manifested themselves in a succession of dictatorships and more or less advanced forms of democracy.

This is the true meaning of the dialectic between authority and liberty, which has its synthesis in history, meant as documentary evidence of the titanic battle between matter and spirit.

This is eloquently witnessed by the various currents of thought which have followed one another and have all agreed – though from different points of view – on the necessity of a moral “presence”, as a means of continuity of the principles from which the social organization, in its numerous forms, draws its inspiration.

The real pivot of the future of civilization rests on the ability to secure a future for the fundamental values.

But the question is whether and how these can be handed down to the young generations.

The answer is in the validity of the moral choice itself, which commands consistency of

conduct and identity between action and the inner feeling that prompts it.

Only in this acceptance does “authority” become “authoritativeness”, because it divests itself of its empty garb or prevents all theoretical formulations, while it expresses itself in everyday reality.

Its persuasive force – edifying and educating – rests in the practice of virtue, which is not the privilege of a few heroes of the spirit but a way of life that everyone can attain, since it requires the supremacy of values that are inherent to human nature and are therefore a common inheritance.

From this derives an education not from words, not made of schemes, not imposed from the height of power, but capable to penetrate the consciences with the sole persuasive force of its concrete manifestation.

Education by “practicing” and not by “preaching”, incentive to improvement contained in facts and not theorized in sermons, progressive exaltation of the spirit through the persuasive force of conscious action and not through abstract lucubrations.

There is no daring logic, no “architecture” of thought – as glamorous and evocative as they may be – than can replace the attracting force of the example, which must bear constant witness to the moral choice.

The persevering and sincere adherence to this choice requires the serene acceptance of sacrifices and renunciations and demands a transparent honesty of intents as a prerequisite for a more and more fervent commitment.

Example as an obliged passage to moral knowledge

The Thomist formula “Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu”, transferred to the moral sphere could be effectively transformed into “nihil est in spiritu quod prius non fuerit in exemplo”.

The passage of ethical knowledge through example appears in fact a fixed course. Practical education is actually obtained mainly by a process of interiorization of the external model.

Not without reason did Lucius Annaeus Seneca affirm: “Longus est iter per praecepta, breve et efficax per exempla”.

This axiomatic truth is especially confirmed in the military context, in which the educator is also commander and therefore combines in himself duties, functions and responsibilities that in other milieus are usually separate.

A conscious discipline, required at all levels, must express itself exponentially in him who is invested with the authority of command.

It is a process of edification which ripens in the mind and soul day after day, and which, outwardly, should express itself in an exemplary conduct, capable of inciting the subalterns to avoid passive behaviour and turning them into active and participating individuals.



The loyal and spontaneous collaboration of the subordinates thus obtained, if in the military organization expresses itself in direct and evident forms – owing to the nature itself of the tasks and functions – is no less important and necessary in society.

Those who are held as examples are the natural guides of our civil tissue, which draws from them its vital ferments and vivifying incentives. They are the repositories of an undeniable truth, which they put in practice, defend and propagate: the reform of society must find its foundation in the reform of the inner self.

To make existence more truthful, to attain social justice to give back to man the sense of his limits, to answer man's expectations of peaceful coexistence, constantly imperiled by tensions, consciences must be strengthened and appointed legislators of the action.

This creed must expand beyond the individual in order to be the first link of a chain connecting family, school and institutions, to reawaken the dormant sense of civilization and human dignity.

It is imperative that we improve ourselves in order to improve others, in a constant tension allowing us to receive the message of the "examples" and then retransmit it, strengthened and amplified.

The crisis of values can also be identified with the decline of this elementary individual and collective duty.

It is therefore a "crisis of duties", marked by the licence to pursue one's evergrowing rights based on false and fictitious foundations.

The upsetting of the necessary balance between obligations and prerogatives has brought forth a loss of social conscience, which favours selfishness and is reflected in an excessive race to consume goods.

Only a moral strengthening will make the beclouded minds understand that fashions, the headlong rush to prosperity, the aristocracy of money, which mortifies the natural aristocracy of the intellect, are not prodromes of progress but cause a civil degradation cloaked with confused exteriorities.

The illuminate Voltaire had already perceived this deep-rooted truth when – with his pungent irony – he affirmed "*Le superflu, chose très nécessaire*" to stigmatize and lash the "consumer" habits of his time.

And no less of a thinker was Diogenes, who was looking for man with the lamp of conscience and thought.

He is still among us, eager to enlighten our spirits, with his little flame, never extinguished through the centuries, to cast the light of his message on the shadows of oblivion.

It is our task to receive it, with purity of sentiment and regenerative will, to bequeath it to the young as a precious gift of civilization and human testimony.



RANDOM THOUGHTS
ON THE MILITARY ART
IN
MODERN WARFARE

RANDOM THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARY ART IN MODERN WARFARE

To apply the classical concepts of the military art to the contemporary context, one has to approach the question strictly in terms of the far-reaching technological, social and economic changes that have modified, and sometimes overwhelmed, the "states" and "situations" that have been established across the centuries, and which are no longer acceptable in the light of a process that is continually gathering momentum, with as yet unforeseeable consequences.

The traditional conceptual parameters that have been codified and consolidated, at least in part, by practical experience, are being "naturally" eroded by events, and are losing their efficacy when measured up against the newly emerging problems created by the prospect of warfare in a highly technologically-conditioned environment.


This is one of the features of the forms that warfare takes in any age, and which are continually overtaken by technological progress.

Advances in technology make it necessary to search tirelessly for criteria and methods to meet contemporary needs,

and this will apply even more so in the future.

The leaders of the main industrial and military powers are well aware of this, and one of them recently said that: "technological espionage is one of the most effective and productive operations in our history".

Consequently, there is a continual clash between physical force and intellectual resources, in which the former constitutes the frontline of a national developmental process, while the latter are seen as immutable terms in a code that is tenaciously anchored to concepts deemed to be fundamental,



THE 1962 CUBA BLOCKADE

This is a good example of the application of the *will/initiative* principle, demonstrating the capability of controlling events.

During the Cuban crisis, the United States' will, translated into initiative, was the decisive factor to the

success of the operation.

Without hesitating, the strategic forces were placed on alert and preparations for the attack were made. It was decided to set up a "quarantine zone" around the whole island, patrolled by the United States fleet, making it clear that any Soviet ships carrying offensive war material would be sunk

if they failed to withdraw when ordered to do so.

The critical moment occurred on 24 October 1962 when a group of Soviet ships carrying missiles to be installed in Cuba made contact with the American fleet.

The Soviet leadership decided to re-route the convoy and turn back.

because they stand above and beyond any changes, however incisive, made to the "instruments".

Military doctrine, which has to take account of the progress made in scientific research, must necessarily go along the paths indicated by the continually changing times, but it cannot ignore the fundamental principles that give form and substance to individual hypotheses, verifying their validity. These principles are solid pillars, giving form to the theories and criteria, which in turn guarantee their efficacy and confirm their viability.


Abstract forecasts are all the more likely to come true when they are backed by the fact that they are in tune with these cardinal principles, which do not preclude innovation and insight, but rather show the need for them.

It is therefore useful to carefully define the basic components of the doctrine, which may be summed up as:

- **principles:** the immutable elements on which every operational theory must necessarily draw;
- **concepts:** the particular ways of programming and organizing operations;
- **criteria:** the general ways of implementing the principles;
- **procedures:** coordinating the implementation phases according to the predetermined courses of action.

Scholars have sometimes tried to identify new principles, on the assumption that in addition to the elements that are common to all forms of operations and which are untouchable, there may be new ones that have developed with time.

According to this assumption, only four "benchmarks" seem to meet this requirement. Nevertheless, the work being done by scholars in this field is still valuable, insofar as it is the expression of theoretical doctrinal research that can open up new frontiers in a difficult subject area which is often hard to assess and certainly in need of further research.



Guerrilla warfare tactics devised by Mao and successfully used between 1920 and 1940


INDOCHINA 1946-1954

Mao was Ho Chi Min's and Vo Nguyen Giap's mentor on the theory of revolutionary war, and to understand the reasons for the success of the Vietminh in Indochina against the superior French fire power, one has to understand Mao's theories.

His main tenet was that the revolutionary must mobilize the people's political will, pursuing the struggle through initiatives illustrated in the 3 phases shown below. The French did not grasp the importance of the

will/initiative principle followed by the Vietminh, and believed that military superiority was sufficient to deal with the guerrilla offensive.

The main reason for the French defeat was that they had to deal with a new type of unconventional warfare for which the French units were not trained. They believed that holding the territory and superior fire power were adequate for success, and were unable to apply the principle of will/initiative as effectively as the enemy.



The four perennial parameters to which one must necessarily refer are: will/initiative, concentration of effort, freedom of action, and economy of force.


These can be found especially in the French tradition, but they have now gained currency in the most commonly accepted warfare "philosophies" today, because of the breadth of their application and the flexibility they possess, so that they can be adapted to various national and infranational theories.

WILL/INITIATIVE

"Will/initiative" consists in the capacity to resist any tendency to allow oneself to be overtaken by events, and is therefore decisive to the possibility of implementing the other principles. This therefore precludes any conditioning factors that may be very strongly felt in modern warfare, as a result of the situations relating both to material supplies and to sudden, unpredictable changes in the operational environment.

The possibilities and probabilities of success are largely correlated to the capacity to keep the morale and intellectual tension high, for these determine the will and the initiative, as aspects of the decision-making dynamism and the real control over any situation.

In modern warfare, this "faculty" must necessarily exist at every hierarchical level, in view of the way in which commanders' autonomy is being extended, as distances shrink and action/



THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF WARFARE TO THE BATTLES OF THE 17th AND 18th CENTURIES

Failure to apply the principle of *freedom of action* in the wars of the 17th and 18th centuries led to the mortifying execution of "movements and counter-movements, marches and counter-marches, feints and counter-feints, which were costly, unproductive and slow".

Typical examples of this mentality were the battles of Blenheim and Oudenaarde.

THE BATTLE OF BLENHEIM

The Battle of Blenheim took place during the War of the Spanish Succession in 1704 on the left bank of the Danube, near the Bavarian village of Blenheim (now Blindheim). The Franco-Bavarian troops under Marshals Tallard and Marsin, and the Elector of Bavaria, Maximilian, faced the Allied armies (Austrian, German, English, Dutch and Danish) under the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy.

Marlborough and Eugene attacked at first light on 13 August. The Franco-Bavarian troops, which outnumbered the Allies, had formidable artillery power and their defensive action was helped by the marshland around the Nebelbach. Eugene commanded the right flank, and Marlborough the left flank and centre.

The attack on the village of Blenheim was repulsed, and for several hours the outcome was uncertain. But at about half past five in the afternoon, Marlborough manoeuvred his forces and crossed the Nebelbach, smashing through Tallard's centre which had been weakened to reinforce flanks, with 80 cavalry squads supported by infantry and artillery. The enemy light cavalry was split apart, and the Allies were able to defeat the infantry and outflank the bulk of the French troops, who had massed in the village of Blenheim. At sunset, the remnants of the Franco-Bavarian Army fled into the Black Forest, retreating towards the Upper Rhine. One third of the two armies lost their lives in the battle, and the Allies took 13,000 prisoners.

reaction times become shorter.

Planning and programming must make reasonable allowances for this, but must not *a priori* exclude the random events that lie on the borderlines of the hypothesis.

This means reappraising the value of man as the kingpin of events, with supremacy that is quite rightly bestowed on him through will translated into initiative, which does not contradict the preestablished principles, but helps to attain their objectives.

CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT


"Concentration of effort" is conditioned, but also enhanced, by this, because it expresses the degree to which man exercises his capacity to dominate a given situation, and the farsightedness of the decision-makers.

However, in the contemporary situation, the notion of "effort" has quite a different meaning from its classical sense of combining instruments and

resources along a preestablished axis.

Today, we prefer to consider this concept as the convergence of fire and resources on the target by forces which are initially dispersed and required to take up their initial position as soon as possible.

This development has been brought about by necessity, but it does not alter the validity of the "general" theory, which is immutable, and has been codified and consolidated by centuries



THE BATTLE OF OUDENAARDE

The Battle of Oudenaarde took place during the War of the Spanish Succession in 1708, on the left bank of the Scheldt River near the fortified Belgian town of Oudenaarde. The French army, led by the Duke of Burgundy and the Duke of Vendôme faced the joint Anglo-Dutch-Austrian forces under the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy.

At dawn on 11 August, the 80,000 man French army crossed the Scheldt and moved on the town of Oudenaarde which Vendôme intended to take by siege. The Allied forces, numbering about the same as the French, arrived

after forced marches and began crossing the river. After occupying the heights north of the town with the vanguard troops, they attacked the troops covering the enemy flanks. While the Allies were crossing the river, the French troops turned round to face them. Marlborough placed the right wing under Eugene and personally commanded the centre which was at a great disadvantage, while the rest of the army deployed in depth to the left; as the left flank spread out, the battle flared up along the front. The Anglo-Dutch-Austrian operation of crossing the river in stages, against an equal number of enemy forces was considered to be hazardous by the military of the time.

The rhythm of the battle and the changes imposed by the Allied tactics

prevented the French from being properly deployed, and many of the soldiers were unable to get into action because they were deployed too deeply. When darkness fell, and the last of the Allied forces under the veteran commander, Overkirk, crossed the river by the Oudenaarde bridges and turned north, Prince Eugene pressed the right flank to the west: both of the Allied flanks approached until they almost met. The French Army was split in two; over 40,000 men were virtually surrounded, while the remaining 40,000 stood impotently by on the hill overlooking the battlefield. Late that night, Vendôme realized that all was lost, and ordered the retreat, leaving about 7,000 prisoners behind, including a great many senior officers.

of experience.

Emphasis is placed on the momentum of manoeuvre to increase surprise and security, obtained by the speed of intervention and the speed with which new positions are conquered.

Speed of implementation underlies the operational act, requiring the coordination of actions over a large radius and a global view of the situation, which were unknown to tactics and strategy even in comparatively recent times.

Objectives are no longer viewed as static targets but as simple benchmarks, constituent elements of a single dynamic plan, even though they still keep their importance in the more complex battlefield situation.

FREEDOM OF ACTION

The plan to which these belong cannot and must not restrict **"freedom of action"**, which is the third fundamental parameter of the military art.

Indeed, the succession of goals enhances the possibility of applying this parameter because, if they are interpreted in their modern sense, they do not condition the pursuit of the operations, being "evolutionary moments" in the battle in view of their physiognomy.

This ensures that the original plans can be altered and adapted to meet contingent situations and unforeseen and unpredictable needs as they arise from time to time.

The decision-making phase therefore becomes completely autonomous, unconstrained by rigid schemata which cannot be allowed to dominate the course of behaviour but merely serve as useful instruments.

If the contrary were to be the case, the manoeuvre would be hard to predict and would lose its effectiveness because it would give the enemy time and opportunity to take viable countermeasures.

The battle is a series of actions and reactions with predictable results, so that the might

of the material takes primacy, mortifying intuition and inventiveness, which are and remain the decisive elements of strategic/tactical supremacy.

In the final analysis, this is a mortifying and anachronistic return to the wars of the 17th and 18th centuries – the so-called "conventional" wars, so dear to the hearts of Turenne, Marlborough, Eugene of Savoy, Villars, William of Orange, etc., characterized by a prevalence of movements and counter-movements, advances and retreats, feints and counter-feints, which were costly, unproductive and slow.

Typical examples of this mentality are the battles of Blenheim and Oudenaarde, illustrated above.

ECONOMY OF FORCE

Success therefore depends on philosophy and doctrine expressed further in the **"economy of force"** principle, as a reasoned and constant quest for the maximum result with the minimum use of energy.

History and experience have shown the validity of this principle throughout the ages, and it seems to be as valid as ever today with our modern approach to warfare in which the traditional operational spaces are shrinking in size, objectives are increasing in number, and it is becoming necessary to reiterate forces in narrow time-limits.

Today, force "dispersal" has become an "active" instrument of war and the "security" of men and machines, but it has also created difficult problems of gearing forces to individual needs.

This need has been met by increasing the speed of movement, so that measures can be taken sufficiently rapidly to attain preestablished goals without using excessive energy.

By doing this, one preserves the possibility of taking further action and constantly having available enough men and materials to concentrate forces on the desired points.

In modern warfare, the concept, which is valid in both tactical and strategic terms, has to be translated into a capacity to act over a large radius with the same effectiveness in every direction, if it is to be rationally applied.

This greatly enhances the chances of success, compared with the chances that used to exist, when the "natural" slowness of the manoeuvre often made it necessary to apply the principle of economy of force in a piecemeal manner, reducing the validity of the action in certain "critical" sectors.

If this criterion is accurately implemented, vulnerability is reduced, provided that one's appraisal of the enemy force size is reliable.

It is particularly difficult to obtain sufficiently reliable intelligence on this today, despite the high degree of sophistication of the facilities at our disposal and our more accurate knowledge of potential enemies obtained in peace time.

The reason for this lies in that feature that is shared by all modern armies: the heightened speed which makes it possible to concentrate forces rapidly and disperse them equally rapidly.

In this context, the whole concept of "economy" – which is pure military technique – cannot be separated from the concept of "intuition", which is a gift of the commander, and almost an "art".

While, in previous wars, the former was able to play a preponderant role, in modern warfare both components have the same value because technique and intuition are closely integrated into an extremely mutable environment, which is subordinate to increasingly unpredictable constraints.

The simultaneous, appropriate application of "concentration of force" is more vital today than ever before, because it is the only principle that can harmonize the rational "economy of force" and the need not to irremediably jeopardize "freedom of action", under the common

auspices of "will/initiative".

These four principles require special forms of implementation in the contemporary war context, in the light of the constant threat of nuclear weapons.

One may realistically posit that nuclear weapons only serve as a deterrent, because apart from any moral, social or political considerations, their use would not bring any immediate benefits to the warring party who uses it, because of the obvious inability to exploit his success and a great many other negative considerations which are too well-known to need recalling here.

If, God forbid, the present equilibria were to be broken, the whole doctrinal panorama would break up, but this would not invalidate the four parameters mentioned above. In this case, they would certainly be applied in different ways because of their intrinsic flexibility, and their enormous capacity to adapt to the most varied situations.

But apart from the frightening hypotheses that we must reasonably relegate to the far reaches of science fiction, we must examine the conditions which – in the presence of nuclear weapons for purely deterrent purposes – arise as the doctrine develops.

First of all, we have to consider that the atomic threat – even though one hopes that it will ever merely remain a threat – makes it necessary to take adequate precautions, and necessarily influences the whole context of war.

First, the enormously enhanced possibilities of destruction have already changed the generic concept of "security" into the specific concept of "survival". This is a factor which has a far-reaching effect on the use of men, weapons and materials, on the way actions are implemented, and on procedures, opening up new avenues and creating huge problems.

Second, because of the direct and indirect effects of weapons whose destructive capacity cannot always be calculated and

whose effects cannot be accurately predicted, nuclear weapons can no longer be viewed as a support to manoeuvre, like artillery or air support. They are of the essence, the focal point, and everything else in the conflict hinges around them.

The conceptual and implementational phases take second place in planning, but this does not mean that they are heavily constrained. Indeed, the inevitable "rigidity" of the action is partially offset by the manoeuvrability and mobility of the weaponry, leaving almost total free-

dom to choose the method and the procedures.

But there are constraints which have to be considered in the organization and preparation of war, and these mainly have to do with space, time, vehicles and material.

I have already hinted at the considerable shrinkage of space, which makes it necessary to give a greater dimension to the individual traditional "zones" in the framework of battle. We should now make it clear that the essential parameters of this innovation can be identified in a



In 1965, Israel launched a lightning attack against Egypt, converging all its armoured columns on the Suez Canal. This attack confirmed the decisive importance of tanks on the battlefield.

The Israeli Army was composed of reservists, with a small number of

recruits undergoing training, and had been organized for rapid mobilization. The total application of the principle of *will/initiative* underlay the Israeli success with an extremely flexible operational plan based on surprise and initiative.

different concept of "terrain" and in a greater "dispersal".

The first centres around the way in which the "canon" of holding fast to positions, come what may, is being transformed into the idea of using positions dynamically and temporarily even though they may be intrinsically strong.

The second makes manoeuvre effective because of the increased breadth of points of intervention, which enhances the security of the personnel and increases their chances of survival.

But as the spaces increase, the operational speed in general terms must be appropriately stepped up, which means increasing the possibilities of movement by having appropriate vehicles and implementing tactical solutions based on rapid intervention and flexible weaponry.

One effective example of the kind of support needed here is combining a mechanized and an airborne unit in which the helicopter's role is increasingly important in operational terms, without prejudice to its logistical use.

Once again the *vexata quaestio* arises about whether or not to emphasize the speed of the tank at the expense of its armour and survival capability.

It is a dilemma that has split the experts, but recent experiences and foreseeable needs will certainly help to solve it.

Also looming on the horizon is the enormous problem of communications, which is making increasing use of data processing and telematics as the main source of intelligence on the situation, and of ensuring constant control over the battlefield conditions.

The instruments and functions of telecommunications are undergoing a far-reaching process of renewal in view – *inter alia* – of their fundamental duty to support the artillery which can only fully exploit their greater firing distance and their missiles if they work very closely with it.

"Time" is a parameter that takes on particular relevance here, both as a result of the enlargement of the operational space and the speed of movement, and because of the need for rapid and functional communications.

Increased speed of action and movement makes it necessary to reconsider the evaluation of implementation times that are tending to shrink, but which require far greater organization and preparation, and make the availability of highly sophisticated material preeminent.

"Promptness" of intervention can only be ensured using highly reliable, high performance land vehicles and aircraft.

"Speed" of intervention cannot be considered without speed of communications, particularly of intelligence. Even a slight delay in supplying intelligence can jeopardize success, however objectively favourable the conditions might be. Past experience has shown this to be true, and today it has taken on vital relevance with the general recourse to electronics that is giving the armies of countries which are not highly technologically developed the appearance of being extremely modern, and endowing them with a considerably high operational potential.

Material therefore no longer has a purely "passive" function, but is tending to become an active element in combat, particularly when one considers the way that instruments reminiscent of science fiction have acquired the capacity to react automatically, so that on the battlefield they can operate much faster than human reflexes and with an "intelligence" that often leaves one amazed.

The real problem is therefore how to dominate these

marvels of human genius to prevent human intelligence from becoming totally subservient to the greater or lesser efficiency of machines.

Modern warfare runs the risk of being at the mercy of the automatic capacities of robots whose features lie on the bounds of human imagination. Yet they should only be viewed as manifestations of the supremacy of the human mind, and as such, be used to ensure the increasingly incisive application of the classical principles of the military art which the technological civilization cannot contaminate because they are the authentic pillars of the "philosophy" of warfare, valid in every age and in every latitude.

A final word, *en passant*, on the principles that I have been dealing with and on the possibility of identifying the true Commander with the true manager.

Much – often too much, unfortunately – is being written about this today.

Will/initiative, concentration of effort, freedom of action, and economy of force dominate the conceptual and organizational scenario with which the Commander has to deal. I have mentioned some of the whys and wherefores above.

But are not these same principles – being perennial and immutably valid – the very same principles that underpin any kind of managerial activity in any other field?

If so, why go on debating the need for a "managerial" training for Commanders, instead of acknowledging that a Commander worthy of his function already possesses the qualities and the physiognomy of the true Manager, precisely thanks to his specific qualities and continuing training?

RANDOM THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARY ART IN MODERN WARFARE



THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA IN THE LAST CENTURY



THE UNITED STATES

We begin our historical survey starting from 1878, i.e. two years after the centennial of the US Declaration of Independence, which was celebrated in Philadelphia with an international exhibition, where foreigners and Americans alike could admire the

progress made by the country.

And surely the United States, in one hundred years of history, had advanced with gigantic steps. Born as the country of pioneers and small-town farmers, it had become a major political and economic organism. It had reached both oceans; it had eliminated the French influence along the Mississippi, the Spanish in-

fluence along the Gulf of Mexico and in California; it had overcome nature's obstacles, and created an agricultural South and an industrial and capitalist East, which, with the thickening of the ways of communication (canals, roads, railways) poured its products into the West, which was then the land of adventure, the "frontier" country, as its contemporaries called it.



1863, Battle of Gettysburg. This battle, in which the Confederates led by General Lee were badly defeated, was a turning point in the War of Secession, and marked the birth of the modern United States.



May 1895.

A contingent of the United States Army lands at Guantanamo, on Cuba's southern coast. The conquest of the last remnants of the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean and in the Philippines determined the final establishment of the United States as a great world power.

in the Chinese question, together with Great Britain, in order to impose the "open door" principle in China, against a more or less concealed partition of that great empire.

In 1899 it took an active part in the creation of the International Court of The Hague, already supporting the principle of arbitration in the international questions.

A few years later the US supported Venezuela in an economic controversy against some European countries; this rôle of champion earned the US a great ascendancy in Central and South America. But the liking diminished some time later, as a consequence of the policy concerning Columbia in the Panama question.

The lease of this strip of land and the subsequent construction of the Canal are events of world importance and a credit to the US. But the rash method followed to obtain the concession partially obscured this merit.

After the creation of new outlets, the intensification of communications, and after replacing the irrational exploitation of natural resources with a conservation policy, a feeling of optimism seemed to spread in the air.

President Wilson, in his address to the people, following his election in 1912, reminded America of its mission of liberty and justice. Two years later, the outbreak of WWI would set the US on a new course.

The first years were marked by neutrality. Public opinion was against war: the Monroe Doctrine had affirmed that Europe would be left alone if it did not disturb America.

The war was having great repercussions in the economic field.

Nevertheless the US was entering a new phase: in 1890, the official report about the census announced that "the entire colonization area had been occupied". The frontier had ceased to exist! The US historians agree on the great importance of the end of the frontier. The adventure was over.

Now it was no more a question of conquering and exploiting a continent, it was a matter of consolidating and governing a large population with different interests, tackling the economic and social problems created by the advent of the machine, facing the conflict between capital and labour, a conflict exacerbated by the huge growth of the population, and the immigration, from eastern and southern Europe, of great masses of men: a cheap labour force, less demanding than the American

workers.

From this derived the need for a world market and, as a consequence, a world policy.

The action in Cuba in 1895 was the first step. The island gained its freedom, but under the political and economic control of the US, which, against payment of a compensation to Spain, obtained possession of Puerto Rico and the Philippines. A Philippine armed insurrection was repressed a little later.

Sometimes the US acted with at least a partial disregard for the principles of its Constitution, which attributed "full validity to a government only when it was freely accepted by the governed": but the status of world power – now within reach – demanded a little "forcing".

The year after the peace of Paris (1898), the US intervened



The orders from Europe followed one another, in an endless increase. Then the violations against neutrality started: Germany commenced a submarine war against commerce; the "Lusitania" was sunk. The attempt to find an accord, accepted at first, was rejected, and this meant war.

The bill for compulsory military service was approved and the country's entire industrial structure was geared to serve the war goals. It was an enormous effort, but the US entry, with new and large resources and in a by then-stabilized war, brought about the victory of the nations allied with the US.

The country's wealth was increased by the war. After all debts were paid, the US credits in Europe amounted to enormous sums. When the peace confer-

*July 1918.
U.S. counterattack at Saint Pierre Aigle.
In the last year of WWI the United States,
with 1 million troops sent to the frontline,
contributed decisively to the defeat of the
Central Empires.*

ence was convened in Paris, the US was at the apex of its power. But Wilson had an inadequate notion of the complexity of the age-old European political structure.

He hoped to conclude a peace that could remedy the old abuses and give mankind an organization capable of starting an area of universal cooperation. Unwittingly he provoked the opposite effects, by rekindling, with his doctrine of self-determination, the fire of nationalism.

His 14 points were rejected. The US did not join the League

of Nations, because the American Senate refused to ratify the treaties.

The US had enough of Europe: but its isolationism could only be a relative one. Too many problems were involving the US in the Old Continent's vicissitudes: the reactivation of international trade, the currencies' stabilization, the settlement of reparations and debts among the Allies.

The crisis that was to shake the postwar world economy had its first major manifestation in 1929, with the collapse of the New York Exchange.

In 1933, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected President for the first time. Faithful to the principles of his country's isolationist neutralism, he considered with displeasure both the weakening of the democratic Powers



on the international plane and the Japanese expansion in the East.

At the outbreak of WWII, convinced of the close connection between Britain's fate and the freedom of the world, Roosevelt tried to help Great Britain by sending war materials. He advocated the nation's rearmament, obtained the introduction of compulsory military service and – with the "Lend — Lease Act" – allowed the government to help the Allies with war supplies.

The Pearl Harbour events led to the conflict, with the intervention of the United States, once again decisive, mostly because of the employment of a gigantic industrial potential, pushed to its maximum output. The declaration of the United Nations, signatories of the Atlantic Charter, on January 1, 1942 set the foundations of the policy in defence of freedom and democracy – which the US continued to follow after the war.

The conflict's positive outcome had put the US in a condition of moral supremacy vis-à-vis the other Allies, which acknowledged its fundamental contribution to the final success and respected its military superiority due to the possession of both the nuclear weapon and the vehicles to deliver it.

The unbalance of the global power between the US, the friendly nations and the adversary was due, moreover, to the enormous



US economic resources and to a different civil and social condition of the American people at the end of the war.

In fact, the loss of human lives suffered by the US was, in proportion, not as high as that suffered by the other countries involved in the conflict, with less heavy psychological repercussions on the people. On the other hand, the demographic expansion had amply filled the numerical voids, although the mourning and suffering could not be cancelled easily.

The postwar recovery was also helped by the fact that the conflict had not even grazed the US territory, which had remained undamaged and therefore in a position to express entirely its willingness to promote its development with renewed and intact energies.

It can thus be explained the exceptional evolution of the American postwar economic expansionism, which found a fertile ground in the necessities of the other countries, which had become huge inlets, absorbing industrial products and food resources.

These privileged conditions in the relations with the exterior had helped a global internal growth with a consequent increase in salaries and improvement of living standards.

Nevertheless, this expansionist policy did not have only economic motivations, for it aimed at stabilizing and consolidating the initial postwar supremacy of the United States, making it the hinge of an organic and permanent "system" in international relations.

It was actually a goal, a flexi-

Facing page, from top.

January 18, 1919. Paris, Salle de l'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay. The opening of the Peace Conference. The attitude of President Wilson, who proposed his famous 14 points, was crucial for the new European political order.

Second World War.

A poster for the recruitment of volunteers for the U.S. Army Air Force. The United States, which had to tackle serious economic problems in the '20s and '30s, entered in practice the war only in 1942, after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.

Below.

December 1944.

U.S. reconquest of the Philippines. During WWII the U.S. – besides helping the Soviet Union and Great Britain with the supply of materials – fought in North Africa, Italy, the Western front and the Pacific.



ble orientation, having no rigid schemes or hidden intentions, capable of adapting to the contingencies, in the light of a pragmatism concretely applied, both on the political plane and in the social context.

Harry Truman expressed it in his domestic "Fair Deal", and in the famous "Four Points" in international policy, with which he set the foundations of a method that up to now has not been disproved.

The "Truman Doctrine" was indeed the codification of the principle of international assistance, envisaged in forms that were poles apart from the Communist conception.

The "philosophy" of aid given not only to the countries threatened from the outside, but also to those imperiled by social disorder, was the fulcrum of the US international policy. This "philosophy" is valid to this day, with some expected transformations and with the appropriate adjustments suggested by the evolution of the times.

The "Marshall Plan" concretely carried out the provisions of this declaration of intents, bringing a sensible relief to the traumatized economies of the Western nations.



Facing page, from top.

August 9, 1945.

The nuclear explosion at Nagasaki. The conflict with Japan ended after the use of the two nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The event marked the beginning of the nuclear era.

November 1950, Korean War.

Armoured forces near the Chinese border.

In the cold war era, the invasion of Korea was a destabilizing factor involving, on one side, the U.S. and its allies, and on the other the People's Republic of China.

Below.

Vietnam War.

Evacuation of a wounded soldier. The U.S. had been involved in the war in Indochina since 1954, when, after the French withdrawal, it assumed the rôle of adviser to the South Vietnamese armed forces.

In compliance with President Eisenhower's will, the aid policy was stepped up considerably. The Soviet Union reacted by cooling its relationship with the United States, accused of having the intention to penetrate the economic-political ganglions of the "friendly countries".

The American proposal of nuclear disarmament, at the Geneva Conference (1955), did not find therefore a favourable atmosphere; on the contrary, it deepened the split between the two superpowers, which started a relentless race for the conquest of space, as an expression of scientific, industrial and technological supremacy.

The election of President John F. Kennedy, a catholic Democrat, opened the way to

forms of détente and tolerance in the relations with the Soviet Union. After the President's tragic death — he was murdered in Dallas on November 22, 1963 — his successor, Lyndon Johnson, continued to follow his political line, succeeded in smoothing away some internal attritions (for instance, the never settled racial tensions), and attempted very actively to soothe the external contrasts.

But the outbreak of hostilities in Vietnam and the "necessity" of the American intervention thwarted all intentions — however sincere — to help make the international relations more serene.

The Vietnamese adventure was a shock for the United States: the internal contrasts among factions became sharper, so much so that the new President, Richard Nixon — elected 1968 — felt the need to proclaim his aspiration to bring the American people together again. In accordance with this essential goal, he implemented a number of political actions intended to improve the relations with the Soviet Union, planning — among other things — a progressive reduction of the American presence in Vietnam.

The US international image came out improved and its prestige increased enormously when the astronauts of Apollo 11 conquered the moon. The apex of this peaceful "escalation" was reached in 1972, when Richard Nixon went to China and to the Sovietic Union itself.

But these events do not belong to history, because they are part of the chronicle, a report of the life we have lived. We have taken part in it — more or less directly — owing to the impossibility to isolate the internal events of each nation from the entanglement of the closer and closer international connections, which have been consolidating in the last decade. Thus, we witnessed gradual and reciprocal overtures between the United States and the Chinese world, although, as regards foreign policy, they both remained on their respective positions, very difficult to reconcile, in the light to principles that nei-



ther side, for dogmatic or historical reasons, could renounce.

The seed sown by Nixon proposes, even after the "traumatic" downfall of the President, a new line of action by the United States, both in its relations with the friendly countries and in the up—and—down tensions with the Soviet Union.

The American public opinion ceases to consider the Chinese planet as an impregnable stronghold of Communism, a stronghold even more impenetrable — on the dogmatic plane — than Russia itself.

A thin fissure is gradually opened, covertly at first, and then more and more openly, in the relations between the two Communist universes, also due to the new trend of the US foreign policy.

This policy is mainly hinged on commercial penetration, made possible by the particularly good conditions offered to the Chinese world, troubled by problems of incalculable dimensions and constrained by its efforts to overcome the technological and industrial gap, vis-à-vis the more advanced Eastern and Western nations.

The US economic escalation is simultaneously a goal and a medium, but, above all, is an assertion of power that commands



respect and indirectly encourages the tacit dissent with the Soviet Union of countries originally close to it.

The image of the US is strengthened by the possession of a large missile arsenal, characterized by its partition in quotas deployed in the Allied nations, and therefore more awesome.

The attempt to keep the necessary nuclear balance unchanged is an aspect of the search for increasingly effective forms of détente.

Ford's and Carter's policies are deeply permeated by this, although with sensible differences in method and general lines.

The Third World problem becomes meanwhile more and more pressing. Its reality cannot

be considered a secondary presence in the multifaceted system of delicate international equilibria.

The United States, faithful to the "Truman Doctrine" — updated and made more elastic in order to adapt it to the new situation — prepares a massive plan of interventions, in the "traditional" forms or through favourable commercial, social or economic ties.

Above.
Vietnam War.
"Tarbe" CH-54 Sikorsky Helicopter
hauling a truck.

Below.
Vietnam War.
A U.S. monitor on a South Vietnamese
waterway.



The main goal is to create a large bloc of pro-West emerging countries, in order to contrast Soviet penetration, especially in Africa.

The US favours the growth of autonomous democratic systems, in contrast with the Soviet concept of creating the conditions for increasing the number of Moscow's "satellites".

As a consequence, the US widens the range of its policy as a democratic bulwark against forms of open or disguised subjugation, not admissible by the principles of a free society. Principles deep-rooted in the American people since the beginning of their history.

The United States finds it more difficult to achieve, every time and according to circumstances, the desired international balance owing to the widening of its interests and the increase of the "critical points" in the world scene.

From the generic initial post-war tension with the Soviet Union to the Cuba problem, from the Vietnam intervention to the opening of the Israeli-Egyptian crisis, from the destabilization of the Middle East balance to the Afghan "case", from the complex Lebanese problems to the explosive intertwining of contrasts among the African countries, the "escalation" of the American engagement has assumed ever increasing dimensions, which do not allow the US to avoid a direct involvement. The result is a unitary but multidirectional policy, which must be adapted to the various contingencies and occasions, difficult to carry out owing to the disturbances that could rise at local level and endanger the entire context of tenuous and precarious relations with the Communist world.

This new aspect of the American position requires a different attitude of the US towards its Allies on the plane of the common defensive strategy: a request for a greater contribution of forces and an increased responsibility of each nation, resulting in a shrinking of Washington's protective umbrella.

The stationing of sophisticated missile systems in some European countries is part of this picture and intends both to keep at a constant reasonable level the imbalance of forces vis-à-vis the Soviet Union's (parity being realistically illusory, given the impossibility to know the real size of Moscow's arsenals) and to give the countries concerned a potential deterrent enabling them to take on the desired larger tasks, within the indispensable limits to decisional autonomy as regards the employment of nuclear warheads.

Meanwhile the United States continues the space competition with the Soviet Union obtaining a significant success – for its possible strategic employment – with the construction of the "Shuttle", a spaceship that can land like an airplane and be employed several times. By this "exploit" the United States undoubtedly scores a point, which also translates into technological and industrial prestige.

It is not by chance that, since the space shuttle's first launch, the American economic policy has achieved a number of significant results, expressed by the constant rise of the dollar in the world market. The effects of this favourable phase of the American currency are quite noticeable in the general

Vietnam War.

An "Iroquois" helicopter and a surveillance-boat type PBR patrolling the Mekong delta.

trends of the American policy in terms of the other currencies' dependence, deeper penetration in the internal markets of the various nations, growth of the American economic-industrial presence in the Third World, and influence on other currencies.

The possible heavy effects of this expansion are mitigated by the truly democratic system in which they take place, for they are the result of openly and fairly competing economic autonomies, which are possible only in a regime of real moral and civil freedom.

RUSSIA

The year 1878 started with a diplomatic failure for Russia. Having won the war against Turkey on the battlefield, it saw the St. Stephen Treaty annulled by the Congress of Berlin, where the English policy, traditionally anti-Russian in Europe and Asia, succeeded in isolating Russia and undermining its prestige in the Balkans. The cession of Bosnia and



Herzegovina to Austria further worsened its relations with the latter.

A few years later (1881) the tragic death of Alexander II – the reformer monarch who had abolished serfdom and was preparing to give Russia its constitution – led to the succession of the conservative and reactionary Czar Alexander III.

The new Czar's wish to confront the liberal and subversive movements resulted in a reconciliation with the Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns, who were also anxious to keep the existing politico-social order.

But the Russian Pan-Slavism could not get along well with Aus-

tria's imperialism in the Balkans, and the two empires confronted each other again in the Bulgarian question.

Thanks to Germany's intervention there was no war, but Russia's foreign policy changed its course and became aligned with France's. In the following decade (1895–1905) Russia's policy gravitated towards the Far East. There it took advantage of China's confusion after the defeat suffered from Japan. The layout of the Trans-Siberian Railroad was changed, in order to reach Manchuria, and the establishment of a Russian–Chinese bank was the first step towards economic expansion. China tolerated: but

Russia's real target was the Japanese imperialism, whose interests in Manchuria and Korea clashed with its own.

An agreement for the delimitation of the zones of influence in these sectors was discussed several times, but never reached. The war that followed, with its unexpected outcome, was a surprise to the entire world and a heavy blow to Russia's imperialism, defeated on land and sea.

Part of Sakhalin, Port Arthur and Manchuria were lost. There were deep repercussions on Russia's foreign policy. Disappointed in its aims in the Far East, it turned again to Europe and,



September 11, 1877
Russo-Turkish War, Battle of Plevna
On April 24, 1877, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The pretext was the liberation of the Balkan peoples; the real reasons was Constantinople. Russia won on the battlefields, but was defeated by diplomacy.

thanks to french support, succeeded in a rapprochement to England. Nevertheless, other serious problems undermined czarist Russia from the inside. The peasants, despite the abolition of serfdom, had not achieved full emancipation and were still subject to the numerous bonds of rural communities, which they endured very much against their will.

The workers, whose number has greatly increased following the country's rapid industrialization, lived in wretched conditions and their salaries were insufficient.

The discontent was kindled by the "Intelligentsia", a movement of intellectuals, which had

its roots in the proletariat and was supported by the large Jewish component, disliked by the aristocratic and traditionalist classes. Peasants and workers, led by intellectuals and Jews formed therefore a very dangerous front against the government.

Nicholas II – the new Czar – was unfit to confront such a serious situation. Though he was not the inept and bloodthirsty brute that the Bolshevik press made him to be, he was not the open-minded man that the times required. Weakened internally by party fights and politically by the yearnings for autonomy of alien groups (the Ukrainians were particularly dangerous), Russia

entered the first world war, consistently with its Slavophile and anti-Hapsburg policy, but in a moment when it needed a pause for solving its numerous internal problems. After a period of harmony and optimism, the early victories were paid with heavy defeats, part of the Empire's territory was invaded by the enemy, the troops were demoralized by rumours of treason in the high circles and in the Court itself, and the abyss between the Czar and his nation became even deeper.

With the Czar's abdication and Grand Duke Michael's renunciation, the three-century old Romanov dynasty ended.

Thus the Russian Republic





began its life but the power was disputed by a provisional government and by the Soviets of Saint Petersburg. The provisional government's weakness opened the way to the Soviets, which took power with the revolutionary coup of October 1917.

The Soviets' first act after taking power was the end of the war, which they obtained on hard conditions: but the Soviet leaders wanted to save the revolution. Nevertheless they were engaged in a hard fight for about two more years. The former allied armies, having vainly attempted to rebuild an Eastern front, supported with a series of badly concerted actions the efforts of the White anti-Bolshevik armies, which were also badly organized and lack-

ing especially in the logistic services. Once the White armies were defeated, the Soviets had no further obstacles.

The occupying foreign troops were withdrawn. With the independence of the Baltic states and Poland, the Western Allies created a "sanitary cordon" between Russia and the rest of Europe.

A Russian attack against Poland, defeated by the Polish heroism, was followed by the Peace of Riga (March 18, 1921).

The new government immediately nationalized banks, country estates and industries. With the Constitution of 1922, a formal federal organization was created with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In reality the power remained in the hands of Russia

Russo-Japanese War, Liao-tung Campaign.

Russian cavalry attacking a Japanese camp. In 1904, the Russian infiltrations into Manchuria and Korea prompted the Japanese government to react. The Russian defeat caused tragic revolts inside the country.

proper, and particularly of the Communist Party. Admittedly, Lenin supported the theory of "dictatorship of the proletariat", but in fact, he had only given Russia a new autocracy, in full keeping with the teaching and traditions of the entire Russian history.

Another of Lenin's dreams was a world revolution, the first step of which was the Russian revolt; on this, he and Trotsky the internationalist had a perfect identity of views.

The year 1924 is important in Russian history. The European nations, one by one officially recognize the new government; within the country, Lenin's death gives rise to a fight between Trotsky and Stalin, ending with the victory of the latter. Trotsky, who had been the tribune of the revolution and the hero of the Red armies, is sent into exile (he will be murdered in Mexico in 1940).

Stalin was a figure quite different from Lenin. A pragmatist, more given to action than thought, he replaced the internationalist idea with that of "Socialism only in one country", going back to the nationalist and imperialist trends. With a series of trials – and without scruples – has proceeded to eliminate the other Socialist currents and the enemies of his dictatorship, and devoted himself to the industrialization of the Soviet Union through the five-year plans, and to the organization of socialized agriculture, allowing just a minimum of individual land property. In 1936 he made changes in the government structure, giving a new constitution.

Meanwhile the Soviet Union was also regaining its place in world foreign policy, still in keeping with its nationalist and imperialist traditions.

The threat of Hitler's expansionism reapproached the Soviet Union to the Western democracies. In 1934 it joined the League of Nations, but new opportunistic considerations pushed it again towards Germany, just as Franco-Anglo-Soviet negotiations for an anti-German pact were in progress. With German help, the Soviet Union was able to recover the Baltic countries and to occupy part of Poland. Having obtained the coveted advantages, the Soviet Union then did its best to cut down the German power, fighting, from 1941, side by side with the Western democracies.

The Allies' success in the second world conflict conferred more weight to the Soviet policy within the framework of the victorious countries' relations and, as a consequence, in the world context.

Already in 1944, meeting

Churchill in Moscow, Stalin could claim, together with the English leader, the right to programme the division of Europe in two zones of influence: an Anglo-American zone and a Soviet one. The plan was actually carried out the following year at the Conferences of Yalta and Potsdam.

Furthermore, the progressive expansion of Communism in the Western countries had increased the Soviet prestige to the point that, within the U.N., the Russian policy acquired a prominent rôle, equal to that of the major Western powers.

Inevitable contrasts resulted from this, giving often rise to harsh disputes, which Moscow used to keep the tension high and to insinuate in the mind of its adversaries the picture of a disastrous break-off and of an open conflict.

Thus the Soviet Union started its "cold war", with a consummate technique, which expressed itself in the ability to take advantage of every opportunity, turning to its own advantage the counterparts' apparent yieldings, which were due to a sense of responsibility, to caution and to a longing for peace.

The Cominform was therefore created, in opposition to the Marshall Plan. The Jugoslavian regime was condemned, under the

accusation of nationalist deviationism, with the intention of giving a further signal of inflexibility to the West, towards which Tito had made some modest openings. The breaking point was reached, perhaps against the will of the Soviet Union itself, with the open confrontation in the context of the "Korean question".

Stalin's death, in 1953, marked the transition to a policy more favourable to détente, pursued by the new leader, Malenkov, whose guidelines, both on the international and on the internal plane, were followed also by his successor, Bulganin.

The Soviet Union was progressively proceeding towards a clear condemnation of Stalinism, silent at first, then creeping, and finally openly expressed at the 20th Party Congress (February 1956) by First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev.

Khrushchev, who was later made Head of the Government, widened the Soviet opening to a dialogue with the Western bloc, also as a result of the increased

Moscow 1918.

A Bolshevik demonstration. The collapse of Czarist Russia in 1917, and the subsequent disengagement from the World Conflict, caused a long period of civil war. At the end, the Bolshevik forces prevailed.



Soviet prestige, due to the launch of the first two "Sputniks" and to Yuri Gagarin's space accomplishment.

On the contrary, the relations with China changed for the worse, due to the Soviet Union's clear unwillingness to cooperate in the nuclear field.

The American blockade against Cuba, in October 1962, started again a very serious crisis; its reflections were in part extenuated only the following year, when the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain signed in Moscow a treaty for the interdiction of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere.

Khrushchev's sudden resignation in 1964 and the election of Kosygin as Prime Minister did not substantially alter the Soviet policy, by then stabilized on post-Stalin criteria, which had been consolidating with time and had given quite satisfactory results, allowing the Soviet Union to acquire international and less prejudiced consideration from its interlocutors. This image, laboriously built with declarations and acts of goodwill, was obscured by tragic events, such as the interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, which destroyed at a blow the credibility of "Communism with a human face".

Russia was suddenly back to a form of strict dogmatism, smacking of neo-Stalinism, which did not permit free national interpretations of the communist canons in the countries of the Warsaw Pact, and obliged them to follow the Soviet model.

The reaction of the Western bloc and of the greatest part of world public opinion was an immediate and severe condemnation of the Russian military intervention.

The adoption of this position gave also rise to a vast intellectual movement regarding the interpretation of the Marxist canons. This movement led — owing also to contrasting practical interests — to heated polemics with Maoist China, which had declared itself the true guardian of Communist orthodoxy.



Since then, the split with the People's Republic of China has never healed so that, after the seventies, it is improper to speak of a "Marxist bloc", when meaning the Soviet Union and China together.

The chronicle of the last decade has recorded a continuous alternation of deep tensions and periods of détente, sometimes real but instrumental, more often only apparent.

The fact is that we have witnessed a progressive increase of the Soviet military expenses, which have resulted in arm sup-

plies to the satellite countries and in the stationing of missile bases in the areas of greater strategic importance.

The numerous meetings between Soviets and Americans on the limitation and reduction of arsenals have clearly shown the Soviet intention to use its nuclear power as a pressure tool to induce the interlocutor to yield, more in the political field than in the military one.

Brezhnev's contradictory attitude was an evident proof of this. He, inspired by a political opportunism chosen as a method



less more apparent in its relations with the US rather than with China, whose "threat" has a "sui generis" character, China being a Communist country.

As a matter of fact, Chinese Marxism, after the transformation of the Maoist dictates, has been – and is today more than ever – an irritating thorn for the Soviet world.

Starting in 1969, when actual military border clashes occurred along the Ussuri river, Russia has been constantly worried about a possible deterioration of the situation.

The exchange of visits of the various "Premiers" and the trade agreements stipulated by Kosygin have been of no avail.

In the last fifteen years, all Soviet efforts have therefore been in two precise directions: one aimed at contrasting the US economic and political expansionism, the other trying to find ways for controlling the effects of the Chinese "growth" in all senses.

This is the true dimension in which the Soviet Union moves today, outside the propagandistic ideological disputes, marked by instrumental incidents and opportunities which are not dropped without adopting positions aimed at concealing the true underlying motivations.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION TODAY

The precarious balance and the essential differences existing between the United States and the Soviet Union can be better seen in the light of the present orientation of principles and methods of the two countries.

The US is increasing its international "presence" also through the dollar's power, which very often has proven uncontrollable, as well as through the increasing development of the emerging technologies, at times reaching science fiction levels.

The massive American penetration inside the vital ganglions of the friendly countries' industry and trade further cements, also from the political point of view, the already close bonds of the Western world.

May 2, 1945.

Red Army troops celebrate the fall of Berlin. The collapse of Nazi Germany and its division into occupation zones mark the beginning of Stalin's expansionist policy and the confrontation between the two blocs.

of behaviour and confrontation, took sometimes positions that were disconcerting for the way in which he denied with facts what he had repeatedly declared in words.

On the other hand, this form of apparent inconsistency has been an aspect of the Soviet political "game" after the seventies, for, in this way, the strings of dialogue can be kept in permanent tension and the opposite side is not allowed to make any logical forecast.

This feature of the Soviet international policy is neverthe-

The Soviet Union opposes to this factor the build-up of arsenals in the Satellite countries and a series of trade agreements within the bloc, often in openly coercive terms. The "canon" of mutual technological cooperation is included in this web of economic relations with the Warsaw Pact countries, in order to recover the ground lost in this specific sector, vis-à-vis the United States.

The competition in this field, besides its beneficial influence at the scientific level, because it realizes the Hegelian principle of synthesis as an achievement of mankind, it produces a series of incisive political reflections, which are summed up in the need for an ever increasing acquisition of "spaces".

The consequence is a permanent expansionist tension of the two superpowers, realized with different systems but clearly projected towards technological and commercial achievements, besides the strictly political goals.

In this community of interests, the Soviet and American aims are very often focused on the same targets, sometimes enticing also for their strategic importance and for their function as factors promoting the increase of their international "weight".

The "conquest" of the emerging countries is the revealing expression of it, in addition to the huge Middle East problems which are of the utmost importance, owing to the multiform interests that gravitate towards the zone. The "Chinese question", with its still undefined aspects, which have nevertheless already had their incisive effects on Soviet and American policymaking, enters also in this picture.

On one side the attritions with this vexing neighbour are increasingly worrisome for the Kremlin, which is trying to ease the inevitable tensions through a number of cautious diplomatic actions and commercial treaties at moderately favourable conditions.

On the other side, the United State is improving its progressive approaching manoeuvre towards the Chinese macrocosm, the ap-

proach that Nixon had started, helped also by the very good relations that some friendly countries have been capable to establish with the Peking government.

But, besides the abovementioned "battlegrounds", there is an abysmal difference between the two superpowers in the method of considering the political confrontation.

A "general theory" can even be derived from it, and we can sum up its main lines.

The Soviet Union is conducting a form of "vindication" penetration, which does not omit means and occasions to make its systematic protest appear as an

answer to alleged offences to its rights.

This attitude translates into a technique of hinted threat, never openly declared, but constantly appearing on the surface.

With such an expedient, carried out also with unquestioned diplomatic skill, the desired tension is constantly kept alive, hoping for weaknesses and consequent, cleverly disguised, "impositions", especially in the economic and commercial fields.

The United States, on the contrary, adopts a system that introduces its political and technological "produce" in the friendly countries, through persuasive "dialogue" and free propos-





Above.

Submarine-launched SS-NX-21 cruise missile, with nuclear warhead. Since Khrushchev time, the Soviet leaders have strongly supported the development of a missile component with intercontinental capability.

Above right.

Launch of the U.S. "Space Shuttle". This vehicle can convey any kind of load to space, and return to Earth by its own means.



als, though employing, as the only form of pressure, the power of the dollar and the related ability to penetrate the industrial and commercial mechanism of the individual nations.

It is an expression of democracy, in the widest meaning of the world, matched by transparency of political and decisional behaviour.

On this ground the two Powers certainly find reasons for fundamental differences over the conceptual structure of the ethics of government.


The United States bases its credibility and its persuasive power on open information, without mental reservations, as an ele-

ment of clearness and honesty before the American citizens as well as before the allied countries.

The guidelines of the American policy are clearly expressed and have systematic corroboration in the concrete reality of the international relations.

There have never been sensational refutations in this regard, even when delicate situations – almost reaching the breaking point – could have perhaps justified convenient deviations.

The Soviet Union has instead chosen, as main instrument of its political action, the skillfully manipulated information, both for supporting its internal power with



incisive social reflections and, at the same time, as a means of pressure on the international plane.

This method stems from precise plans for reaching those goals deemed indispensable for Soviet prestige.

Nevertheless the lack of transparency sometimes proves ineffective, as shown by some difficulties recently arisen in the relations between the Soviet Union and some Communist parties of the West show. Rumania has, for many years, shown tendentially autonomous attitudes, which are added to the deep dissent creeping among the Polish people, who find, in the vast Christian component, reasons for moral and social redemption.

The Soviet Union has been forced to substantially accept the two very hot situations, limiting itself to an action of control, but there is no doubt that the tensions in the Warsaw Pact countries are

a nettlesome problem for its policy.

The Soviet Union's behaviour in international relations could be influenced by them, owing to the fact that the cautious Rumanian "opening" to the West and the effervescent Polish reality have drawn significant sympathizing declarations both in Europe and in the United States.


But the latter considers the Soviet methods of control and repression of requests – which, to all democratic consciences appear legitimate civil achievements in line with the times – irreconcilable with the general lines of its internal and international policy.

The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is thus removed to the social plane, also in the light of the enormously different living conditions of the two countries.

They are two worlds which

Artist's view of a Soviet space station. The USSR plans to send into orbit, in the early 90's, a space station of remarkable size, manned by a large crew.

THE UNITED AND RUSSIA CENTURY



Resupply of a U.S. space station by a "Space Shuttle". The modern technologies could give the United States the capability to develop new armaments, according to the so-called "star wars" doctrine.

STATES IN THE LAST

reflect two clashing ideological conceptions: the American one, which intends to privilege the protection of human rights within freedom of thought and behaviour; and the Soviet one, which considers the superior interests of the collectivity preeminent over every form of individualism and opinion.

This is actually the "philosophic" origin of the two policies, whose outcomes are unforeseeable at the moment, because their ethical presuppositions are irreconcilable.

The repeated declarations of good will on both sides are not supported and confirmed by sidestepping the snares inherent to these fundamental parameters which sometimes lead to open disputes.

One can cite as an example the reciprocal boycotts of the United States and the Soviet Union during the last two Olympic

Games; events which, since their Hellenistic origins, marked periods of tacit truce and loyal keeping of a temporary peace among warring nations.

In the light of the constant teaching of ancient, civil Greece, we hope that the universal wisdom of mankind will prevail.

Détente, wished and pursued by all peoples in the present political world situation, cannot be and must not be a myth, a chimera, but a concrete show of good will and conscious responsibility in the light of true social and civil progress, which is the assertion of the spirit in history and the construction of a better future.



NOTES ON THE STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION





THE IMPORTANCE OF OPINION

Public opinion has always been widely acknowledged as an important basis for authority: present in the life of the Greek "polis", considered by the Romans as "rumor" or "vox populi", referred to by the general term of "consensus" in the Middle Ages, it was considered also by Machiavelli, who pointed out the importance of the people's support, and thus of public opinion as a powerful force in government.

However, the role and influence of public opinion have developed and grown stronger with the rise of contemporary mass society and with the gradual process of the democratization of nations.

From Rousseau's "general will", which has led several scholars to set the emergence of modern public opinion at the time of the French Revolution, the "opinion" factor gradually grew in a country's democratic structure as a force capable of exerting an appreciable effect on State affairs, although outside the constitutional organs.

The Armed Forces in general, and the Army in particular, as the largest and most representative component of the military apparatus, have always implicitly acknowledged this importance, equating the "morale" of its personnel with its own form of "public opinion".

PUBLIC OPINION

What actually is public opinion, in essence and in all its multi-faceted aspects?

In its definition as the general opinion, and not just the opinion of active minorities, comparatively little is still known about this important "phenomenon" acting on the social and political life of the people. Even

its more authentic institutional forms, such as voting in elections and political parties, fail to give full expression to it. However it is defined, public opinion remains an element of fact, not theory, a concrete problem and not an abstract concept.

A movement of opinion either exists, or it does not: modern survey and experimental observation methods make it possible to state this without fear of contradiction.

Like the population itself, public opinion is not homogeneous; it is divided into different groups according to sex, age, geographic position and working environment. To varying degrees these different aspects and influences determine the different individual attitudes.

Evaluations concerning the formation and development of public opinion are dependent on the peculiar "distribution" among the homogeneous groups of "values" corresponding to historical, psychological and social factors, the most important of which is "tradition". The principles handed down from the past are generally accepted as absolute, i.e. not subject to verification, as they have become consolidated in time and are now respected as axiomatic. Having become part of everyday life, these pillars of "common sense" provide a basis for other "values" that are considered unstable because they are linked to fashion, passing fads and the current state of affairs.

The lowest common denominator of both lies in their interest in the community, whereby the majority tends to subscribe psychologically to certain utilitarian models which correspond to widespread logical patterns of thinking.

In this framework, Italy today manifests set patterns or "formulae" and is characterized by the predominance of certain

stereotypes, i.e. of those socially shared beliefs organized into sets of characteristics attributed to such a category of persons as represent the essence of Lippmann's theories. This phenomenon is encouraged by the spread of consumerism in the broader sense of the term, which involves the general acceptance of patterns of behaviour often unaccompanied by any rational justification. There is no denying that the Italian people is currently the unwitting prisoner of so-called "factors of conformity" ranging from isolated phenomena to the incessant bombardment of commercial advertising and other forms of pressure that ultimately lead to an actual "polarization of opinion".

The "cliché" is now so much part of our daily lives that its antidote, consisting of forms of rational realism, is often interpreted as a sign of originality and non-conformism. This provides a fertile soil for the growth of the "pluralistic illusion", since individuals are convinced that the generalized adoption of certain models means that an identical conviction is held by the majority of citizens.

However, it would be a mistake to think that Italian psycho-social reality is made up of various homogeneous groups linked by a basic consensus of opinion. The apparent uniformity of behaviour merely conceals a whole kaleidoscope of different ethical values, customs, class prejudice, atavistic pre-conceived ideas which cannot be changed by the various fashions and conventional atti-

Left.

Picturesque image of the square in front of Orvieto Cathedral during the oath-taking parade of recruits of the 3rd btn. Granatieri "Guardie". In the foreground: the Colour Troop.



tudes. This gives rise to methodological problems when the time comes to carry out evaluative surveys of characterological aspects, typical temperaments, the incidence of the religious factor and environmental conditioning.

An opinion scale system, i.e. a "qualitative" evaluation of opinion based on an established theory like that of Thurstone,

would be suitable for the Italian context. However, this method is very slow and would call for laborious techniques. The tendency is thus to use the faster "sampling" method, which is also characterized by higher acceptability levels. This system is now being used both by private and public structures, all of which acknowledge its "scientific" nature in view of its

proven adherence to the social reality of the results obtained. This explains the great success enjoyed by public opinion surveys used to measure the extent of the phenomenon. They cover a wide range of applications and allow extremely reliable predictions to be made.

A good example of this are the "projections" made at election time, which almost always give a fairly accurate picture of the results of the final count. However, the question to be asked is: what are the basic motivations and characteristics of Italian public opinion that must be taken into account in any research that is to have a guaranteed significant content? It is therefore necessary to give a brief outline of the lines of development that have characterized Italian society in this century. Historically speaking, in Italy the various aspects of public opinion take on a peculiar physiognomy as a result of the lack of any real tradition of democratic independence. The stirring events of the Risorgimento leading to Italy's unification and independence did not find any immediately fertile soil which could foster the development of a true form of training and growth of common trends or coherent schools of thought on which the modern concept of public opinion could be based.

The ideals underlying the great political movements of the nineteenth century, although almost unanimously supported, did not find the right objective conditions to allow them to be translated into factors of perceptible transformation of the psychological structure of society.



CH-47C helicopter on a fire-fighting mission. Attached to the aircraft is a "Smokey" container with a capacity of 5,000 litres of water or retarding liquid.



Also, after the unification of Italy, the obstacles linked to the previous conditions continued to have a retarding effect on the "explosion" of public opinion. The governments of different political colours that followed one another during the post-Risorgimento period did, however, take popular demands into account. These demands were either expressed openly or else could be guessed at behind the screen of an apparently uneventful life and a social "peace" that was more apparent than real.

The mingling and coexistence of middle class, patriotic, materialistic, spiritualistic, utilitarian and epical ideals that characterized the early twentieth century was unlikely to allow a dominant factor to emerge from among this kaleidoscope of social trends. However, it was actually this intense dialectical exchange of ideas that, during and after the first world war, was to increase the importance of the role of public opinion vis-à-vis political decisions and customs.

These historical facts seem to explain the delay with which the "science" of evaluating social trends developed in Italy. The advent of a dictatorship in the 'twenties was not favourable, among other things, to the free development of the various survey techniques, except for those suitable for obtaining certain well-defined results.

The general acceptance of certain rigid principles forms the basis of widespread homogeneous behaviour patterns that are accepted acritically and without being tested against a set of opposing circumstances. The resulting psychological constraint is concealed by means of skilful propaganda often cloaked in authentic but naive enthusiasm.

This "science" of forming public opinion weighed heavily on an artificially guided society and had inevitable repercussions also at the military level. Youthful enthusiasms, carefully and subtly directed, can, on the one hand, be useful for disciplinary and behavioural purposes, although they can also lead one to lose sight of objective reality. It may not always be possible to predict which direction the resulting disappointment and reactions will take. World War II,

An army unit guarding a railway line. As part of its civil protection and guard duties, the army also provides personnel for polling-booth guard duty at election time.





which had a disastrous outcome for Italy, is a perfect example of this. However, this war laid the foundations of the historical and social dialectics forming the basis of the present Italian democratic situation, in which public opinion has been raised to the level of clear political will as expressed in the organs of the State. It is no coincidence that article 21 or the Constitution sanctions the safeguarding of the free expression of thought in the wide and diversified forms sanctioned by the law. It is true that the constitutional enactments also favour the freedom of propaganda, which often acts as an instrument of persuasion, but it is also true that the autonomy of general opinions and the cultural growth that has occurred since the last war allow both single individuals and communities a choice of thought

and opinion sufficient to render even the most "sophisticated" expedients virtually harmless. Consequently, also under the influence of the systems of social analysis in use overseas and in northern Europe, new techniques and "scientific" criteria for evaluating public opinion are now being introduced at a rate that would have seemed impossible several decades ago.

These methods make an extensive use of statistics, a branch of learning that is now developing in leaps and bounds. This extraordinary evolution of statistics, which, as a science was created about in 1660 for the purpose of describing states in the wake of Conring's courses at the University of Helmstedt and which became firmly established in about 1850 when it merged with Quetelet's proba-

bility calculus, is now accompanied by that of the computer. The tremendous impact of this machine, which has now been introduced even in the home, is gradually changing our way of life and has actually come to represent a threat to independent thought.

However, when viewed in perspective, these devices are seen to have made a substantial contribution to the free formation of public opinion. One example of this is the computer's

Lagoon troops on the Tiber during a boat race. An annual event in the "Tevere Expo" show held in Rome is the rowing race between lagoon troop units. On the same occasion, engineer units traditionally give a practical demonstration of throwing a bridge across the Tiber.





capacity for making projections, which although still only statistical predictions, nevertheless provide a reasonably accurate indication of future trends.

For some years now, extensive use has been made in the military field of results and indications obtained through the use of computers, which have proved to be particularly useful in recruiting and in establishing objective situations to be taken into account when drafting specific regulations. However, the technical instrument consists mainly of a system of recording the main trends of a society of which the Armed Forces are an integral part.

In a dynamic and dialectical democracy, other components have been given the specific tasks of acting as the vehicles of formative ideas. These are the mass media, i.e. in the first instance, television, which for

better or for worse has literally become the modern equivalent of the old fireside.

Increasing use has been made also by military organization of television's capacity for transmitting messages down to the lowest levels, in order to give a more realistic image of the Armed Forces, and in particular of their social function. At the same time there has been a considerable increase in the amount of space devoted by the national press to defence matters, and a growing awareness of them by the public at large. The general attitude to military matters has thus become much more favourable and a hitherto unsuspected social sensitivity to related topics has emerged. Except in cases of vested interests and propaganda, it may be assumed that no public "pro-military" or "anti-military" opinion exists, only a concrete

Bersaglieri fanfare on parade. The music units of the Army often perform on public occasions, captivating the people present and earning a lot of applause. The most prestigious musical unit is the Army Band composed of 102 NCOs who are conservatory graduates.

appraisal of what the Armed Forces produce for the benefit of society. This is closely related to the image they project through their loyal and generous efforts. The reason for this is that the principles and convictions generally accepted in Italy today are not the result of abstract concepts but derive directly from facts and events in



which the entire population is involved through the media. This is shown by the unanimous consensus and manifestations of gratitude received by our soldiers for their services in times of national calamity and their significant action on behalf of peace. It would be interesting to conduct an extensive survey of the people's attitude to the military as a whole, and not just of a specific

branch, as the results could be highly indicative of the more general relations that exist between the citizen and the institutions.

A survey of this kind could provide interesting indications for a country like Italy that has yet to probe deeply into its own psychosocial identity. This probing has already been done in certain countries, in which for decades a wide use has been

Military and civilians during a public exhibition. One of the Army's many tasks is to seek continuously to make direct contact with the civilian population, and particularly with young people. This is done by means of stands set up at the various local and national exhibitions, congresses, shows and festivals.



made of statistics and other survey tools for the purpose of sounding out their own public opinion.

The present historical period is marked by the increasing use being made of these tools at the international level despite their obvious limitations. These limitations are implicit in the very field in which they are used, namely human nature, which is essentially heterogeneous, unpredictable and changeable. To some extent Disraeli's caustic comment that there are three kinds of untruths – the outright lie, perjury and statistics – still holds true.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although a tool for observation and not for action, a public opinion poll is nevertheless capable of illuminating and guiding the behaviour and the study of the human environment. Public opinion polls must be set up and carried out using the correct scientific procedures. If this can be done they will render a very precious twofold service: at the theoretical level, increasing our overall knowledge; at the practical level, improving the organization of social relationships within the framework of democratic institutions.

With specific reference to the military field, a scientific understanding of opinion or "morale" adds a further decision-making tools to the array already available to the command function in order to back-up the decisions to be taken. Furthermore, the interest taken and the efforts made in studying a human environment and investigating public opinion can have extremely valuable spin-offs. The results of these studies allow the manager or commander to make use of environmental evaluations and public opinion



surveys by going from a knowledge of the opinions held in a given human environment to making certain predictions based on its behaviour.

Leaders can utilize the results of the human factor survey as a powerful means of acting on "groups". This will provide them with a psychological "keyboard" from which they can choose the different "keys" they wish to press.

Of course certain doubts will come to the surface from time to time, more as the result of erroneous or distorted applications of survey methods than of any lack of validity in the actual statistics. In the words of the French sociologist Jean Stoetzel "the legitimacy of any quantitative science cannot expect to go unchallenged. However, philosophical objections of the transcendental type have merely delayed the progress of science without making it possible to establish a qualitative science that will both satisfy the mind and be effective in its applications. The value of the use of the concept of 'quantity' is a matter of fact".

Trooping the colours during a parade. Veterans and Servicemen's Association rallies provide the occasion for young servicemen, veterans and the general public to meet.

And for us in particular, in the face of the growing importance of statistical and sociological studies, the following statement by the French Marshal Louis Lyautey, who is also the author of a book on the social function of officers, should serve as both a warning and a spur to making a greater and "more open" effort: "the soldier who is nothing but a soldier is a bad soldier".

Ethical perception is a fundamental characteristic of man. It manifests itself in his capacity to participate in the events of life and is bound up with the very essence of the individual. Without the capacity to distinguish between good and evil, between right and wrong, man could not live in freedom.

Ethical perception is an innate faculty linked to the coexistence, in one and the same individual, of a real world, which forces him to come to terms with reality, and an ideal world; it raises him above material concerns, at the same time, however, subjecting him to the authority of his own conscience.

Man thus exists as a complex and mysterious being, a perfect microcosm that, although of enormous proportions at its own level, appears quite tiny when compared to the Universe as a whole.

The history of man is characterized by his constant endeavour to reach unattainable perfection. To this end, he has gradually extended the boundaries of his knowledge and his capacity to implement his ideas, striving to pass on to the following generations the transcendental values of society and of the individuals of which it is composed. He has tamed nature and, with the help of science, has made great efforts to understand the complex phenomena affecting his life. One of these phenomena is violence, considered as a means, a tool, a form of social behaviour. Violence is one of the factors permanently influencing human evolution. Nevertheless, we are now at a point in our history in which violence has reached such an absurdly high level as to threaten our civilization and even life on this planet.

Another of these phenomena is the gregarious aspect of human nature, which is in permanent contrast with man's violent nature. Man's instinct for preservation leads him to seek the company of others, so as to form a tightly-knit social group and ensure that social values can be developed.

The incompatibility often found between these values, whether taken separately or in their interaction with rules and established practice, is what produces the violence which occurs in human relations and justifies the creation of a social group specialized in the use of force. "Militariness" is thus felt to be a necessary part of all forms of organized human society.

Right.

"The surrender of Breda" by Velázquez.
The city was conquered in 1625 during the uprising of the Netherlands. The painting illustrates the embrace between the victor, the Genoese general Ambrogio Spinola and the defeated governor of Breda, Giustino di Nassau, depicted as about to kneel before the victorious general. In a gesture of great humanity, the latter prevents him from completing this humiliating act.

ETHICS



AND MILITARINESS



THE MILITARY PROFESSION

The soldier is trained by and for his country to be a specialist in the use of force on behalf of his particular Service. His training consists in increasing his effectiveness in using the available weapons and equipment in order to inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy. Both from the personal and the Service points of view, the serviceman can consider his task as accomplished if he can achieve this aim. However, this aim entails the unavoidable use of organized force, considered by many as the essence of the military profession.

The control of violence is a vital function of any society and the soldier, i.e. the professional of the armed forces, thus forms a social group that is necessary to the national society. This truth is of use to those bearing arms for their country in that it helps them to overcome an apparent contradiction which may otherwise lead them to have doubts about their chosen career. This is because, in actual fact, man rejects violence. It is, furthermore, condemned by ethics in all its forms and also our own conscience tends to consider it in a negative light.

If this is true, as it appears to be, why has the military profession always withstood the above attacks? Why have there only been 200 years of real peace over the last three thousand years? One major reason has been the use man has made of violence as a factor of change and historical development. The various schools of philosophy that have attempted to provide man with a moral code of behaviour have vainly sought to explain the reasons underlying violence. However, in spite of the different methods followed and the praiseworthy efforts made, these philosophical efforts have not obtained the desired effect. It has been vainly attempted to justify violence and to limit its scope by the application of morality, politics and law.

Ethics has attempted to come to terms with violence by the use of different religious and ideological structures to water it down and somehow make it more acceptable.

Politics tends to rationalize the way violence manifests itself by introducing the logic of the balance of forces and of mutual effort to achieve a situation characterized by good will and tolerance.

Lastly, in order to admit the use of violence, the law requires the underlying causes to be essentially just and refers to cases of defence against aggression, although the difficulties involved in defining aggression and the variety of possible forms of conflict have considerably reduced the effectiveness of this rule.

THE ESSENCE OF WAR

As a manifestation of organized violence, war has been one of the main means used by man in his relations with other men. Ever since the beginning of human events, this form of social pathology has been handed down through the centuries, to quote Hegel's apt phrase, like a "judge of history". It is precisely its importance over the centuries that has led to the consideration that it does not depend either on the collective will of the masses, nor on that of the dominant minority. As an extreme hypothesis, war can be considered as a violent conflict between organized groups arising out of a clash between opposing interests. However, the contingent cause must always be sought in man's independent will. In fact, the "law of cause and effect" found in natural phenomena does not seem to be operative in this case. War is impervious to the humanistic ideals used to try and steer human behaviour within the narrow confines set by "duty" and "being", and continually reappears as an inescapable recurrent historical reality. To refuse to acknowledge the de-

structive effects of war would amount to subscribing to one of those totalitarian follies in which it is considered to be a moral condition peculiar to human society.

However, to refuse to accept war in any form would be equally idle and would merely shift the emphasis on to an abstract, ideal world based on Utopias incompatible with man's very nature.

And so the concept (or the appeal?) of the "just war" again raises its head. The origins of this concept are as old as Christianity itself, as symbolized by St Augustine's exhortation to Count Boniface to use the sword received from his Emperor against all those disturbing law and order in Africa.

When on the horns of the dilemma of whether to engage in a just or an unjust war, it would be absurd to expect to be able to retrace the entire troubled path trodden by Christian thought. Ideally then, we can conveniently link the exhortation of the Bishop of Ippona, in "De Civitate Dei", who refers to war as a necessary evil, something inevitable, to certain statements by Pius XII in some of his messages and speeches. In this 1948 Christmas message the Pope said that certain people hope to find salvation and the solution to all their problems in the formula of peace at any price. Unwittingly, they actually end up by jeopardizing the cause of peace, because they encourage the arrogant certitude of would-be aggressors. He goes on to say "true Christian desire for peace is strength and not weakness or passive resignation".

Jean-Paul II himself, in his unceasing oecumenical efforts

Right.

"Officer of the Chasseurs on horseback during the last charge" by Théodore Géricault.

Like a modern snapshot, this romantic painting captures the release of vital energy from the horseman and his mount.





to abolish the very idea of "just war", peculiar to mediaeval thought and revived in the modern age, and to induce an increasing number of peoples and nations to adopt a "peace culture", stated in an address to the UN in 1982 that "under the present conditions, deterrence based on equilibrium – which is certainly not to be considered as an end in itself, but as one stage in the process of gradual disarmament – can still be considered as morally acceptable".

But how long is this stage to last? It is not possible to suggest any reliable figure: years, decades, or perhaps even centuries?

The very definition of "war" as an immanent reality, however deplorable, has given rise to extensive and persistent controversies. Such renowned experts as Basil Liddell Hart and Raymond Aron have defined it as the art of using the Armed Forces to achieve set political objectives. The French general Beaufre goes even further, considering war to be the art of combining force with political ends.

Such approaches to the problem, characterized by a valid conception of war as the collective manifestation of the use of force, can all be related back to the military thought of Karl von Clausewitz, whose work has steadily been growing in importance and acceptance for a long time now. Untainted by dogmatism, von Clausewitz' principles were doubtlessly a clear expression of his age.

His arguments concerning the moral implications of war and his conceptions of total and limited war have been, in many respects, highly illuminating for

any statesman faced with the problem of choosing the best strategic course in a hectic world torn between different ideological poles. Nevertheless, also the ideas that Clausewitz produced and disseminated with such Teutonic methodicalness had a number of precedents.

Without embarking upon a long and possibly unrewarding survey of past history, let us simply examine the case of Flavio Renato Vegezio (late 14th century – early 15th cent). A statement in the early part of volume I of his "De re militari" ("...the Romans conquered the whole world exclusively ... because of their disciplined organization, their use of the Army") reaffirms the link between the policy of Rome and its military activity. Nor did the role played by the Army (i.e. the present-day Armed Forces) in the general framework of the system of government weaken the unitary spirit on which the Roman state was founded. In this state every aspect of the institutional context was a cogent force of the "lex", the rigorous and functional civilian ideals and the basic philosophy of military art, imbued as it was with the concepts of order, training and discipline.

Two further considerations must be made in this brief descriptive note on the phenomenon of war, both of which can also be found in Clausewitz' thought, although the nuclear situation has now made absolute and total war practically unfeasible as an instrument for solving international disputes.

The first consideration is that of war as an historical event. No conflict to date has produced absolute results. The defeated nations have often suffered only a temporary setback, and have found a satisfactory solution at the political level. This assertion is worth dwelling on. If it is true, as numerous actual historical cases seem to indicate, another piece can be said to have been added to the jigsaw puzzle comprising the several elements condemning war as a decisive factor in international disputes. But do the non-defini-

tive value of war and the opportunity that the defeated countries have of making up for their defeat still exist today? The apocalyptic, although only hypothetical, vision of the possible consequences of nuclear war raises a number of doubts in this connection.

The second consideration, also perceived by Clausewitz and confirmed by military events and studies in every historical period and part of the world, refers to the often decisive rôle sometimes played by chance in the uncertain world of war. Indeed, more than in any other human activity, a history of battles would clearly indicate that war is linked to chance. Together with luck, which is only one aspect of the same thing, chance often plays a preponderant role in human vicissitudes and, despite all the careful planning, leads the phenomenon of war into the field of uncertainty. The chance factor exerts its effect throughout the duration of any conflict. The risk thus arises of an uncontrolled use of violence, so that war, which is a phenomenon that can elude all control in its abstract form, can find sufficient rationality and possible ethical justification only in the expression of political means and objectives.

LIMITS TO THE VIOLENCE OF WAR

Violence may find rational limits in the reasons that ought to, or actually do, justify its use and the extent to which it is used.

The first of these reasons consists essentially of legitimate self-defence. However, the concept of self-defence covers a wide range of different situations and necessitates a clear definition of what constitutes aggression. The most readily perceivable conception is the one in which the aggressor is identified as the one first using force. This is the definition given in International Law.

However, some thought must be given to the possible ways aggression can manifest itself.

Left.

"St Martin shares his cloak with a beggar" by El Greco. In this symbolic image, the figure of the horseman represents the synthesis of the moral principles informing the soldier's life. As well as valour and obedience, he must also cultivate civic qualities to the highest degree.

In modern times, these manifestations often do not involve actual physical aggression, but are expressed in subtle forms of psychological, economic and cultural pressure. Although much less conspicuous and destructive

tion that the reasons sought to contain and perhaps "humanize" war have a kind of intrinsic ambiguity. No definite elements can be found, either juridical or moral, to sanction violence, despite the moral and juridical rules intro-

the subjection of the enemy to suffering for pleasure or vengeance, mutilation or the causing of wounds outside actual fighting, or to torture in order to obtain confessions. The use of poisons is prohibited, as well as any



than actual armed conflict, these forms of aggression can have equally devastating effects in their specific fields.

The other limit mentioned above, i.e. the use of violence on a reduced scale, tailored to the objective to be attained, is related to the perpetual endeavour to "humanize" war, so often unsuccessful in the history of armed conflict and today clashing harshly with the almost unlimited power of modern offensive weapons. The attempt to identify these limits leads to the conviction

that the reasons sought to contain and perhaps "humanize" war have a kind of intrinsic ambiguity. No definite elements can be found, either juridical or moral, to sanction violence, despite the moral and juridical rules introduced over the centuries in order, on the one hand, to reduce the number of those who have to suffer the consequences of the violence and, on the other, to reduce the suffering of those taking part in the war operations.

One significant example, chosen from among the many available, of the rules "humanizing" war is the "Instructions for the conduct of United States armies in the field" issued by President Lincoln in 1863. These instructions state that "military necessity cannot justify cruelty,

Above.

"The Oath of the Horatii" by Jacques Louis David.

This work, an example of noble and austere celebratory art, shows the Horatii's moral strength, expressed by their powerful posture.

Right.

"Charles V at the battle of Mühlberg" by Tiziano.

Against the background of the battlefield and a livid sky, the victorious Emperor seems to have sacrificed all sense of humanity to the myth of royal power.



arbitrary act of devastation. The deception allowed in the conduct of operations must not degenerate into acts of perfidiousness. As a general rule, the state of military necessity does not justify any act of cruelty that would also needlessly make the return to peace more difficult".

These noble principles were suited to the period and to a war in which, despite its peculiarities, it was possible to respect them up to a certain point.

With all the best intentions in the world, could they be applied to a hypothetical conflict of the '80s? The answer can only be no, which confirms the flimsiness of all theories humanizing war and defending everything that can be used to increase the credibility of the Armed Forces as an instrument of deterrence, dissuasion and détente, a champion of peace, designed to preserve and foster the essential values of civilization.

MILITARY ETHICS

It was mentioned earlier in this article that the soldier lives and operates inside society as a specialist in the use of force.

The military profession cannot bypass the constraint obliging it to prepare itself to use force: the very nature of armed conflict makes this impossible.

In this sense the use of force in the interests of peace and not for the purposes of aggression, is legitimate and justified by the need to safeguard the common interest.

Even the Vatican Council II (*Gaudium et spes* 79) acknowledged that "all those dedicated to serving their Country in the ranks of the Army can be considered as ministers of the security and freedom of their peoples and, when they carry out such duties correctly, truly contribute to the stability of peace".

The result is a kind of "exclusiveness" of the soldier in return for which he must show himself to be worthy, and cultivate also the civilian virtues to the highest degree.

The thoughts and actions of the soldier must be characterized by respect of the law, honesty in his social dealings, austerity and patriotism.

He is thus considered as someone special, not only because he is capable of bearing arms in his Country's defence, but above all because his conduct is based in the highest moral principles.

The first in this scale of values is valour itself, which consists of a synthesis of qualities that are indispensable for anyone who has to face responsibility, risks, danger and sacrifice. However, valour must not be confused with rashness or cruelty. Valour is accompanied by obedience, an essential quality for a soldier. This obedience is not passive, but must be conscious and participatory. Its *raison d'être* lies in the conviction of the need to implement the overall aims of the nation.

In practice, it nourishes and expresses that sublimation of freedom which is discipline, the fulcrum of the hierarchical principle and the strength of any well ordered community desirous of progress.

Discipline thus appears as a corollary linking up the various qualities of the soldier because it tones down courage, preventing it from degenerating into rashness and cruelty; it also rationalizes obedience so that the latter becomes part of the soldier's consciousness.

Unfortunately these qualities are sometimes misunderstood and despised by modern individualistic and hedonistic society. By replacing confidence, solidarity and being with scepticism, selfishness and the idea of gain, modern society has been the cause of widespread psychic conflict and frustrating discouragement among the military.

But these are the values that make the soldier a man with confidence in himself and worthy of respect. Backed up by his character, raised to the level of a coherent life system and, according to Stoetzel, representing the true objective aspect of the personality, these qualities

give commanders the moral strength they need to take the right decisions at the right time, and to accept responsibility for making them.

This moral strength can be present only when it is based on deep-rooted ethical convictions justified and supported by knowledge.


This is the form of military ethics that can survive in troubled and alarming times, in which the structural and cultural factors, over which the atom bomb has cast its shadow, only increase the feeling of uncertainty over the validity of a life style chosen and deepen the sense of isolation from civilized society which sometimes seem to hover this professional category. Although by no means a closed caste, they still preserve and cultivate interests and qualities of their own which characterize their fundamental ethics, but nevertheless remain open to the new technological, organizational and cultural influences.

Protection must be afforded to this military ethics from the insidious threats of beguiling destabilizing forces by affirming that the present-day Armed Forces must not only serve in the Country's defence but also be a means of education and of strengthening the national identity, as well as having new tasks to carry out, such as technological training, emergency services to protect the free institutions and in defence of the community in the case of national calamities and the execution of special high-risk missions (inspection and clearing action, bomb disposal, etc.).

This is the ethics tout court to which William I of Orange was referring when, extolling the principles and actions peculiar to military service in his times, he stated that "there is no need to hope in order to begin, nor to succeed in order to persevere".



24 MAY 1915
70 YEARS AGO ITALY WENT
TO WAR



BRITISH TANKS AT CAMBRAI

A HIGHLY INSTRUCTIVE TECHNICAL SURPRISE IN NOVEMBER 1917


After all the studies that have been carried out, to go back now and review events and aspects of World War I could be considered as a fruitless search for something new.

This is made all the more apparent by the fact that the 70 years or so separating us from that conflict have been characterized by scientific and technological innovations and advances of unprecedented proportions.

The overall impression is not so much of ordered and gradual progress but of a rather frightening case of actual mutation. As a result, the events of the 1914-1918 war have been projected much further back than just 70 years.

Nevertheless, not everything has been engulfed by this maelstrom of mutating phenomena of unheard of proportions. This confirms the lasting value of par-

ticular events which, having survived obsolescence and oblivion either completely or in certain of their aspects, allow credence still to be given to history as a source of information that, although always linked to the past, affords us some insight into the present and even allows us to make reliable projections regarding the future. One of these events is the battle of Cambrai, which was fought between 20th November and 6th December 1917. In his book "Tanks in the Great War", with understandable and well-grounded enthusiasm, Col. Fuller describes Cambrai as the first great tank battle in the history of war and, whatever the judgment of future historians might be, one of the most noteworthy battles ever fought.



THE SCENARIO

The general situation in Autumn 1917 was characterized by the aftermath of the partial failure of the offensives of 1915, 1916 and Spring-Summer 1917. All three offensives had been preceded by massive and prolonged artillery preparation which merely tore up the ground without, however, completely eliminating machine gun nests or barbed wire, the main obstacles to any attack.

Attempts were thus being made to find something new which would allow the deadlock of trench warfare to be broken.

According to the convincing assertions made by Liddell Hart (*"La Guerre Mondiale, French tr. published by Payot in 1932")* the main idea of the supporters of the early tanks was to launch them in massed surprise attacks.

This idea, as set out in a memorandum of the British

Supreme Headquarters in February 1916, was first applied when some fifty tanks were deployed in the Battle of the Somme (15th September 1916) as a means to re-establish the initial aims of the attack, now in a state of complete disarray.


Incomplete and overhasty preparation, the inevitable mechanical shortcomings of the early machines and their deployment in twos and threes, i.e. disregarding the principle of the concentration of effort, cost the venture all possibility of a resounding success. Nevertheless, the 15th September 1916 saw the introduction of firepower, movement and protection combined in a single weapon, which had hitherto been regarded as exclusive to those fighting on the seas.

Of the 49 available tanks, only thirty or so succeeded in reaching what would now be called the start line. Nine of the latter advanced together with


the infantry, a further 9 failed to keep up with the foot-soldiers, although they proved useful in mopping up operations, 9 had mechanical failures and 5 became bogged down in shell craters.

Despite the persistence of adverse factors (e.g. mechanical problems, bulkiness, environment, mode of deployment still slightly influenced by unconscious constraints or determined by the procedures adopted in nearly three years of fighting) slightly better results were achieved by the French the following Spring, north of Rheims, on 16th April 1917.


The objective of this first deployment of tanks by the French (eight companies of Schneider tanks) was to effect a rapid penetration of the Chemin des Dames area. Although better than the British performance in the Battle of the Somme, the results were anything but satisfactory and left in their wake doubts and prejudices, most




Scottish War Chariot, 1456.




Stevin's land ship, 1599.



Valturio's War Chariot, 1472.



16th century Assault Chariot.



Holzschuher's Battle Chariot.

of which persisted until the battle of Cambrai.



These were the first and best known concrete attempts to solve the problems involved in tank deployment. They were passionately upheld by the supporters of the new weapon and viewed with considerable skepticism by those whose mental inertia prevented them from accepting any innovation that was not the result of step by step evolution. Of course, these attempts were accompanied both by raised hopes and confidence and also by disappointments. There was also a lot to be learned from them.

The same lessons were even more obvious after the battle of Cambrai. One of these will be discussed immediately as it was taken into account in planning and organizing the Cambrai operation, i.e. the need for the tanks of the time, and to a certain extent also modern tanks, to operate over terrain that has not been damaged too much by artillery fire.

An examination of how the Cambrai operation came about is of fundamental interest as regards both the planned action procedures, although not all were actually implemented, and the experience thereby acquired.

The prelude to Cambrai was the third battle of Ypres, which began on 31st July 1917 and ground to a halt in the mud of Passchendaele three months later.

The main lesson to be learnt was, as we have seen, that the customary procedure of using prolonged massed artillery preparation made the terrain over which the attack was to take place practically impassable. Consequently, on the 3rd August of the same year, Col. Fuller made an alternative recommendation to Tank Corps HQ, preceded by an introduction in which he stated that, from a tankman's point of view, the third battle of Ypres could be considered as over. To insist on using tanks under those conditions would not only lead to the loss of good vehicles and even better men but also to an inevitable decline



Top.

French "Schneider M.16" tank. This vehicle had several structural defects and was also vulnerable to light artillery fire. Four hundred were commissioned in 1916 and it was used for the first time at Chemin des Dames in 1917.

Above.

The British "Little Willie" tank, the first armoured fighting vehicle. It was nothing more than a large armour-plated box mounted on tracks. Tried out in 1915, it was to be equipped with a 6-pounder mounted on a revolving turret. This solution was however abandoned, as the centre of gravity was too high.

in the morale of the infantry units and tank crews.

This convincing introduction was followed by an alternative recommendation that, in order also to raise British prestige, a tank attack should be carried out on St. Quentin before the onset of winter, as a strategic prelude to a subsequent (Spring 1918) thrust towards Valenciennes.

After discussions lasting a whole day, during which the difficulties involved in mounting a combined Franco-British operation became only too apparent, and it was seen that the latter would not be compatible with the simplicity and rapidity of action considered necessary for the success of the new tactic, a second and less ambitious plan was proposed the day after, 4th August.

This plan called for a tank raid in strength to be carried out to the south of Cambrai. The emphasis was laid on the rapid and violent nature of the raid, the aim of which was to hit enemy personnel and weapons

in order to cause serious disorganization and demoralization.

The raid was to be of 8-12 hours duration so as not to allow the enemy time to concentrate the forces required for an adequate counter-attack. This limit was subsequently extended to 24 hours, although the other operation parameters remained unchanged. In his book, Fuller summed up the latter clearly and concisely, as follows: "Advance-Hit-Retire".

The zone chosen, i.e. the Cambrai region, where the Germans had carried out a deliberate withdrawal in March 1917, was held to be suitable for the operation.

The zone was delimited on the left flank by the Canal du Nord (now in the dry period) and on the right flank by the river Escaut and the canal branching off it. On the ground it consisted of a corridor 8-10 kilometres wide running South-North and characterized by five topographic features in a West-East direction:

- the Gouzeaucourt plateau, attack position;
- a large ridge sloping down to the Escaut at Marcoing;
- the Flesquières crest;
- the hollow in which the villages of Anneux and Cantaing are situated;
- the subsequent crestline of Bourlon, with the wood and village of the same name.


THE BATTLE PLAN

The plan has already been seen to consist essentially in the massed deployment of tanks in a violent surprise attack to replace the heavy artillery bombardments that had been used up to that time.

French "Renault F.T.17" tank. Designed in 1916, this vehicle weighed 6.7 tons, mounted a 37 mm gun, for which it carried 237 rounds, and had a 2-man crew. The Renault F.T.17 was also used in World War II.



OPERATIONS' ZONE



The overall plan of the British 3rd Army entailed:

- breaking through the Hindenburg defensive line through the corridor between the Escaut canal and the Canal du Nord;
- occupation of Cambrai, the Bourlon wood and the crossing of the Sensée river;
- cutting off the enemy forces in the area south of the Sensée and west of the Canal du Nord;
- exploitation of the breakthrough in the direction of Valenciennes.

The tanks' role in the operation was to open up a path for the infantry. The subsequent exploitation of the success of the operation was to be carried out by the cavalry as far as the Sensée river. Surprise was to be pursued at all levels, taking all the necessary precautions to achieve this end.

The forces allocated to this ambitious plan consisted of the 3rd and 4th Army Corps, i.e. a total of 6 divisions, a cavalry corps comprising two divisions, 381 battle tanks of the Royal Tank Corps, reinforced by some hundred or so older tanks in a supporting and ancillary role, i.e. a total of 476 tanks, plus about a thousand artillery pieces.

The 381 battle tanks were of the Mark IV type, each weighing 28 tons and having an average speed of 3 Km/hour, a crew composed of 1 officer and 7 other ranks and the capability of crossing trenches up to 3 metres wide.

As far as armaments were concerned, the tanks were divided up into "males", with two 58 mm guns and 4 machine guns, and "females" equipped with only 6 machine guns.

The German defences consisted of the network of positions known as the Hindenburg Line and included an outpost zone and three main lines of defensive trenches: the Hindenburg Line proper, the reserve Hindenburg Line and the Beaurevoir-Masnières-Bourlon line. The latter was still incomplete.

All that remained of the original plan of attack were the

essential parameters of surprise to be achieved by the massed deployment of tanks, the tactic of using tanks followed and protected by infantry, and the sector chosen for the operation.

The other essential features of the original idea had been modified: the raid had become a large-scale offensive with objectives lying deep in enemy territory.


Instead of striking into a pocket and then retiring rapidly, it had been decided to make a systematic advance along a narrow sector bounded by two watercourses. While providing protection for a brief raid, the latter would become a dangerous limitation in the case of a

large-scale attack because the tanks would be forced to deploy in a narrow area and thus lose their outflanking capability.

However, the principal weakness of the overall plan was above all the lack of reserves, as the two cavalry divisions available could not be considered sufficient for the task. The effectiveness of organized defence, particularly thanks to the machine gun, had in fact clearly shown that the cavalry could no longer play a decisive rôle in the battle.


THE ACTUAL BATTLE

The preparation for the battle was carried out very skill-



The Mark IV was the most important World War II tank. It derived directly (like the Mk. I-III) from the 1916 tank prototype. Work on its design began in October of the same year. The first model appeared in March 1917 and by April, the first vehicles were ready to go into action in France, where they were used for the first time on the Messines crest on 7th June. In October 1917, 700 of the 1,220 commissioned were delivered to the Royal Tank Corps, which used 378 of them at Cambrai. Weight: 28 tons; length: 7.93 m; height: 2.45 m; crew: 8 men (two drivers, two gunners for the 6-pounder and two for the machine-gun, two mechanics); ammunition: 332 2.7 Kg HE shells in two containers and 5,640 Lewis gun rounds; range: 56 Km (on road); armour-plating: 6 to 12 mm cladding.

- 1 Plank for anti-tank ditch
- 2 Entrance and exit manhole
- 3 Tubular radiator
- 4 Secondary gear levers
- 5 QF Hotchkiss cannon
- 6 Ammunition container
- 7 6-cylinder Daimler engine
- 8 Rollers
- 9 Drivers' seats (two)
- 10 Brake levers for tracks
- 11 Track adjustment device
- 12 Transmission shaft brake
- 13 Engine clutch
- 14 Gear lever
- 15 Foreward observation hatch
- 16 303" Lewis machine-gun
- 17 Water tank
- 18 Rail for anti-tank ditch plank
- 19 Forward turret
- 20 Silencer
- 21 Starting crank
- 22 Reduction unit
- 23 Rear turret




fully and in great secret. To deceive the enemy as to the scale of the operation and the front involved, fire actions were carried out using smoke and gas, and diversions created using small numbers of dummy tanks to the north and south of the sector chosen for the real attack.

At 0620 hours on 20th November the tanks and infantry began advancing over a front of about 9 kilometers, achieving total surprise and complete initial success over the entire sector, except for the central zone of Flesquières. This one and only "slip-up" occurred because the 51st Division had, on its own initiative, adopted a different battle tactic to that laid down by Tank Corps HQ. The prescribed close cooperation between tanks and infantry was not achieved; this resulted in the infantry being unable to exploit the protection of the tanks and becoming pinned down by machine-gun fire on reaching the barbed wire entanglements. On the other hand, the tanks, advancing on their own (thereby earning themselves the epithets of "knights errant" and "privateers") were subjected to close and concentrated fire from several German batteries, which had been allowed to go into action undisturbed owing to the failure of the British infantry to keep up with the tanks.

In the overall economy of the battle, however, the setback suffered at Flesquières, although much dramatized later, was actually nothing more than a simple pocket of resistance, which was bypassed and cut-off by the flanking units as they continued their advance as far as Marcoing.

Indeed, in the other parts of the sector to the north and south of Flesquières, the 20th of November was characterized by the complete achievement of surprise and a successful penetration of something like eight kilometers, i.e. as much as the advances previously achieved at the cost of months of heavy fighting and much heavier losses during the battle of the Somme



and the third battle of Ypres.

The British troops were in reach of a decisive victory: the main defensive works of the Hindenburg Line had been breached; the next line of defence had only been partially organized; beyond the latter lay undefended terrain. However, the infantry and tank crews engaged in the attack had practically run out of steam and the two cavalry divisions, except for a Canadian squadron, failed to exploit the situation.

The following day, 21st November, the deployment of a few

"local" reserves allowed some further advances to be made. The position of Flesquières itself was abandoned by the Germans at dawn, and the British 51st and 62nd Divisions advanced rapidly as far as Fontaine-Notre Dame, more than two kilometers beyond the point reached on 20th November.

The 48 hour time limit set by the British Supreme Commander, General Haig, had now expired. However, numerous considerations, including the hope of eliminating the threat posed by the Bourlon hill, still held by the

enemy, and to force the enemy to withdraw – while somewhat less probable after the modest gains made on 21st November and by the arrival of German reinforcements – convinced Haig himself to continue the offensive. This he did despite the misgivings and risks mentioned earlier, including the vital fact that all the available attacking forces had been thrown into the battle by 20th November.

Starting from the 22nd, the subsequent actions were anything but successful, and only increased the number of losses. On the 20th alone 179 tanks (about 50%) had been lost, together with 118 officers and 500 other ranks.

From then until the 29th, a series of undecisive local actions were carried out, especially around the positions of Bourlon and Fontaine-Notre Dame. During this time, the Germans, displaying great resilience, spirit of initiative and tactical sense, were preparing a deadly counter-attack, the potential seriousness of which was not fully realized at the time.

The part played by the tanks in the long drawn-out operations declined progressively in importance. For a few days more they were used in several sectors in small, comparatively ineffective groups until they all had to be withdrawn because of mechanical wear and tear.

The violent and unexpected German counter-attack was unleashed, on 30th November against the two flanks of the British salient. The surprise achieved by the British tanks on 20th November was now matched by another surprise, of similar conception, if different in its execution.

Instead of the usual prolonged preparation, a short heavy artillery bombardment was used to open the way for the German infantry to advance using "infiltration" tactics. This represented the prototype of the attack to be used by the Germans on a large scale in the Spring of 1918, just as the preceding British attack had introduced the tactics that would be used by

the Allies in the Summer and Autumn of 1918.

The upshot was that, between the 30th November and the 6th December, the British lost most of the ground previously gained and, after an even more serious setback had been avoided thanks only to the valour of a few units, practically the same balance of forces and positions as prior to the attack was restored.


"A gloomy sunset after such a brilliant dawn" were the vivid words used by Liddell Hart in the book cited above. We shall return to the significance of these remarks of his in our conclusion.

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNT

On 19th November 1917 (it is again Liddell Hart who describes the events, and not without a note of humour) the German troops before Cambrai were contemplating, with serene confidence, the calm hovering over the sector. In the well-appointed trenches of the Hindenburg Line they compared their peaceful situation with the much more difficult one of their comrades in the Ypres zone.

On 20th November, 381 British tanks, followed by a comparatively small number of infantry units, carried out a dawn advance which took the Germans utterly by surprise. The defenders were almost incredulous before the unpleasant novelty of an attack carried out using unusual weapons and tactics and, above all, executed without the customary artillery warning which almost always left the defenders a few days in which to prepare a suitable welcome for the attackers.

On 21st November the church-bells of London were rung joyfully to announce a triumph, which appeared at the time as the prelude to imminent final victory. On his return to his HQ, Field Marshal Ludendorff hastily drafted his orders for a general withdrawal. Both the London church-bells and Ludendorff's draft orders were reliable



prophets, only that they were some nine months ahead of the real events.

On balance, the outcome of the Cambrai operation left the British with comparatively little of the ground they had seized (ironically, that little included the position of Flesquières, the site of the main setback of the 20th November).

At the end of three weeks' fighting, British and German losses, excluding the British tanks (about 200), were also indicative of a disappointing relative equilibrium. The British

had lost 44,000 men, 145 artillery pieces, 456 machine-guns, and the German 41,000 men, 145 artillery pieces and 500 machine-guns.

Both sides learned numerous lessons from the battle of Cambrai which, from the standpoint of military history, can be considered as the successful rediscovery of the fundamental principle of surprise. However, the beneficial effects of this rediscovery were cancelled out by repeated violations of the equally essential principle of the economy of forces, which was

neglected both as regards fitting the means to the objectives to be achieved, and in the appreciation of the capacities and limits of the human factor.

Some of these lessons were learnt immediately, while others were assimilated only after more serene and detailed post-war studies.

Briefly, the former are as follows:


On the German side: an overhasty rejection of the operational value of the tank, perhaps due to the Germans' desire to bolster the image of their own defensive system. This rejection was shortlived and of dubious validity, as subsequent experience and studies were to show.

On the British side, the lessons learnt were obviously greater in number and more varied. From the technical point of view it was realized that some important innovations and enhancements were necessary, e.g.:

- the need to increase the tank's speed for faster action and to increase the chances of avoiding the enemy's counter-attack;
- increased fuel tank capacity in order to enhance the tank's range of operation;
- an improved power-weight ratio, which in later years was to be the subject of many investigations and studies, as a result of which more and more advanced solutions are still being sought;
- optimal gun placement, suggested by the fact that, because of the low position of its main gun, on a rise, the Mark IV became a target for enemy fire before it could bring its own gun to bear.

From the operational standpoint, the Cambrai operation showed the British that:

- surprise had actually been achieved;
- the German line of defence had been broken;



- the success could not be exploited owing to lack of available reserves;
- the action had had no true centre of gravity;
- it had been seen how decisive tank-infantry cooperation could be and how hard it was to implement promptly and effectively.

Of course, after the end of what has sometimes been called the last "Romantic war", there was a plethora of comments and studies on both sides. The first main supporters of the tank were Fuller and Guderian, whose ideas basically converged on several essential points, i.e.:

- on the need to use armour with the support of the other arms (infantry, artillery, aircraft);
- on the massed use of tanks,

with sufficient echeloning in depth;

- on the conception of the armoured division as a tool to be used in conjunction with air power to achieve the above two conditions.

In conclusion, the battle of Cambrai seems to have been increasingly influenced by a gradually developing error of conception, perhaps due to a form of unconscious hysteresis, during the operational stage.

The brilliant initial idea of carrying out a raid without actually occupying any ground was turned into an offensive action typical of the time, except for the fact that tanks were used instead of the conventional preliminary artillery bombardment.

The means available were insufficient for such an opera-

tion, particularly because tanks were still in their infancy and their performance inadequate.

The above transformation, which took the form of an almost unconscious return to a routine established by three years of fighting, shows that neither the high commands nor the units themselves were yet ready to return to a war of movement, although the writing was on the wall.

However, the considerations and lessons discussed herein would be of much less significance were it not for two other repercussions they have had on military history.

The first of these is once again suggested by Fuller (op. cit.) when he claims that, although only a partially successful surprise attack, Cambrai represented a new Valmy. Just as the latter in 1792 paved the way to the use of massed artillery, so the British tanks at Cambrai paved the way to the use of armour.

The second reflection is related to Italy. In the collected "Dépêches de Sir Douglas Haig", the 1920 French edition of which was enhanced by a significant introduction by Field Marshal Foch, we read that the Cambrai operation was of direct and substantial assistance to the allied forces operating in Italy.



It is the authoritative opinion of the British Supreme Commander on the French front, supported by several other sources, that several German divisions posted to the Italian theatre were rerouted to the Cambrai front to ward off the unexpected British attack. The concentration of the forces of the Central Powers in Italy was thus reduced at a very critical time, i.e. when the Italians and their allies were engaged in setting up the defensive network on the Piave. The reliability of the source and the probable accuracy of the information justify this citation of the battle of Cambrai in an Italian review 68 years after the actual event.

Below.

French St. Chamond tank. This vehicle had a 9-man crew, 5 of whom serving the 75 mm gun and the 4 machine-guns. This tank was used for the first time in May 1917. It weighed 23 tons and could attain a speed of 8 Km/hr. Some 400 St. Chamond tanks were built, one of which was ceded to the Italian Army to be used for experimental purposes.

Bottom.

The German "Sturmpanzer Wagen A/V". This tank had an 18-man crew and mounted a 57 mm gun and 6 or 7 machine-guns. Twenty tanks of this type were built, each powered by a 100 HP motor. It could attain a speed of 9 Km/hr and was equipped with 30 mm thick armour-plate.



BRITISH TANKS AT CAMBRAI

NOTES ON THE SOCIAL PROBLEM



GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENTS

"... On one side lives a minority that holds as hereditary right, by reason of aristocracy's traditions, all the elements of wealth, land, machines, capital: on the other side bustles the majority, whose only property are their hands and their ability to work, and on whom weighs the need either to supply hands and work on the conditions imposed by the former, or starve.

Now you, reformers of society, throw between these two classes your theory of profit, of the maximum possible prosperity. How will you reconcile the conflicting interests?"

Thus Mazzini, in his "Thoughts on bureaucracy in Europe", admirably summed up the complex contents of the emerging social conflictuality, which developed in the second half of the 19th century, often revealing its dramatic aspects.

Left.

"The banker and his wife" by Marinus Claesz Reymerwaele (XVI cent). The author, considered one of the most renowned artists of the school of Antwerp, expresses in this work a stern condemnation of usury, as an instrument of immorality and social injustice. Note how the hands of the two indeed resemble the talons of birds of prey; the expression of both is tense with greed.

Right.

"The laboratory of alchemy" by Jan Van der Straet (Giovanni Stradano) (1523-1605). This painting is deservedly well-known, both because it shows in great detail the work and the instruments (presses, retorts, alembics) of an alchemic laboratory of the Renaissance and because it witnesses the changed conditions of researchers who, after the medieval isolation, start scientific researches using experimental methods. This is also proved by the circulation, in the same years, of the treatises on the metallurgical and mineralogical art, by Biringuccio and Agricola, as well as the linking of alchemy with medicine, made by Paracelsus.



Already during the Middle Ages, in the history of the relationship between capital and labour, there had been flashes of modern light.

In the 13th and 14th centuries, numerous organizations were established which, sometimes imitating the ancient Roman corporations, sometimes creating new ones, joined craftsmen

together forming associations for mutual aid, which gained great economic and political power. They carried out a strong action of solidarity and were watched suspiciously by the great lords and by the authorities.

These organizations – from the "Arti" of the Italian free cities to the French "Frairies" and "Confrairies", from the En-

English "Guilds" to the German "Zunft" – with their actions aimed at obtaining economic improvements – and also political recognitions – sometimes led to gusts of rebellion which, like the Vespers of Bruges of 1302, the uprising of Gand in 1345, the Ciompi's riot of 1370 in Florence, were a foreboding of the dark social picture of future times.

At the dawning of the modern age, the struggle between capital and labour had, therefore, already begun.

At the same time the State and the individuals were taking those initiatives intended to temper the harshness of a conflict which did not always depend on man's will, but often imposed itself over this will.

Later on, between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, science and the machine invaded and upset the field of industry bringing, at first, innovations and changes. These innovations, that were to cause a real revolution and bring about a new form of social order in the world, went, from England and France where the big mechanical industry had obtained its first and difficult successes in the first half of the 19th century, on to the rest of Europe and the world and charged the social problem with a significance and an importance that would make it one of the most complex aspects of modern history.

The workers' crisis – which inevitably derived from the decisive and imposing development of modern industrialism, which was fostered by various factors – was only a passing event of the last decades of the 18th century and the first decades of the 19th century. The dramatic prophecy of Friedrich Engels, according to which industrialism would render the majority of the proletariat unnecessary, condemning it to death or revolution, was destined to remain the frightening dream of a stormy dawn.

The dreaded event affected only the first generation of workers, the one contemporary with the initial development of industrialism. After that, a more pow-

erful contrary trend started, for the machines, while driving the worker away from a single type of job, improvised around him various other forms of activity.

The working population increased dramatically, as did industry, and crowded around the large industrial plants, producing the phenomenon of urbanism, owing to which new cities – such as Manchester or Essen – developed in a few years.

the struggle between capital and labour can be found in the various forms of workers' associations which – starting from the British

"The forge" by Joseph Wright (1734-1797).

The author, a keen observer of the technical and scientific process and of the English industrial revolution, emphasizes in this work the play of lights and the suggestive atmosphere of the ambient which is, together, a home and a working place.



This process of gigantic development of the working masses, together with their concentration in the industrial centres, caused inevitable, new, and wider conflicts between capital and labour. Conflicts that soon took on unusual proportions and violence.

The first manifestations of this new, more recent phase of

trade-unionism – spread all over Europe.

Marxism, born at the end of 1847, stepped down into reality and became the true force of the workers' movement, gradually replacing Proudhonism, when on September 28, 1864, in London, gave rise to the International Workers' Association, better known as First Internationale

"An experiment with the pneumatic machine" by Joseph Wright (1734-1797). Wright's interest and active participation in the events related to the English industrial revolution and the technical-scientific progress of his time, could not find a more pertinent and direct witness than this intense and passionate work.

The documental importance of the painting appears immediately evident, both for the analytic veracity of all the components of the machine and for the realistic and psychological representation of the expressions and reactions of the onlookers. The adults' attention contrasts very effectually with the

(1864-1876).

The dissolution of the First International did not mean the end for the various European socialist parties which flourished in all countries and became very active.

It was this vigorous presence in the various countries that, in 1889, made possible the creation in Paris of the Second Internationale, which was to be alive and active until the first world war.

derived from the Rights of Man spread by the French Revolution, saw in the coalitions of workers an evocation of Federal corporativism and tried to oppose their success, thus helping more and more the prevalence of capitalism.

Meanwhile, theorists and statesmen were realizing the importance of the working classes' rising tide and were trying to organize their forces, spreading new theories or striving to check




attitude of the little girls, who appear to be more concerned for the fate of the bird in the glass ball – where a vacuum has been produced – than interested in the scientific experiment in itself.

The Christian Churches – Catholic and Protestant of various denominations – tried to take away the monopoly of the workers from Marxism, imparting a radical turn to their doctrine and starting a new era in the history of the relationship between church and society.

The democratic liberalism prevalent in the 19th century,

their drive. Blanc's "Ateliers sociaux", the political and economic acknowledgment of the trade unions are stages of the working classes' progress, in which the extremist theories of Marx and Sorel fermented actively.

They led another important feature of the modern workers' movement to success: the inter-



Left.

"The felling of the trees" by Hubert Robert (1733-1808).

A protagonist of the archeological landscapism, which in the XVIII century attracted many European painters, Robert mainly addressed his work to the description of man's labour, without neglecting – besides the individual activities – its general organization, its equipment and tools.

Below left.

"The foundry" by Adolph Menzel (1815-1905), certainly a major protagonist of realism in Germany. Menzel, besides working in this pictorial perspective – meant above all as a concrete manner to be and to communicate – does not evade the direct political engagement, and participates in the uprising of 1848. After 1870, Menzel remarkably changed his attitude, fully joining in the new technological and productive fervour which invested Kaiser Wilhelm II's Germany, making its industry one of the most advanced and imposing in the world.

Therefore, in 1875, Menzel made this painting in a celebratory spirit, with the intention of praising, more than the workers, the places and protagonists of a new national situation.



nationalist spirit, that pervaded the proletariat, against the passionate nationalism of capitalism. Through internationalism, the thought was spread that the worker's interests were not tied to his nation and that his real world was the workers' international.

Such an orientation stemmed from two considerations: the internationalism of production and trade and the levelling of all workers to the common condition of wage earners.

The danger deriving from these conceptions is its tendency to diffuse a brutish materialism apt to repress all spiritual values. This danger provoked the Catholics' intervention. Pope Leo XIII tried to oppose the principles of Karl Marx's Manifest with the ideologies of the Encyclical "Rerum Novarum".

The intervention – vis-à-vis the dominant socialism – had a twofold character: contrasting and competing. Contrasting, in that is proposed to contrast the blind materialism with a social ethic inspired by Christian principles. Competing, because – like

the Workers' International – it tried to find a form of organization with the same international character.

After that, the problem did not acquire other particular innovative aspects, excepting the intervention in the struggle of a large class of civil servants, which aimed at the State – its employer – its polemics and darts. The problem has remained basically unchanged since the dawning of this century, which had certainly witnessed improvements and social progress in the whole world.

The various current political ideologies, from moderate and collaborationist socialism to communism and the most combative syndicalism, all conscious of the political importance of the masses, always set the relationship between capital and labour at the centre of their programs.

There are still many – too many indeed – who try to lever on this century-old conflict for their political ends. And still too many are those who do not seem to understand the words written by the American "Steel King" Andrew Carnegie: "Capital and labour must proceed side by side and he who sows seeds of discord between them is the enemy of both".

THE SOCIAL QUESTION IN ITALY

The first appearance of a social question in Italy dates back to the foundation of the societies for mutual help, the first of which was born among the printers of Turin, in 1738. The relevant problems spread all over Italy, slowly at first and then at a quickened pace, after the ideas of social vindication had become active in every country as a consequence of the French Revolution.

The joining together of people of equal social standing, albeit for reasons of mutual assistance, evidenced the shortcomings in their material and moral conditions and brought new problems to the surface.

One of the first was ignorance and illiteracy, owing to which an interesting phase in the life of the associations of mutual help was marked by the creation of the association for mutual teaching, created by Confalonieri in 1818. This association had a precedent in the *Repubblica Cisalpina*, with the founding of the Society of Public Education in 1797.

From mutuality, which is a form of assistance limited to the cases in which the individual, owing to illness or other reasons, is prevented from working, a further step is made toward a more active phase, i.e. "cooperation" among the various members of a society with the intent of obtaining improvements for the whole category.

Thus, from the workers' associations for mutual help we go on to the craftsmen brotherhoods. The first newspapers for the worker are born ("*L'Operaio*") by Perego, "*L'Emancipazione*" by Bravalle and "*La Politica per il Popolo*").

The first conferences are held in Asti in 1853, at Novi in 1859, in Florence in 1861. Among the economic questions, the political element slowly permeates these meetings, for also the participation of the individual to the political life appears to be a right that ought to be defended.

Thus the social question enters into its political phase at the beginning of our national unification.

Nevertheless this workers' movement, organized into craftsmen brotherhoods, is not an element of disgregation for the newborn Kingdom of Italy. The deep religious sentiment that permeates the masses prevents the first hints of social struggle from degenerating into a materialistic interpretation of life, bound to rouse hates and disturbances.

This without mentioning that Mazzini, as head of the popular Republican Party, had given deep ethic contents to the concept of "elevation of the people", setting the idea of "people" near that of "God" and speaking of rights as compensation for the

duties done. For this reason the first Italian workers' movement remained in a national sphere of balance and moderation. And it was indeed following Mazzini's initiative that in 1871, in Rome, the various associations joined in a pact of brotherhood, which accepted the programme worked out by the International Workers' Congress held in Geneva in 1866.

The first demands for legislative provisions mark the beginning of the third phase of the social question. In the meantime, while the workshop was being replaced by large-scale industry, the workers' movement acquired the more specific character of class struggle.

Mazzini's ideas clash with Marx's and Bakunin's internationalist ones. The first strikes are organized and the peasants also join in the workers' clamourings, especially in the south, where Marxist ideas, confusedly understood, feed the people's exasperation.

A moderate and evolutionist line splits from the extremists: it consists of young, cultivated and enthusiastic people such as Andrea Costa, Bissolati and Turati, who lead the workers in their claims. The Socialist Party of the Italian Workers is thus born in 1892 and the first Trade Unions are established, which in 1893, after the Congress of Genoa, will join in a federation.

A hybrid organization between workers, peasants and noblemen was formed in Sicily (the Sicilian Fasces) and led to disorders. In order to stop them, Prime Minister Crispi deemed it necessary to proclaim martial law and dissolve the leagues and the organizations.

The social problem had by now become a major factor, so much so that, along with the Socialist Workers' Movement, a Catholic movement took shape and, under Pius X, led to the formation of a proper confessional party.

The Italian government, confronted by the workers' claims after Crispi's and Pelloux's stern reaction, followed, with Giolitti, a line of concessions. Thus for about a decade a policy



Above.

"The parquet planers" by Gustave Caillebotte (1848-1894). Although a direct participant and very active supporter of the Impressionist group, Gustave Caillebotte remained close to the parameters of his original realism which was, inter alia, very attentive to the figures of the working-man's world.

of social reconciliation was followed; laws were passed regarding work accidents, the work of women and children, weekly rest in the industry and night work. In the political field, the universal suffrage, which was obtained in 1912, increased the number of voters from 3 to 8 million. Nevertheless this conciliatory policy did not reconcile the hearts.

Strikes multiplied; associations sprouted; the weakness shown in facing pressures remarkably diminished the authority of the State. Meanwhile, also within Socialism itself the splits deepened. The party, which had the undeniable merit of having improved the people's education by evidencing their interests and problems, thus enhancing the living standard of the masses, now that it was materially stronger, appeared to be spiritually weaker.

The dissension between reformists and revolutionaries became more marked: the Sorelian syndicalists, who advocated a systematic opposition by means of strikes, split from the latter. The various currents of Socialism were unanimous on a single point: in their opposition, at first, to the Libyan campaign and, afterwards, to Italy's interven-

tion in the first World War.

Nevertheless, after the beginning of the conflict, the Socialist Party's attitude was generally that of non-support, but never of sabotage. Filippo Turati's sound patriotism set an example in this direction, stating that "to fight imperialism at home, we must not help that of others". But the forces withheld during the war period exploded immediately after the war. The sufferings, the reaction against the war profiteers, the difficulty of finding work for the veterans, and lastly the influence of the Russian Revolution, aggravated by demagogic propaganda, produced disorders, unruliness and violence.

Italy was one of the countries most hit by the post-war world crisis.

The new political alignment of the parties, marked by the Socialist Party's maximalism and the birth of the "Partito Popolare Italiano", recorded, after the Congress of Livorno in 1921, the foundation of the Italian Communist Party, which joined the Third Internationale.

The Communist Party was a chip off the Socialist Party's block; from Turin started the race between the preparation of

the proletariat to revolution and the reactionary tide of Fascism that advanced menacingly.

The government found itself unable to contain the turbulent masses and hoped that the Bolshevizing winds would blow over by themselves.

The occupation of factories, which ended in failure, made some people hope in the revolutionaries' incapability to organize but, meanwhile, the Fascist Party was drawing forces from the disorders and from the government's weakness.

Fascism, after prohibiting the strike and lock-out rights, tried to solve the social problem with a corporative organization. Its intent was to substitute the struggle among the classes with cooperation in the ambit of the same activity, with the State's supervision. The system's shortcomings were precisely in its strict centralized character: the worker's interests were entrusted to people appointed "from above", mostly unable to resist the government's pressures. The Trade Unions continued to exist, but only as tools of the dictatorship.

With time the social confrontation has grown significantly, involving huge fields and problems (agrarian reform, the civil servants' question etc.).

Many results have been achieved in the last years, through provisions which guarantee the dignity of work and the welfare of the working class.

The work in this field could be even more rewarding if there were not elements of exploitation, which now and then disturb the development and perform a polluting action in a phenomenon of democratic growth and social

From top.

"The wheat sifters" by Gustave Coubert (1819-1905). Rather than describing or denouncing situations, Coubert's realistic paintings wanted to assert the principles of concreteness and positivity, typical of the new working class of which he, as a public figure, was in fact to share the cause and the revolutionary action during the experience of the Paris' Commune.

"The hauliers of the Volga" by Ilja Efanov Repin (1844-1930). This work of strong and expressive realism made its author famous. Repin is rightly considered one of the best known protagonists of both the so-called "Itinerants" (a group of democratic artists counting, among others, Tolstoy and Borodin) and of the entire Russian culture.

"The slaughter of tunny-fish" by Antonino Leto (1844-1913). In this painting, very intense in its narrative clarity, which fits perfectly in the cultural trend of social and humanitarian engagement, typical of the pictorial and sculptural works of the end of the century, Antonino Leto shows the fishermen's toil as well as the perennial battle between man and nature, imposed by the often ruthless fight for survival.

progress, which is destined to rise more and more towards contents and manifestations of a higher civilization.

The disturbances are nevertheless inevitable in today's impetuous socio-economic dynamics.

Modern reality, stemming from serious human and civil tragedies, concretizes in conflictual dynamics which, though in more developed forms, seem to reach back to the source of the wide set of questions very wisely focused by Mazzini in his "Thoughts about Bureaucracy in Europe".

The Trade Unions are an expression of this, for they are a stimulating and driving force which confronts a Capitalism organized and amalgamated by a strong cohesion of converging interests.

The farmers' conquest of divided property and their ensuing disappointment due to the scantiness of the income derived from the land – consequent to the transformation, in a reductive sense, of the big estate's



"logic" – are the foremost reason of the widespread phenomenon of urbanism, which is matched by the extraordinary growth of industry in the '50s.

Thus, new conditions of social contrast arise, almost in a Hegelian cycle, with the owners of the so-called "work tools" on one side, and, on the other, the vast human reality distinguished between industry workers and workers of the "Third Sector".

There is, as a consequence, a wider circulation of money, which, on the one hand encourages the progressive formation of a pseudo-bourgeoisie, ever more intent on its climb towards a more apparent than real prosperity, on the other it creates the prerequisites for increasingly intense social dialectics.

This tendency becomes sharper in the '60s. In the light of it, the individual's rights are emphasized and amply publicized, but they are not always supported by actual legal principles; and this in evident contrast with an evolution which, to be true to its name, should hold in equal consideration the rights granted by the concrete requirements of a civil and harmonious social life.

The urge to consume and the egalitarianism contribute to a transformation of customs which necessarily leads to a dynamics in the social rise of the working classes not always in line with the necessary balance between just aspirations and an orderly economic development.

Therefore, from the '70s onwards, the defence of the "proletarian" classes often clashes with the principles guiding the enterprise; principles that are perhaps backed by economic theories and models which, although certainly valid, are no longer in line with the changing times.

The brunt is taken mostly by industrial stability, which witnesses the opening of deep fissures under the pressure of politico-social motivations, which have disruptive aftereffects, even if they are justifiable and deserve consideration from the human point of view.



The problem of growing unemployment adds itself to this context; unemployment caused by the developing technologies and, particularly, by automation, which demand very high specialization, reduce the size of human intervention and produce at the same time among the "traditional" workers, a class of castaways who are no more accepted in a "logic" dominated by a sometimes excessive sophistication of means and materials.

The prevalent use of machines, on the other hand, results in an overproduction of goods which often does not find an adequate response by the market, for it surpasses the real demands of consumption.

As a result an absurd contrast of social situations comes about, which sees, on one side, a wide availability of goods – a sign of prosperity – and, on the other, a diminished capability of the less wealthy classes to absorb them.

The consequence is a chain-reaction which distinguishes the present world and influences heavily all manifestations of the physiognomy of modern civilization.

A civilization that is resolutely projected towards the year 2000 despite the hindrances and contradictions that mark its image.

This is today's fundamental motivation, beyond the admittedly positive ideologies and the exciting achievements of the mind.

The dialectics among strong concentrations of equally justifi-

fied positions is desperately trying to find a synthesis on the basis of which the human progress will assert itself and prevail.

We are all responsible for it, on the moral plane and in front of history, which is written in a continuity of spirit, in an epic but silent dimension, built with conscious devotion in the sign of man.

The end of the second millennium is, like the first's, full of exalting expectations.

In the Middle Ages, the world's attention focused on finding the God's truth, which was mainly a search for a more human dimension of existence and a restoration of the essential values, faded after the fall of the Roman Empire of the West.

In the framework of G.B. Vico's theory of the repetition of historical phenomena, today we are living in the hope of the restoration of the disrupted social balances and the reawakening of consciences, shaken by inhuman disorders.

The social reality, which we are now labouriously preparing, cannot and must not be a problematic one, because we cannot accept the "logic" of an exciting scientific development not matched by an equally vivifying moral ascent, in a true ethical vision of civil society and progress.

The medieval tensions ripened, after the first millennium, a wonderful fruit: Francis of Assisi, who embraced all creatures, in a universal conception of existence, to the point of calling even death his "sister".

True as it is that history repeats itself with constant rhythms, in the light of the Franciscan teachings we are allowed to hope that the future will see the triumph of the new man, more conscious of his qualities and devoting all his forces to the accomplishment of an irreplaceable good: the peaceful coexistence of peoples, which is a prerequisite of civilization and a result of the supremacy of the spirit over matter.





THE EASTERN

QUESTION

SINCE 1878

The problem known as the "Eastern Question", comprises a whole set of political, ethnic, economic and religious problems connected with the regions that used to form the territorial base of the Ottoman Empire in the 15th and 16th centuries. It therefore encompasses the following areas: in Europe, the whole of the Balkan peninsula; in Asia, Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia; in Africa, Egypt and the Mediterranean coast as far as Tunis.

Our historical review begins in 1878, the year of the Congress of Berlin and the end of the 1875-1878 Balkan crisis, marking one of the most important turning points in the intricate story of the Eastern Question that had been dragging on for over a century, and which was to constitute the focal point of European politics until 1914.

The Congress of Berlin prevented Russia from attracting the Slavic nations of the Balkans into its orbit, and using diplomatic means, it took away from Russia most of what it had earlier seized by force of arms. However, it left behind a smoldering war, not merely a Balkan war, but a European war in Macedonia.

It supported Austria's thrust eastwards, now that it had become Europe's bulwark against Pan-Slavism, and helped Britain to push Russia out of the Mediterranean and retain a dominant position there. In addition to Russia, France and Italy felt let down: France, because the British occupation of Cyprus and the British control over the Suez Canal jeopardized France's aspirations over Syria and Egypt; and Italy, because Austria had strengthened its hold over the eastern Adriatic coast without yielding anything in exchange.

Thanks to the diplomatic skill which Bismarck displayed immediately afterwards, a number of agreements were made and a compromise solution was reached under which peace was ensured in a situation of unstable equilibrium. But this did not solve the problem, and it allowed the major powers to conduct

an intense economic propaganda exercise throughout all the Turkish territories.

Austria persevered with its railway-building policy in the Balkans, and had set its sights on reaching Salonika. France lent heavily to Turkey in exchange for monopolies and other economic favours; Britain set out from Egypt to begin exploiting Turkish Asia. Even Germany embarked on a policy to penetrate Asian Turkey with the Anatolia Railway. This, coupled with the German occupation of Kiaochow in the Far East, marked the transition between Bismarck's essentially European policy to Wilhelm's world policy.

To have a free hand in this field, Germany encouraged Russia to move towards the Far East, and urged France on to the large-scale colonization of Africa and Asia, leaving Britain with East Africa.



Title page

Lebanon
(26 August - 11 September 1982).
Bersaglieri troops of the Italian peace-keeping contingent landing in Beirut for "Lebanon 1".

Above

Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878). The battle of Shipka in a painting in Sofia Museum. The fighting lasted for six days, and the Russo-Bulgarian forces managed to keep their hold on the Shipka Pass.

While all this economic activity designed to seek out new raw material sources and new trade outlets was going on, the reorganization of the Turkish countries was ignored, and this led to new internal crises that were later to cause the crisis in the Turkish Empire — the sick man of European diplomacy — to snowball.

The situation was aggravated by the Armenian crisis, the Crete question and above all the

perennial turmoil in Turkish-controlled Macedonia, where the Serbs, Turks and Greeks were in continual conflict amongst themselves and against the domination of Turkey, encouraged by the attitude of Bulgaria.

Concerned about its Far East policy, Russia envisaged a rapprochement with Austria, for peaceful cooperation over the reforms in Macedonia which, at the Murzsteg Conference, turned out to be a new affirmation of Austrian supremacy in the Balkans.

Amid the chaos of nationalities and religions, compounded with diplomatic intrigues, the weak Turkish policy increasingly showed signs of cracking.

In 1908, the constitutional revolution of the "Young Turks" for the reform of Turkey along the lines of the Western States, failed to regenerate the decrepit empire, and had very serious repercussions abroad.

Bulgaria and Montenegro declared independence; Austria, with German support, proceeded with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Russia, still smarting from its defeat at the hands of the Japanese, was militarily weak and split by Socialist agitation, and was forced to yield.

The war between Italy and Turkey over Libya showed that Turkey had not recovered its strength, and once again the will to see the end of the Turkish empire was aroused throughout the Balkans.

Having been repulsed in the Far East, Russia returned to its traditional Balkan and Mediterranean policies, and it was quick to seize the chance of avenging itself against Austria, by supporting the Balkan nations' agreement to declare war on Turkey.

Flushed with victory in the first Balkan war (under the 1912 Treaty of London) and with a larger booty than expected, Bulgaria provoked the second Balkan war with the support of Austria which was anxious to trim Russia's plan to enlarge Serbia (1913 - the Treaty of Bucharest). Bulgaria's defeat left Austria diplomacy in tatters.

Austria then toyed with the idea of attacking Serbia, but since Germany did nothing to encourage it, and above all because Italy held Austria back, the war was put off by one year.

The outbreak of the two Balkan wars may be considered to have been the inevitable, cruel consequence of the European powers' failure to lay down a rational and constructive policy in the Balkans from 1878 onwards. The second war wiped out most of the advantages gained by the first, because by setting the Balkan States and peoples at one another's throats, it destroyed the union of the Balkans which might have acted as a bulwark against Austria's claims and perhaps prevented Austria's July 1914 initiative.

At the end of the first world war, with the fall of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, German and Turkish empires, things worked out favourably for Serbia and Greece against Bulgaria and, partly, Turkey.

In Asian Turkey, while the Arab world was being consolidated by rallying around nationalistic sentiments (Saudi Arabia), France and Britain extended their influence with their mandates over Syria, and over Palestine and Mesopotamia, respectively.

In Egypt, Britain consolidated its supremacy, but this was not enough to prevent recognition of the subsequent independence of Egypt in 1922, nor the 1936 treaty that emerged after a series of conflicts and agreements, nor the eventual complete British withdrawal in 1954.

In both the Balkans and the Arab Middle East, there were fresh clashes mainly as a result of the attempts at expansionism on the part of the various powers there, especially in the border areas.

Venizelos' "great idea" for Greece clashed with Kemal Ataturk's idea of a nationalist Turkey, leading to the war which ended with the 1923 Lausanne peace treaty that offered a reasonably fair solution that resembled the Italo-Yugoslav Rapallo Treaty in some respects.



The problem of Macedonia, which Greece and Turkey solved at Lausanne, remained a source of attrition between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, and in the Arab Middle East there was friction between France, Britain, Arab nationalism and Zionism.



In 1934, the Balkan Entente united Turkey to the Balkan powers, and helped by French policy it appeared to be a useful means of curbing Fascist expansionist aims.

Nationalistic passions, the thirst for revenge, and fear of

Fascist expansionism in the Mediterranean caused the Balkan states and Turkey to take different sides in the second world war.

As the war drew to its inevitable conclusion, Churchill far-sightedly tried to prevent the

The Russo-Turkish war (1877-1878). The Russian general Gurko entering Sofia. In the background, the ruins of St. Sofia Cathedral, built by Justinian in the 6th century, and later converted into a mosque by the Turks.



Left

The map shows the Balkan States after the Congress of Berlin on 13 June 1878. Serbia almost doubled its territory, and Greece's rights over Thessalia were recognized, even though it was only able to occupy it there years later, while Bulgaria was dismembered.

Below

The Greek-Turkish war (1897). The battle of Domokos, the most important engagement happened during this conflict. In the battle excelled, gallantly fighting, the 700 Camicie Rosse commanded by Ricciotti Garibaldi.

to attract the Arab countries into the Western sphere of influence. Since it clashed with the Arab world's wish to keep out of the East-West conflict, it caused a crisis in the Arab League, which is still smouldering.

These two important pawns in the Western diplomatic game, designed to draw Yugoslavia and the Arab League into the Western camp, might have enabled the Mediterranean to become a fully-fledged internal basin for Western strategy, because having to face a compact block of countries running all the way from the Baltic to the Red Sea and beyond would have caused Russia to suffer yet another major political setback in an area in which it had previously tried, and failed, to carve out for itself an anti-historical and anti-European position of predominance.

I say that this "might have" happened, because things turned out differently.

Soviet forces from spreading out throughout the Balkans by opening up the "second front" there.

But the American wish to bring the war to a rapid end prevailed, and the strategically preferable idea of having the second front in France won the day.

After the war, with a disorganized Europe worried about its future, Romania and Bulgaria were child's play for Soviet expansionism, which bore down heavily on Yugoslavia, the Balkans in general, and the Middle East.

In the period 1945-1950, France was pushed out of the Middle East, Britain's influence was gradually replaced by Russia's (because of Communist propaganda in the Islamic countries, designed to eradicate the influence of the capitalist countries by supporting and encouraging the nationalistic movements there), and by America's, which had taken Britain's place in defending the Middle East against Soviet infiltration.

This led to Syria's successful struggle for independence, the revolution in Azerbaijan, the Iranian crisis, the struggle between Israel and the Arab states, the Egyptian crisis and the constitution of the Arab League.

Subsequent developments took matters still further. In 1953, membership of the Balkan League included countries belonging to NATO (Turkey and Greece) and Yugoslavia, whose political balancing act between East and West enabled it to take a more definite stand and reach a solution to the Trieste question, in addition to the rapprochement and the agreements made between the Italian and the Yugoslav economies, which had traditionally complemented one another.

The Iraqi-Turkish pact, drawn up by a Western bloc country and an Arab League member state, was an attempt



There were too many vested interests at stake, too much mutual mistrust and suspicion, and too little was done too late to overcome the diffidence and the dissent and to encourage a meeting of minds.

Around the end of the Fifties, the Middle East problem increasingly came to mean the Palestinian problem, and the situation gradually worsened as small underground groups that had been in existence for a long time grew more powerful as they became convinced that they were the only way of ensuring that their cause would be successful after the collapse of the union of Syria and Egypt in 1961.

Many different organizations in all the Middle Eastern countries sprang up, linked by common aims but differing in methods, structures and areas of operation.

Because of the danger of splitting and weakening the action of these organizations, the Arab League worked for the creation of one single organization that would attract all the converging interests and coordinate the "operations" of the individual underground movements.

This is how the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) came into being, broadly supported in the countries where the Pan-Arab tradition was most strongly felt.

But in 1967, the Six Day War showed that the combined efforts of Syria, Jordan and Egypt were unable to effectively match Israel's offensive capability.

Following its lightening victory, Israel occupied the Golan Heights, Sinai, the land to the east of Suez and the Western part of Jordan.

This new state of affairs persuaded the young leaders who were establishing themselves in the PLO that it was not advisable or a realistic politically viable proposition for the organization to be too closely linked to the "protector" States as the old founders of the Organization had wished.

Thus the Palestinians began to enjoy their first genuine taste

of policy-making and operational autonomy, and also to take a different approach to the Palestinian presence in their host countries.

The Palestinians living in exile (accounting for about 60% of the whole population) in countries sympathetic to their cause became actively involved in different social spheres, to raise their individual cultural levels and acquire international experience so that they could eventually attain their main objective.

Palestinians who had remained behind in the occupied territories supported the exiles by cooperating with them in organizing underground resistance activities at home.

As the movement grew in size, so did its armed wing al-Fatah, which had been operating for several years with less far-reaching aims, and which had now become large enough to be able to claim to represent the whole of the Palestinian national front.

Al-Fatah demonstrated this in a series of military actions against Israeli troops, such as the 1968 al-Karameh operation.

However, one should not underestimate the importance of

another operational group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) which only really became significant in 1967 thanks to the active leadership of its founder, George Habash.

This faction's activities have not always been transparent and consistent, and it has been through certain notorious episodes such as splits and clashes, and the defection of individuals and whole groups who have declared themselves to be independent of it. But this is only due to the growing multi-directional ideological fervour that underlines the birth of different movements, some of which become firmly established because of their size or because of the support they receive from individual Arab countries.

It was this support from sympathetic governments that enabled the first guerrilla groups to emerge, composed not only of Palestinians but other nationalities, too. These groups varied


The 1912 Balkan War.

The Chiefs of Staff of the Bulgarian 7th Division directing operations near Bulair, where the Turks tried to land using primitive vehicles and without adequate artillery cover, causing their defeat.





*The Six-Day War (July 1967).
An Israeli tank in the Sinai desert.
The tank is the symbol of the crushing
assault which enabled the Israelis to rout
three armies in a war that only lasted
five days and eleven hours.*



widely in their policies, some of which were difficult to reconcile with the original ideology of the movement.

This inevitably led to differences of approach and method, and sometimes led to open clashes.

For example, there was the war of words between al-Fatah and the PFLP, and the independent line taken by the Syrian-backed as-Sa'iqah, and the Iraqi-backed ALF (Arab Liberation Front).

But in 1969, al-Fatah came out on top after the free elections to the "Palestine Congress", and imposed its leader, Yasser Arafat, as the leader of the PLO.

But with such a dynamic and self-willed leader as Arafat, the movement failed to win the authority it needed to attract positive reactions from the whole of the Arab world.

Very soon, serious differences surfaced: first with Lebanon, which was unhappy about having a large number of well-armed and organized Palestinians on its territory, and then with Jordan, which felt that its domestic stability was being threatened.

As if to confirm the fears openly voiced by the Jordanian government, in 1970, the Palestinians tried to overthrow the Hashemite dynasty which reacted with harsh countermeasures that ended with an all-out massacre.

Al-Fatah's bases in Jordan were dismantled.

Meanwhile, the United States was working on a peace formula which Egypt accepted, distancing itself from the guerrillas of the PLO which had now become an embarrassment.

Almost totally isolated, the Palestinians gradually lost what little sympathy and credibility that a few Western countries claimed — very prudently — to have for them.

Terrorism was the only vocation open to the PLO now, to attract world public opinion to the Palestinian question, to continue their resistance and to assert themselves.

However, the way was opened up to a political solution of the crisis after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, when Israel withdrew its troops from some of the previously occupied territories.

However feeble, PLO support for anti-Israeli states gave the movement the chance to play an autonomous rôle once again among the Arab countries, and to acquire a new-found dignity.

Conscious of this new flush of popularity, Arafat set about drawing up a more moderate line of conduct, to encourage dialogue and play down terrorism.

As a result, the PLO was recognized by the Arab States in 1974 as the lawful representative of the rights of the Palestinian people, and the United Nations partly acknowledged Arafat's ideas, and condemned the Israeli expansion.

Meanwhile, however, the traditional antagonism between Christians and Moslems in Lebanon led to outbreaks of violence that soon took on all the features of a civil war.

The Palestinians were quite numerous in Lebanon and they were inevitably caught up in the tension, indirectly at first, and then directly when a number of them were killed by the Christian Right.

It was this (in 1975) that led the Palestinian guerrillas to ally themselves once and for all with the Moslem Left, which received substantial backing from Syria.

In 1976, Syria came forward with a peace plan, but it was so unacceptable to the PLO that when Syrian troops next intervened in Lebanon, Arafat's men sided against them.

Because of all these changes of position, the Arab States' support for the Palestinians began to wane. They were rigidly controlled on the one hand, and suddenly exposed to attacks on the other, as the political wind changed direction on the complex Middle Eastern political stage.

Seeing that their attempts and struggles over the years had come to nothing, the leaders of the various factions of the movement decided to seek common ground, and this gave the PLO a new lease of life, and enabled it to resume its rôle as the only lawful representative of Palestinian rights.

With its newley re-acquired status, the PLO gradually worked on an international psychological plan to sensitize worldwide public opinion.

Thanks to this less warlike and more political image, the PLO managed to acquire a spe-

Palestinian conflicts.

The efforts of the Multi-national Peace-Keeping Force, to which Italy made such an important contribution, with two missions to Lebanon, have been in vain.

The fact is that in addition to the many, worldwide interests that are involved in the Eastern Mediterranean coastal area, the Arab and Israeli "question" is plagued by the changing alliances, resulting in short-lived treaties, and a cavalier attitude to agreements, even those drawn up under the auspices of international organizations, as well



cial place on the international scene.

By the end of the Seventies, negotiations were the order of the day, with the mediation or at least the supervision of the countries most directly concerned by the Middle East problem.

The superpowers in particular made sure that the world knew about their plans for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, where conflict was rife, and threatened to spread more widely.

Unfortunately, all the attempts made to find a stable solution to the problems came to naught.

Even today, tensions in the area are continually in the headlines, fuelling international terrorism, and leading to the more recent inter-Arab and Israeli-

Lebanon

(26 September 1982 - 20 February 1984). ITALCON Paratroops in Beirut during the "Lebanon 2" mission. Italy's peace-keeping contingent managed at all times to maintain a stance of total impartiality, and this helped the rival factions to engage in dialogue and negotiations.

as the unbridgeable historical, ethnic or religious divisions that exist between the people in the region.

It is these features which lead the causes of attrition to explode in a chain reaction, and the chances of any lasting solution being found in the foreseeable future to the many issues at stake are very slim indeed.

The area's problems are kept continually on the boil by

the fact that the area is of such major economic importance as a crossroads of international trade. Overt and concealed pressures from outside also hamper the search for a definitive solution, or at least a peace plan that might guarantee a state of equilibrium between the warring factions for a reasonable period of time.

Another important factor is the very high armament density in the region, where demand outstrips the supply from the technologically advanced countries (with huge economic repercussions), which weakens the individual countries' resolve to withstand the temptation to resort to arms in reaction to provocation or to real or imagined outrages. All these factors taken together, plus the region's undoubted strategic importance, make the Middle East one of the high-risk areas in which a worldwide conflict could be sparked off.

The tension between Libya and Egypt, the Iran-Iraq war, the

stance of Syria and Jordan in regard to the Palestinian "question", Israel's refusal to budge on what it considers to be infeasible principles, and the profound religious divergences between the Moslem, Jewish and Christian communities, constitute aspects of a confused situation whose features are often hard to grasp and therefore more dangerous.

One of the many special envoys who have seen this situation that has overstepped the borderline of the absurd has given us a most emblematic, yet sadly realistic, description of contemporary Jerusalem and Beirut which sums up these dangers.

He says, quite rightly, that there is the traditional city, with its history, and the various "cities" with their day-to-day affairs, and their clearly defined districts transformed into villages/fortresses, in which each community lives with its ideology and traditions, its obsessions and its hatreds.

It is a situation that we cannot ignore, and which demands the goodwill and the help of every country that is sincerely concerned about peace.

If they are vigilant, and if their help is forthcoming, they can give substance to the hope that in the dialectical ups-and-downs of history, after the dreadful tragedy of war, the people

will learn to live together in peace, because this is the indispensable condition for any genuine progress. I know that this is still wishful thinking at the present time, and I realize that the chances of its becoming reality in the light of the tragic events of the past few years are slim indeed.

But it is a hope that must not be set aside, and which should cause us to reflect on what the UN might do to create a system for negotiating crises instead of managing them once they have broken out. It is quite clear that the normal function of any international organization in the present political situation, must be the very arduous task of seeking out the broadest possible consensus above all else, for this is the only way to draw near to the ideals enshrined in the United Nations Charter, but which are unfortunately still beyond our reach.

Exploring every area in which agreement seems possible is the only way to make an indirect contribution to the establishment of peace.

And this applies to the "Eastern Question" — a question that seems to become increasingly more problematic, and whose difficulties appear to become increasingly more acute, with the passage of time.

The commitment of the national contingents working with the UN wherever there was trouble, helped to lessen the tension. In future, the UN might be required to create a system for negotiating crises, instead of managing them after they have broken out.



THE EASTERN QUESTION SINCE 1878



CHARACTERS AND ASPECTS OF PUBLICITY



Publicity, lexically defined as "any form of activity aimed at guiding the public's preference towards a given product or service", is, first of all, an economic factor.

A hinge between production and consumption, publicity carries the message of industry and commerce to the public and is, without doubt, a typical expression of our industrialized society. A society that, in order to expand production, must create new, more or less real needs and new types of consumption, often connected with the "status" and aspirations of the individual.

The original task of publicity was only that of informing: that is, making the existence of a new product known.

Examples of this existed also in ancient times, in the written "advertisements" discovered in Pompei and Ostia, or with the town criers and heralds of the Middle Ages, whose tradition in Southern and insular Italy has not completely died.

Nevertheless, the greatest development of publicity occurred with the appearance of printing.

Starting from the first printed announcement, displayed in Great Britain in 1480 to promote a book, through the first newspaper advertisement appeared in Germany in 1525, to the first paid personal advertisement published in 1651 by a doctor on the 6th issue of the "Gazette" – later "Gazette de France" – the way was long but progressive, and in 1830 led to the first wall posters and placards.

The initial black and white poster was printed in two colours (red and blue) in 1836 and became subsequently polychrome and ever livelier, thanks to two concurrent factors.

On the one side, the advent and improvement of chromolithography; on the other, the interest of famous artists who, like Henri Toulouse-Lautrec, in the second half of the 19th century

Facing page.

From 1915 to 1918 the war loans followed one another, and their promotion, for lack of means such as television, was entrusted to newspapers and, most of all, to posters. One of the most striking for its realism and dramatic impact is undoubtedly this one drawn by Mauzan, which appeared around the period of Caporetto: in the portrait of the fiery-eyed infantryman, with his finger pointing almost threateningly towards the public, one can almost perceive the symbol of the resistance on the Piave.

Below.

While the 19th century was a period of great inventions and scientific discoveries, the following one appears from the beginning as the century of technique: almost immediately, the automobile becomes one of its symbols. This poster of the new born FIAT (whose vaguely Latin trademark is really made up by the initials of Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino) shows one of the first models. The external frame is that of a horse coach; the steering wheel has not yet appeared.



Right.

The 1910 Milan Air Rally was a European event; 45 pilots from all over the world accepted to participate; five of them declared to be ready to engage in the "almost impossible" flight across the Alps, planned to take place before the rally. Actually, only Chavez made the attempt, and died after his victory. The rally took place all the same, and the public was certainly not less enthusiastic than the spectators imagined by Jean Béraud, author of this poster extolling the "new sport" of the beginning of the century: aviation.

Below.

From the appearance of the first "coaches without horses" of Daimler and Benz, the automobile has progressed enormously and is considered by many the "transportation means of the future".

The car industry is developing very rapidly, as proved by the Milan exhibition, which opened just before the Paris-Peking raid. The winged genius on the poster gives almost the impression of a last, melancholic tribute to the world of the 19th century.



overcame their initial adversion for this new activity and created posters that were successful as original artistic expressions.

Colour printing, photography, newspaper and magazine advertisements, ever brighter and more attractive, luminous signs, radio, cinema and television led with time to an extremely rapid "explosion" of the publicity message. The salient aspects of the peculiar mass civilization, which had fostered this "explosion" were caught in 1930, with fine perception, by the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset in his book "The Revolt of the Masses".

The phenomenon was then actually only moving its first steps and the author had been able to perceive its mechanisms because it was still in its initial, simpler and therefore more evident phase. He could consequently affirm, with modern and up-to-date expressions: "He who wants to meditate, to collect his thoughts, must learn to do it submerged by the public din, like a diver in the ocean of collective noise. It is practically impossible for man to be alone. Willing or unwilling, he must stay with others. The



Below.

During the years of the Triple Alliance, the official Italian policy seems to be that of forgetting the past conflicts with Austria.

Everything "German" if fashionable, including beer which, nevertheless, is still foreign to the Italian taste and must therefore be vigorously advertised, although – as a tribute to the particular climate – it is named "Italia". The poster reflects at the same time the spirit of a period when Europe, essentially peaceful, could afford to fight "small wars overseas".

big avenue and the square throw their anonymous hubbub through the domestic walls. All that was meant as a protection against boundless publicity vanishes day by day.

That was 1930, but we were at the heart of the problem and faced situations similar to the present ones which, after the respite of the second world conflict and the hard, immediate

post-war years, record the rampant success of a more and more sophisticated publicity.

Publicity is sometimes not fully known as an economic activity because next to the major full time advertising agencies, sometimes quoted on the Stock Exchange, there are "miniagencies", that base their production mainly on their "gray matter". As a matter of fact, there are many small organizations that do their work in a precarious setting: two small rented rooms, a telephone, two or three people, a few letterheads and a lot of will and initiative. This is the embryo of the advertising agency, whose survival and development will depend on the talent and ability of the founders.

The large industrial and commercial enterprises mostly

fulfill their publicity needs autonomously. There are in fact publicity services within the companies, with tens or hundreds of employees, capable of conceiving, carrying out and developing any type of campaign. The availability of these "home" services does not exclude the possibility that the companies entrust the launching of some of their products to well-established advertising agencies.

Moreover, in this multiform and variable way, next to the two main groups of independent and integrated agencies already considered, there is the category of the consultant offices that cooperate with the heads of the major firms and, as experts in an activity in which innovation has the highest priority, supply appropriate ideas, suggestions, criticism.

As a profession often envied, sometimes defamed, doubtlessly necessary, publicity, often considered a witchcraft endowed with powers that it certainly does not possess, suffers – in case of crisis – the repercussions of the unfavourable conjuncture more rapidly than other activities.

In the business field it is not unusual to hear the statement that a good part of the publicity expenses is wasted money.

The difficulty is to find out the useless part, for the returns of the "campaigns" cannot be quantified with scientific exactitude. Despite polls, investigations, inquires of every kind and size, the returns of the publicity expenses in terms of business remain hard to determine, despite the "specialists'" affirmation that their activity is the motive power of economy and expansion.

Actually, mass production and consumption cannot do without this product of our times.

As an integrant part of the producing companies' strategy, publicity takes part in the various phases of marketing. From the conception of the product to its presentation, its marketing, its pricing, publicity



Tricolor flag, plumed Bersaglieri hat, laurel foliage: today, these elements would be used with caution even for an Armed Forces propaganda poster. Between 1910 and 1918, instead, they were considered suitable ingredients for the publicity campaign of a newspaper — one of the most renowned and important.

Prices are also remarkable: a yearly subscription brought the price to 5 centesimi per copy.

It is interesting to note that 5 centesimi was the equivalent of 150 lire of today.

accompanies the article and almost prepares it with a sort of "pre-sale" that results in making it considered as indispensable.

Just as one proceeds when the promotion regards the name of a "pop" singer or the image of a person to be imposed on public opinion.

On the other hand, the advertisers' situation is not always as brilliant as it might appear.

Apparently omnipotent in the eye of the people at large, who sometimes resignedly endure a real persuasive hammering, often considered as the ultimate expression of luxury and modernity, the advertising agents in reality must sell their ideas and skills to businessmen who want and demand an actual increase in their sales and who, if difficulties arise, are ready to reduce, as a first measure, the expenses of this specific sector.

Designated by some as the spearhead of contemporary life, often considered an affirmation of optimism and enjoyment, publicity really does entertain the eye and the spirit, and deserves to be regarded as an outstanding feature of our civilization, on an equal footing with the car, the "exotic" holidays, the conquest of space.

It is a "feature" which is continuously reevaluated. As one can read in an essay by Gian Paolo Ceserani "The unarmed persuaders", a Gallup poll conducted in the United States in 1940 showed that only 40% of the people interviewed expressed criticism about publicity, which was deemed

IL GIORNALE D'ITALIA
ROMA · PALAZZO SCIARRA
ABBONAMENTI
ITALIA: Anno Lire **16** - Semestre Lire **8.50** - Trimestre Lire **4.50** - Mese Lire **1.75**
ESTERO: Fr. **34** - Fr. **18** - Fr. **10** - Fr. **4**
DONO A TUTTI INDISTINTAMENTE:
Splendida **RIVISTA ILLUSTRATA**, di oltre 100 pagine, **IL SECOLO XX**, pubblicata dallo stabilimento **Fratelli Treves**, Milano, e che separatamente costa Lire 6.

useful, honest and sincere by 51% of the interviewed.

In more recent times — on the contrary — an inquiry held by the "Harvard Business Review" ascertained that 85% of the interviewed criticized publicity, perhaps because they considered it a factor of the excesses of consumption.

A peculiar "fact" which, just a few years ago, was well liked by almost 7% of the Italian consumers, who considered it a proof of the social advancement of our society.


A "fact", finally, with its restraints and limitations, for in the reality of our days the mass of consumers has ceased to be a submissive, easily conquerable terrain, that affects instead in its turn, as a kind of social echo, both production and publicity.

In its continual eagerness to sell more and in better way, publicity seeks and employs all possible means to reach its potential customers. "Props" of all sorts are multiplied toward this end: all that can be used to draw the attention of the particular category of people considered the "objective" of the "campaign".

Press, radio, television, cinema, walls of the underground and railway stations, buses, taxis, etc. are suitable for this goal.

In a powerful "crescendo", the written or spoken texts employ sounds, images, music.

The operators' imagination explodes, searching for increasingly effective ideas, up to the point of manifestations which having reached the permissible limits, border



Food is Ammunition - *Don't waste it.*

sometimes on abuse.

Surreptitious advertising, pressures on the press and false publicity are the most common expressions of these abuses.

The fact that a publicity "flash" turns out to be more effective if concealed and not shown as such, is the main reason for the so-called surreptitious advertising.

Press, cinema and television can take part in the game, unbeknownst to the reader or the audience.

There are obviously norms and prohibitions in this regard, but they can be – and often are – more or less openly circumvented.

Pressures on the press are another form of abuse. The relations between the organs of the press and the advertising organizations have never been

simple.

Newspapers cannot live without publicity, which – in the form of insertions or editorial pages – make up the most substantial part (up to 80%) of the revenues. There is therefore no reason to be surprised if, with some frequency, certain advertising organizations or other enterprises – in a complicated interplay of public relations – try to obtain the publication of articles of indirect support – or at least not adverse ones – threatening, in case of refusal, to cancel or reduce the publicity contracts.

The effectiveness of these undue pressures diminishes when the press takes its precautions, both through wider all-round publicity concessions to different sectors, and through

In 1918, the participation of the United States in the war is not yet very weighty on the military plane, but is already decisive from the economic viewpoint.

The American foodstuff invades Europe well before the U.S. soldiers reach it.

The spectre of hunger, that in 1917 had begun to haunt the countries of the Entente, is exorcised.

This poster of the U.S. Food Administration shows an often neglected aspect of war: unlike the soldiers at Caporetto, those on the Piave had behind them a country where there was no danger of revolts caused by the lack of bread.

the professional rigour of the editors.

There are, moreover, forms or attempts of actual false publicity which are sometimes the result of a behaviour which, being naturally inclined to hyperbole and emphasis, often results in actual falsehoods.

The ideal would be that the spontaneous and general observance of a deontological code could lead to a kind of self-discipline. But this, desirable and enticing as it may be, will never be able to work without the cogent power of laws and rules.

The Italian criminal code, in Articles 662, 663 and 664, considers a group of crimes (unlawful printing activity; unlawful sale, distribution or posting of inscriptions or drawings; destruction or defacement of posters and placards), which lists the transgressions concerning the surveillance over the advertising means.

One can note, in this regard, that the norm of Art. 663 on the unlawful distribution of printed publications has been deemed constitutionally illegitimate, together with the corresponding norm of Art. 113 of the Police Law.

It must also be remembered that, as from 1954, all forms of advertising have been subjected to new tax regulations.

These days, finally, advertising has definitively rejected the idea of the simple, rather unrefined "réclame" of its beginnings, and has also



A 1934 poster.

The author is Dudovich, easily recognizable for his style and composition. As for the "Balilla", it is not exactly "for all", considered that its price is the equivalent of an average worker's two-year wage. Still, it is a new and important fact in the history of the automobile in Italy: "Balilla", for the first time, offers "four wheels" to a public which is no more formed only by rich people. With "Balilla", in fact, the number of cars in Italy increases rapidly, from about 60,000 to more than 300,000.



overcome the successive moments of confusion between "information" and incitement to purchase.

With the advent of mass society, a consuming society, gone and far away are the times cited by Maria Corti in her work "The Sectorial Languages in Italy", when advertising was called "réclame" and was considered "the very soul of trade", when it was "homemade" and pathetic, a bit bizarre, deliciously naive.

Today the modern techniques make possible to know the consumers' tastes and preferences; advertising, availing itself of psychological and psychoanalytical knowledge, exploits the consumers' unconscious motivations in order to present itself increasingly in the form of amiable and objective information.

In this light, publicity avails itself of fashions, trends, models that in other fields have shown their vitality and which, through the advertising message, become officially acknowledged.

The admen – called by Vance Packard with a fitting expression "The Occult Persuaders" in his work by the same title – see their position in today's society shade off into one in which, in the words of the already mentioned Ceserani, he assumes the rôle of a qualified and diligent "occult observer". An observer who must strive to perceive in advance the fads, needs, impulses and languages that seem to breed and develop spontaneously in society and which represent society's emotional profile and vulnerable points.

Among the more or less subtle distinctions that can be

For the British propaganda, calling the Germans "Huns" (and also "dogs"), is a habit going back to WWI. We see it again in this poster of 1942, urging the soldiers on the North African front not to underestimate the importance of camouflage nets. And for good reasons: the excellent concealment of the artillery positions was in fact very useful for the British forces during the Battle of Alamein.



made in the extensive field of publicity, some are particularly interesting.

It goes without saying, in fact, that the advertising techniques, widespread today in all directions, from their primary economic purposes can be projected on other courses.

If subjected to an ideology, in particular, they become propaganda techniques.

This British poster refers to the Mediterranean landings during WWII. But the picture is perfectly fitting also for Normandy: the sea teeming with craft of all kinds, tanks advancing directly from the beach, the soldier on the foreground, equipped with the most modern weapons – all details contribute in composing a picture very similar to that of the "great invasion". The common element of the Allied landings is in fact the great abundance of arms, materials and equipment: in this respect, the operations in Normandy are not very different from those carried out in Italy.

From the ethical point of view, as concerns the public, the dangers of this manipulative techniques are of much greater significance, because it is not a matter of improving the sales of a car or a television set, but an attempt at influencing the individual's mind and the citizen's behaviour.

According to a creditable assertion by Kenneth Bouldin of the University of Michigan, one can envisage a world dominated by a sort of invisible dictatorship, where, nevertheless, all the outward forms of democratic freedom are preserved.

In the face of this danger, the individual's right to autonomous judgement demands that all be ready to discern and reject the more or less concealed attempts at persuasion. Luckily, as observed by Clyde Miller in his book

Today American women are even at West Point, and a poster like this would be unthinkable. But in distant 1942 it had a remarkable psychological impact.

The exhortation "be a man" (with the implicit addition "don't let a woman be 'more of a man' than you") was typical of the pioneer mentality, which was still alive in those years. The United States, which at that time was fighting mainly in the Pacific, needed mostly sailors.

"The Persuasion Process", the persuaders' devices sooner or later are revealed and followed by the development of an instinctive mechanism protecting the freedom of will and choice.

Also the Government authority, working on the same line, can try to employ advertising methods to effectively spread ideas and norms.

The postal code, used for speeding the mail service, was divulged employing all means, and in a relatively short time has come to be a generally accepted rule, thanks to an expert and insistent propaganda.

What are the possibilities and limits of advertising as regards the Armed Forces? The problem can perhaps be observed from two angles.

The first, more simply and immediately perceived, concerns weapon systems and all kinds of military materials.

In this respect, the characters and techniques of advertising in general can be found in full also in the special branch which addresses itself to the Armed Forces.

It is a branch that, for reasons of appropriateness, and sometimes of reserve, often avoids radio waves, cinema and television screen and centers essentially on the press, through specialized reviews and magazines, newspaper articles, promotional pamphlets.

It is also a branch that does not turn to the public at large but rather operates towards circles and groups of "initiates". The whole is done, perforce, with an exasperated and exasperating attention to public relations.



A number of exhibitions, of the "fair" type, are also addressed to the abovementioned circles and groups of specialists; some are yearly, such as:

- the electro-optics exhibition at Brighton (GB);

- the military electronics exhibition at Wiesbaden (FRG);

some are biennial, such as:

- Farnborough (GB), in even years, and Le Bourget (F) in odd years, displaying means and weapon systems in the field of winged and rotor craft and anti-aircraft weapons;

- Aldershot (GB), in even years, and Satory (F) in odd years, regarding land vehicles, materiel and weapon systems;

- Athens (Gr), even years,

concerning technologically advanced equipment and materials of the three Services, produced by the most important European, American and Asian industries.

These and other minor exhibitions, often presented under the banner of technological incentive in the service of progress and security, are often crossroads of industrial and national interests of great moment.

Security, defence, international cooperation, offsets, industrial and economic returns, bilateral or multilateral associative proposals are the expressions that dominate in the meetings and disputes of the specialists, in a "sui generis" world, striking for its vitality and



DOM De FORE - ANNA KASHFI - JOCK MAHONEY e Carl Benton Reid

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impressing – in all positive and negative senses – for its achievements.

The other aspect of our problem is a wider and more composite one.

For the defence of security in peace, there are the recurrent and rightly dominant concepts of dissuasion and deterrence, as premise and foundation of détente.

The common denominator of these values is universally recognized in the "credibility" of the military instruments.

But how can this credibility be pursued and attained? Certainly not through publicity "tout court", but also with the help of advertising techniques, always strictly within the bonds of "fair" information. An

information that can avail itself of some of the tools of publicity, but must reject its philosophy.

An information which should reject with the same rigour, as counterproductive, any form of propaganda. Finally, an information which must absolutely not be tainted by commercial interests.

It must be, in short, an activity, whose ultimate purpose is to give updated information to the citizen. An activity that does not take advantage of the people's credulity, but stimulates their interest.

The goal of this type of information is after all the country's security, in freedom and peace.

There is therefore an urgent need to make public opinion

This is the time when, on the entertainment pages, newspapers present Hollywood's war movies with teasing words such as: "Three-Americans-three against all-Japanese-all: incredible, the Americans win". Rock Hudson seems tailor-made to embody the "hero made in USA": strong, brave, invincible and, at the same time, human, unconventional, apparently shunning all forms of rethoric.

aware of the problems and difficulties of national defence.

For such an opinion campaign all media must be urged to make an information effort that will become an effective credibility only if the appropriate informative activity is supported by the irreplaceable persuasive power of concrete facts.

Defence, strategy, security, peace are undoubtedly issues that the public is ready and willing to leave to the experts, or to those that like to think of themselves as such. But these are also issues with which the public opinion must be confronted.

It is in this context that France – within an attractive formula of civic education – has recently produced a new kind of television programme, intended to warn against the dangers of war and entrusted to the professionalism and popularity of Yves Montand.

As rightly maintained by Pierre Lellouche (author, among other works, of the recent "L'avenir de la guerre"), the West European man, accustomed to seeing on the screen somebody else's wars, has been led to take a closer interest in the threats and risks of war and has been able to reflect on the close ties between deterrence and peace.

Among the salient arguments of the cited television programme, there is one that deserves to be mentioned: having enjoyed peace, day after day, for a long time, has made it hard for the European countries to realize how and to

what extent the very concept of war has been removed from their life and culture.

To our contemporaries, the well-known diagnosis made by Raymond Aron, "impossible war, improbable peace" seems sufficient to continue the course of civil progress and peace in security.

By proceeding along this path one risks, regrettably, to ignore, when the time comes, the difference between the benefits of the peace enjoyed and the elements that must realistically be protected and deserved.

The responsible evaluation of this difference can be helped with an information that employs the most convincing and valid tools of publicity in its broader sense.

This kind of information – or civic education, if you prefer – is in any case also necessary in order to confront the subtle Soviet weapon that could be called "psychostrategy", largely employed in a sort of nerve-racking war of disinformation.

The Soviet Union has already achieved some noticeable success through the employment of psychological means (one example: the U.S. has given up the neutron bomb project).

With its psychostrategy, the Soviet Union constantly tries to transform the justifiable abhorrence for war into resistance against the programmes of Western defence. Through alternatively threatening and conciliating attitudes, the USSR really aims at maintaining unchanged the advantages obtained in the military sphere.

The campaign against the Euromissiles has, in this sense, stirred up discussions, protests, uncertainties and delays.


Efforts are made to interpose similar elements of confusion, doubt and mistrust between Europe and the United States as regards the SDI project, instrumentally labelled "Star Wars".

Making a lot of noise about the U.S. project of

strategic defence, the Soviets manage to distract the attention of the world from the fact that they have been for years pursuing a similar project of interception and active defence against missiles.

since it has become clear that a nuclear conflict would not bring about the victory of Communism, but would rather mean mutual destruction.

It might be wise to return to Lenin's doctrine, which



These are the most evident aspects of a threat that hovers in permanence over the Western world and which, far from being limited to the military components, seeks to undermine the balance of the wills.

Victory without war is one of the goals of Soviet policy,

foresaw – if necessary – to alternate phases of violent and direct revolution with an indirect strategy which enabled to disrupt and wear out the adversary, maintaining the advantages obtained and preparing other advantages for the future.

Left.

In this poster, published in the first months of 1942, there are all the ingredients of the American propaganda against Japan. A young sailor, stabbed by a samurai sword lies on the Stars and Stripes: it is a reminder of the Pearl Harbour "treacherous" attack and, at the same time, the exhortation – unspoken but no less eloquent – to avenge the victims and save the honour of the nation. There are neither inscriptions nor slogans: this makes the image even more impressive.

Right.

This poster, published in 1943, is kept at the "Musée des deux Guerres Mondiales" in Paris.

Considering these realities, the French television experiment must be appreciated and understood as an example of how to inform and make public opinion conscious of the problems of defence, which are also – and above all – problems of survival, if – as was rightly maintained in the broadcast – a country or a continent, which is no more in a position to guarantee its defence, is destined – sooner or later – to forfeit its independence.

These are, again, realities that the European citizens – willing or not – will have to take into account in the near future, realities which give new dignity to the advertising techniques, if these, correctly employed and coordinated, succeed in making the common man more aware of the problems of defence, and make more credible before the country the aspirations of the military instrument and its effort for an improved efficiency.

This is perhaps the only way to contribute to the transformation of the mentioned diagnosis by Raymond Aron into a milder formula, in the sense of making war "even more" impossible and peace a little "less" improbable.



CHARACTERS AND ASPECTS OF PUBLICITY



THE CONCEPT



OF SUBVERSION



The term "subversion", derived from the late Latin word "subversio", in its lexical definition ought to be understood as "the overthrowing of a traditional order, often associated with the idea of a degeneration and corruption of values".

A sociological definition tends to explain subversion as the psychological transition of a collectivity from a given sociopolitical context to a different one.

Proceeding from the latter definition, one can state that any subversive movement presupposes a group of individuals animated by a common ideology. An ideology which, in its turn, prompts the groups as well as the individuals to a cogent solidarity that verges on real military discipline.

From this point of view, it is easy to perceive the characters of an actual struggle, which can affect the very existence of any collectivity. Initially shaken at its spiritual, ideological and political foundations, this collectivity falls victim to a real "hypnosis of decline" and, in a successive, more or less rapid and conscious phase, advances towards the formation of a different community.

All this, namely the process through which subversion aims at obtaining its scope, entails time, money and patience, and is based on two prerequisites:

- collective organization of groups and individuals;
- psychological penetration.

Pieter Bruegel the Elder: "Battle between Carnival and Lent", 1559, Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum. The composition of this work is entirely done in sober tones just enlivened by dashes of red.

A tremendous vitality animates the picture and is expressed in various figurative episodes, in which reality and grotesque, symbol and satire, intermingle in a language which, on one side echoes the medieval typology and, on the other, paves the way for the seventeenth-century style.

Of these points, the first – **collective organization** – presents aspects of special interest.

For the totalitarian regimes this kind of organization has always been a primary objective, that can be attained through the fragmentation of groups – homogeneous as regards ethnical background, religious and political creeds, social habits – and the establishment of groups differing from each other in their respective function. This becomes in itself cause of union and origin of real “parallel hierarchies”, which come to form heavy and effective nets of reciprocal mistrust and mutual control.

Subversion, nevertheless, lacks the state authoritarianism that regulates the collective organization in the totalitarianism regimes, and therefore must reach the same goal with different methodologies. The simplest way – no other seems to be available anyway – is that of operating on the human groups that form each collectivity, in order to seize the command of the most important ones.

It is an action that requires the support of an ideology, but which can initially be conducted also without such specific support. In other words, one tries to weigh upon the Western culture with the gloomy shadow of a so-called “scientific” vision of the world, expanding the Marxist seduction from old Europe to young Africa and to South East Asia.

Once the main human groups are set into a frame and, through them, the masses themselves are controlled, it will be easy to label with a given ideology the resultant organization.

In this sense, Communism itself can appear, besides a doctrine and a creed, essentially a collectivization technique, suitable to the global character of modern societies, complicated and ambiguous, and oppressed by a deleterious levelling trend.

Apparently the success of Soviet Communism and Mao Tse-tung’s very victory can be attributed to Lenin rather than Marx, and more to the efficacy of Mao’s political organization than to an actual ideological conversion of the Chinese masses.

In other words, the rigid structure realized in the two emblematic cases was more influential than doctrine.

Once a satisfactory collective organization is

obtained, one can deal with the second preliminary condition of subversion, i.e. the psychological manipulation of groups and masses.

The transition of a collectivity from an ideological conviction to another, from a certain mood to a different vision of problems and realities, requires a variable amount of time, which often involves more than one generation, and avails itself of the composite system of communications and



Pieter Bruegel the Elder: “The Triumph of Death” (detail), Madrid, El Prado.

mass-media. In any case, within a shorter or longer term, no segment of the communications system remains immune from the inflationary subversive disinformation.

It is a wide-range action, aimed at progressively destroying the amalgamating values of each collectivity, replacing them with a new and different psychological condition.

This psychological condition is not attainable through the simple use of advertising and propaganda criteria and techniques.

Some criteria and proceedings of this particular "world" are indeed useful towards this end, but the undertaking is of much greater dimensions and formed by more composite strata.

In fact, it concerns at the same time culture, will and sentiments of the various groups.

By "culture" is meant, simply, the "whole" formed by the sentiments and values that configure a man's way of life, which – more or less consciously – inform a man's existence, as the air of the times he breathes, the horizon in front of him, the language he speaks, his personal convictions.

In order to influence culture at large, the psychological action must upset or sterilize the community's fundamental values.


"The Intellectuals' Opium", the well-known work by Raymond Aron, mentions – as an example of subversion's attack on culture – the sly and persisting action aimed at silencing or converting the Personalities who are held as the most representative and influential custodians of the fundamental cultural values of the community.

The destruction and sclerotization of these values are the most probable causes of the intellectual confusion and spiritual anguish that are spreading today like an oily stain. Nowadays, the young and the

not-so-young, dazzled by a false prosperity and an attractive permissiveness, are led to ask themselves questions about the very meaning of existence, and risk to lose the sense of evolution, which nevertheless exists and bears a positive mark.

In this state of collective confusion, it is neither surprising nor amazing that the individual's and the groups' accomplishing will should lose ground, and that the motivations to defend the

Salvador Dali. "Presage of Civil War", 1936, Philadelphia, Museum of Art. A complex and multifaceted personality, Dali has worked with unique liveliness and phantasy in various art fields, giving, in painting, a personal interpretation of surrealism, labelled as "critical-paranoid" by the painter himself; it consists of a "critical" setting and use of the visionary imagery derived from delirium. In this work, the sense of the absurd and of violence flows from the desertic landscape, peopled by anthropomorphic creatures bound in a precarious poise.



community should tend to fade away.

Neither should it come as a surprise that organisms and initiatives slip through the open gap trying, in the name of a false pacifism, to undermine the community's defensive will.

Having caused the deterioration of the community's cultural bases and the drainage of its defence motivations, the successive step directed against the sentiments that

govern the human soul becomes much easier.

At this point the typical techniques and procedures of propaganda permit to develop a subtle psychological action which, according to André Malraux's appropriate definition is "the organization of passions" ("The Conquerors"). In fact, it is a matter of seizing and exploiting, towards a definite end, the hopes and fears, the grudges and hostilities, the

dissents and disillusionments, in order to work slyly on the subconscious. It is moreover an action all the more crafty and effective because it operates from within the communities.

In a 1959 press conference, General De Gaulle, referring precisely to such troubled and troubling situations, in which subversion and the ideologies that justify it meet and intermingle, stated that at a time when a colossal action of destabilization is carried out against the West and its fundamental values, the West itself seems to overlook the absolute necessity to defend itself.

What are the possible and necessary measures for an incisive response to subversion?

A surely effective formula does not exist. Tragic events – some of them recent – are pitiless proof of it.

In order to protect and consolidate the existing political and social structures, one must conduct a preventive vigilant action and duly consider the subversive threat in all its forms, securing, first of all, public opinion's assent.

One must think and act bearing in mind that the most appropriate, meaningful, elevated human experience is that of meeting others. More sincere and unconditional or non-instrumental relations, a society richer in values, a more humane culture, will most probably render the relations between man and community – also with the help of faith – more responsive to understanding and progress.

When faced by a more or less coordinate range of multiform threats, the struggle must be extended from the political to the diplomatic field, from the economic to the social world, from the cultural to the religious and military contexts.

Moreover, as the objective is mostly political, the "response" must be of the same kind and, consequently, it becomes the Executive's chief responsibility. Military action,

in this context, is only one of the components. But the action cannot be fully implemented without the support of the people who – precisely for this reason – are the objective and the tool of subversion.

Other essential aspects, which concur in outlining the features of the anti-subversive struggle can be seen in:

- the need to isolate the subversive organization from the outside, in order to deprive it of the moral material support that it could obtain from world public opinion and especially from the friendly countries;
- the dynamism with which the encounters or confrontations must be faced, to avoid losing the initiative completely, shunning supine resignation and skepticism;
- the flexible employment of means, which must constantly be adapted to the adversary's pragmatic and variable procedures;
- the fundamental function that must be performed by an effective intelligence organization;
- the employment of the psychological weapon, for strengthening the defensive will of the community, thus retorting the similar, sly action of the adversary.

Moreover, these elements evidence that the struggle against subversion involves all sectors of national life and consequently requires a convergence of efforts from all the institutions of the State.

Information and communications dominate at present the world scene and – coming to think of it – influence our way of perceiving today's phenomena and challenges. This way of perceiving appears sometimes more altered than the evolution itself. In other words, it is not so much the world scenario that has undergone transformations but – as it happens on the stage – the changes have occurred in the "lights" and the "perspective"

Right, from top.

James Ensor: "The Strike", 1892, Antwerp, Musée Royal des Beaux Arts. Ensor has followed many trends of the contemporary art (Expressionism, among them), without joining any particular current.

This painting, marked by a strong realism and done with lightness of touch and delicacy of tones, evidences the artist's commitment to social and political themes.

Renato Guttuso: "The Flight from Etna", 1939, Roma, Galleria Nazionale di Arte Moderna.

An outstanding figure of the Italian Realism, Guttuso, in this work of deep epic-narrative engagement, seems to foreshadow the oncoming ruin of war in the gleaming of the advancing lava and in the Sicilian village destroyed by the earthquake.

in which these phenomena are observed.

Furthermore one should also consider the preponderant influence that the popular sentiment has on the outcome of the struggle. As regards final success, the military force ought to be considered only one of the many tools available to politics.

In particular, in the preliminary study of the adversary's possibilities, one can find some logistic axes of effort, but, in the tactical field, it would be detrimental and dangerous to claim the ability to point out directions and efforts, ignoring the hard truth of a fight that, in its customary forms (terrorism, sabotage and guerrilla warfare), spreads "on the surface".

Considering that subversion is characterized by the existence of a rigid apparatus for the organization of human groups and by the obstinate attempt to infiltrate its elements into the ganglions of the leadership, an effective countermeasure should tend to isolate this apparatus from the various social groups and make sure that the levers of the institutional structures are in reliable hands.

In substance it is a matter of guaranteeing and inciting





an active presence in all sectors; a presence whose effectiveness stems from a precise informative and formative effort. The former permits to know the adversary, the latter is used for countering its infiltration and expansion attempts.

If, on the one hand, the information of the masses serves to isolate the subversive apparatus and is therefore realized through a reasoned and reasonable rejection of totalitarian principles and snares, on the other hand, the

David Alfaro Siqueiros: "Death to the Invader", 1941-1942, Chillain (Chile), Mexico School.

This painting is an example of ideological painting, in which the leitmotifs of vanguard art stand out, from Expressionism to Futurism, from New Objectivism to Surrealism.

Cadres' formation must ensure an operational capability apt to be transformed into positive facts.

These must find their logic and coherent implementation according to a realistic programme which should entail:

- simultaneous social, political and economic development of the national community;
- gradual attainment of mediate and immediate objectives, which should satisfy the expectations of individual and collective progress;
- strengthening of the political institutions' efficiency;
- improvement of the masses' living standard;
- employment of all possible means – in particular towards the development of agriculture, industry, public health, building industry, education and major public works, placing particular emphasis on individual initiative.

All induces to uphold one of the West's fundamental and irrenounceable values: liberty in general and, in particular, spiritual liberty. It has been said that subversive totalitarianism is the enemy of the total man. It is not a new concept. Socrates, in front of his judges, reminds us of it.

The West, and Europe in particular, face a dilemma: either renounce gradually their age-old civilizing function to the point of jeopardizing their very existence, or concentrate their will and efforts to harmonize the human tendency to collective organization with their ancient and never extinguished moral, the sole capable of giving a meaning and a limit to our spreading and desolating mass society.

It is neither a battle of one party against another, nor a war waged by religious believers against the followers of Reason. It is a battle outside and above all various possible antagonisms, because it concerns the liberty of man and that of his spirit and welcomes with equal dignity the support of Faith and that of Reason.



The persistence of the subversive danger must be countered with a similarly persistent response. A response capable of opposing conscience to irresponsibility, good-will to skepticism, truth to deceit.

A response capable of bringing back to a troubled world, standing on the verge of ruin, that special way of conceiving man and life, which could be found in the spirit of Cluny and in the universal conception that informs the Franciscan teachings, although with the indispensable transpositions required by our century.

In this connection, our thought goes to Ignazio Silone who – in "La Nuova Resistenza" – suggests that our epoch has been called the era of atom disintegration, but he says that one should add to that also the disintegration of the soul.

It is hard to indicate the most frightening of the two phenomena. We know for certain

Roger de la Fresnaye: "The Cuirassier", 1910, Paris, Musée National d'Art Moderne.

De la Fresnaye, as is evident in this picture, adopts the Cubist procedure of decomposing the atmospheric space into coloured planes. He remains nevertheless strictly anchored to the rules of traditional composition, maintaining the subjects' essential forms.

that both threaten the very survival of mankind.

Together with Silone, we can conclude by affirming that the password of the new resistance to subversion is every human being's right to his own spiritual entity, as an expression of the Universal Spirit.

There is no other way of facing and overcoming the strife between "education and subversion" which – as we are reminded by A.G. Wells – is the dominant note of the modern world.

EVOLUTION OF THE IMPERIALISM



CONCEPT OF

FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO THIS DAY


The phenomenon of imperialism, as a multifaceted manifestation of a country's will to extend its political and territorial domination over peoples, is known since the dawn of civilization.

As a general and abstract concept, the fundamental tendency of the primitive social embryo is certainly that of gaining an economic and military prevalence on its competitors in attaining the material goods that will satisfy its primary needs.

In more advanced, protohistoric and historic times, this characteristic of mankind – which follows the dynamics of progress, through a Hegelian process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis – is realized in the involvement of entire nations and great crowds.

Thus the Empires, in the full meaning of the word, arise and follow each other, in an uninterrupted series marked by famous names, from Semiramis to Alexander the Great, from Caesar to Napoleon, from Charles V to Genghis Khan who, as the greatest conqueror of all times, can be considered the embodiment of imperialism.

Temucin, known as Genghis Khan, spread his domination from China to Yugoslavia, producing a real philosophy about the imperialistic system and planning a surprisingly modern administrative organization, which was doubtlessly at the root of the sharing of powers theorized by Montesquieu.





Left.

The painting shows French troops entering Constantine in 1837 – through a breach opened by the artillery in the external fortifications – to put down the revolt of some Algerian tribes.

Right.

In 1830, France invaded Algeria and conquered it in a few weeks, but had to fight a long war against some tribes which, under the leadership of Abd-el-Kader, held the French troops in check for more than fifteen years. The print portrays a moment of the fierce clashes in the streets of Constantine (October 13, 1837), during which 1200 French died and more than 2000 were wounded. The Arabs lost about 5000 men.

as those in central-southern Africa, but it is also a fact that the ensuing impetuous process of cultural advancement of the subjected develops in a context of substantial, skillfully disguised exploitation.

This is the price that mankind pays to progress, a progress often made through difficulties and pains, but always victorious and bearer of new ethnical and social conquests.

This moral and philosophical foundation of colonialism can be traced back to the expansionist policy promoted by the commonly acknowledged founder of modern imperialism, Joseph Chamberlain. Chamberlain, in view of the difficulties encountered by the English free-trade policy, due to the presence of products from competing countries, establishes very close bonds with the British colonies, which obtain preferential prices for the national wares. At the same time, duties are laid on foreign products that could damage the market of the colonial raw materials.

As a result, the general theory of free exchange is completely upset, due to the technical implications and hindrances that invalidate its traditional principles.

The intervention of political decisions compulsorily bends towards the desired directions the autonomous choices and the natural fluctuations of demand and supply.

The guidelines set by the great Mongolian leader can still be considered a valuable model up to the threshold of our era.

But modern imperialism draws its vitality from very different and innovative motivations, because it does not rely on individual or dynastic standing to consolidate in a national policy, as collective hegemonic will of a given people.

The most representative expression of this evolutive form of the imperialistic phenomenon is colonialism, which is born out of reasons not always sufficiently justified by the

camouflage of assumed "civilizing" missions, being mainly grounded on economic requirements.

The main protagonists are the European nations, which, in the availability of new territories try also to find an outlet for the unbearable, very composite, internal pressures which threaten the stability of the social order.

It is a fact that the colonial expansion acts as an historic catalyst for the evolution of peoples that are still underdeveloped or who are still at the lowest levels of life, such



A new economic area is born, not only for the British Empire, but for all the colonialist countries.

The regime of trade established by Chamberlain becomes in fact an almost general rule, which has deep reverberations in every field.

The consolidation of the economic bonds between the mother country and its colonial territories leads to a strengthening of the political ties and demands common defensive lines and "strategies".

Other European powers follow the British in this

direction: such as France, which is also encouraged by the enormous development of the technology of the 19th century, which translates into a progressive erosion of the agricultural economy by the newly born industrial system.

France indeed finds in its colonies the necessary outlets for the impelling needs of its transformation enterprises and favourable fields of employment for the large private capitals.

One cannot omit the trend of the United States which, with the Cuban war of 1895, starts its expansionist policy, supported

and strengthened by President Theodore Roosevelt.

The German penetration in Africa and Oceania starts in 1882, under the impulse of the industrial leadership as well as of political motivations and reasons of prestige which hide urgent demographic problems.

This latter aspect – shared by many overpopulated nations, and particularly by Italy, Germany and Japan – is one of the main causes of colonial penetration, producing the phenomenon of emigration and the "poor people's imperialism", as Giovanni Pascoli defined it.



This hard truth surpasses all other human motivations and cannot be hidden by ideologies thought up in order to justify the conquest of socially and ethically underdeveloped countries.

The attempts to find noble and historically acceptable reasons for campaigns made against populations of evident inferior standing are manifold and sometimes degenerate into an exasperated nationalism, when they do not become inhuman and degrading racism.

A most evident example is given by Hitler's conception of psychophysical supremacy of the German race, destined by natural law to excel in all fields.

But this is the sunset of the typically colonial imperialism, which already in the precedent conceptual experimentation by Marx and Engels has discovered the critical foundations of a deep transformation.

The Communist theory, in

fact, refuses imperialism as a product of the capitalist bourgeoisie and sees it as destined to certain ruin when, having taken advantage of the last occasion of conquest, it will be unable to overcome the consequent inevitable crisis.

Apart from these catastrophic conclusions, it is evident that the phenomenon's colonialist aspect is gradually overcome in the first half of the 20th century.

The first World War destroys the German Empire and promotes, within the League of Nations, the "mandate" concept, which presupposes the possibility of a gradual evolution toward self-government of the subjected peoples.

The second World War gives the coup de grace to all forms of actual subjugation of peoples less developed than the "colonizers".

The idea that the white man is superior to the coloured

man has waned. The latter has assimilated from the civilization of his dominators all he needs in order to understand in full his right to independence; in many instances he has attended universities in Paris or Oxford, has lived in the ferment of the European metropolises, has brought his country's dramatic reality to the political attention of the world through credited representatives, such as Pandit Nehru, Ho Chi Minh, Sukarno and many others.

Britain, always endowed with fine political sensitiveness, is the first to understand this grandiose evolutionary process of the peoples and to realize that imperialism must modernize if it wants to survive.


This gives birth to economic imperialism, with its exciting and dramatic aspects. Exciting, because it is a direct vehicle of civilization, and dramatic owing to the related and understandable human and social implications.

Left.

In the second half of the 18th century, Great Britain expanded its domination to almost all of the Indian subcontinent. But in the 19th century was confronted by Russia, which was pressing on the Afghan border. To prevent Russia's expansionism, the British waged two wars against Afghanistan, winning both of them. The painting shows a British unit attacked by Afghan rebels, near the town of Gandamak (summer 1839).

Right.

After conquering Algeria, France wanted to expand further along the North African coast. Tunisia was occupied without difficulties in 1891, but with Morocco things became involved, due to the rebellion of some nomad tribes and the opposition of Germany, with fears of a possible Franco-German war. Only in 1911 Berlin and Paris signed an agreement which legitimated the French protectorate over Morocco. The illustration from "Le Petit Journal" portrays an episode of the resistance in the Sahara: a clash between Tuareg warriors and a French patrol.



Great Britain is in fact the first to carry out in practice this evolutionary dynamism, making a series of concessions to its Dominions, helping them along their spontaneous ascent.

In 1931, the Westminster Statute lays down the foundations of new relations between Britain and its subordinate countries, affirming that the laws promulgated by the British Parliament cannot concern the Dominions that do not accept them.

Meanwhile, the Governors become simple representatives of the Crown and assume the function of advisers to the free governments.

In 1948, as a consequence of the new blow dealt by the second World War to old-style colonialism, the Commonwealth includes India and Pakistan among its members, emphasizing its character of association of free nations.

A similar transformation

occurs within the American and Dutch "empires" (independence of the Philippines, United States of Indonesia).

France is a different case because, intending to exploit the resources of its colonies and having perhaps overevaluated the bonds established with some subjected countries, it has sometimes delayed the inevitable concessions to the emergent nationalist currents.

The entry of the non-European free peoples in

international politics is a grandiose phenomenon in modern civilization, but also a problem that demands vigilant caution.

As a matter of fact, not all peoples are mature for forms of self-government and there is always the danger that, incited by an opportunistic propaganda, they fall under a new different sort of yoke.

This is the democratic powers' main worry, and particularly the United States',



Beginning in 1652, thousands of Dutch went to settle in South Africa, where they founded a new country: the Boers' nation. When Great Britain took possession of the colony, the Boers preferred to emigrate rather than suffer a foreign domination, and moved to Transvaal and Orange, where they discovered many gold and diamond mines. The British threatened them again and they, to defend themselves, declared war on Great Britain in 1899. Against all odds, the Boers obtained some successes, but were unable to exploit them and surrendered in 1902. The illustration shows British prisoners after the battle of Nicholson's Neck, where the Boers captured more than thousand British officers and soldiers.

whose policy has at present a characteristic function of control over the international situation, with the aim of defending both the principles of democracy and the American economy.

The contrast with the Soviet position is evident; the USSR's policy goes clearly against history, because it tends to obtain a real ideological, political and economic supremacy over countries of ancient civilization, at times when history records the emancipation of less civilized peoples.

But most of all the present era records the replacement of sovereignty by a cooperation aimed at defending common interests.

It is not fortuitous that the "San Francisco Charter" perorates the promotion of the political, social and economic progress of the less advanced countries subjected to the international mandate system, in the interest of a superior justice and in view of gradual emancipation.

Considering this reality, submitted to uncontrollable, evolutionary, and in some ways disturbing dynamics, the only possible form of imperialism is – as we have already said – the economic one.

The remarkable improvement of the Third World countries' living standard and the ensuing increased demand of consumer goods is not matched by an adequate development of the local technologies and industries. The unbalance between demand and

supply renders the emerging nations subject to the great international markets.

The producing countries, in constant quest of outlets for the surplus of their consumer goods, unabsorbed and unabsorbable by the internal markets, find it easy to introduce their wares to extremely receptive populations that need almost everything.

No matter if, at this stage, the subject Nations' economy is unable to offer an advantageous compensation, for the producers envisage the future development of their working and marketing capabilities, which suggest the conquest of a position of privileged partners on the market.

In view of this, the weaker populations are implicitly blackmailed by the industrial powers, which impose a given type of products, and, consequently, a social custom formed by new habits, sometimes alien to the native traditions of the territories.

Economic imperialism therefore deeply influences the continuity of the ethnical components and, from this point of view, it can be seen as an inhumane and subverting phenomenon.

But, besides the ethic and social aspects, the willingness to bring the developing countries under industrial subjugation inevitably causes attritions and dissensions among the producing nations, which quite often lead to deep contrasts, bordering sometimes on open conflicts.

These are, in any case, clear manifestations of a constant eagerness for supremacy that embodies the modern form of creeping imperialism, which is as concrete as the past one.

Armaments have been replaced by products, the tools of oppression are now being substituted by coercive means, disguised as unselfish offers in the name of a pacifism, perhaps sincere, but certainly proclaimed in view of concrete advantages.

In this kind of subjugation of the emerging countries, the big powers include also the friendly countries, which in theory should be on an equal standing.

The planning of certain products deeply modifies the character of the markets, increasing consumption as an indispensable tool for guiding and adapting demand to the nature and extent of supply.

Power relations take part in this psychological game, which can deeply affect the very ganglions of the social organization of the countries less prepared to resist the pressures of the more efficient foreign economies. The progressive adaptation of the population to the fictitious tastes, habits and needs imposed by the "aggressor" country is certainly a more or less felt form of subjugation.

Nevertheless, also the phenomenon of economic imperialism shows signs of decline, because the cultural and social rise of the emerging nations tends to promote a more marked growth of the national industries and products.

The ensuing drop in the outward demand of the less developed countries sooner or later will bring about a slackening of the existing bonds of "subjection", until new balances are reached, which presumably will revive free exchange.

Thus a century-old cycle will be concluded, which has been of real historical importance and has had an enormous civil significance.

But the foundations of a new type of imperialism – which, without being rhetoric can be defined as "space imperialism" – are already being laid down.

The superpowers are already directing their efforts towards the conquest of outer space, for a number of scientific, economic, strategic and prestige reasons, that can all be traced back to a common denominator: the pursuit of supremacy.

The environment of the competition and conquest changes, as do the tools and



Left.

As it was with the conflict against Turkey for the conquest of Lybia, also the war against Ethiopia – started on October 3, 1935 – was, for Italy, more difficult than expected. Officially the Ethiopian campaign ended on May 3, 1936, when the Italian troops from Somalia joined the forces from Eritrea. The tableau by Beltrame, of October 20, 1935, depicts an assault of Italian troops against an Ethiopian position.

Right.

The superpowers are now pursuing the conquest of outer space with many different motivations: science, economy, strategy, prestige. Nevertheless all can be traced back to a common denominator: the quest for supremacy. The photo shows an astronaut near the space Shuttle in orbit around the Earth.

At this point, also the financial aspects come into play, because the enormous amounts of money appropriated for the experimentation cannot go wasted.

In concrete terms, the space undertaking tends, first of all, to prove a technological supremacy which has "terrestrial" goals besides the evident "space" objectives.

As a matter of fact, the "sideral conflict" is still closely linked to traditional interests, but presumably, in a not so distant future, it will mostly concern new factors which, at the moment, are still hard to foresee.

At the present time, therefore, we must limit ourselves to the evidence, i.e. to a rapidly and vehemently evolving scientific component, apparently devoted to the exploration of our solar system but having, indirectly, practical application and psychological effects of high political value.

The U.S. experiments have registered from this standpoint an unquestionable technological supremacy over the Soviet Union; this is a fact that demands immediate responses at different levels.

The USSR, on its part, has shown the ability to keep pace with the New Continent, but only as far as space is

prospects, but the hegemonic objective remains unchanged and everlasting.

The possibilities to control space, which only a few decades ago belonged to science fiction, seem today more realistic and concrete in the light of the recent positive tests, and not obscured by episodic and, unfortunately, sometimes dramatic failures, such as the explosion of the Shuttle and its launcher, last January, at Cape Canaveral.

The American and Soviet

repeated and ever more onerous tests of endurance in space clearly show the intention of establishing there a human working presence; this is due not only to scientific motivations, but also to strategic and tactical reasons.

One can easily predict that such efforts will be increased both qualitatively and quantitatively, because none of the two superpowers can at the present stage disregard the substantial interests involved, and withdraw from the contest.

concerned, while it shows undeniable symptoms of inadequate industrial productive capability as regards social needs.

On the contrary, the two superpowers are equivalent as far as nuclear weaponry is concerned, and this is a sector in which it is difficult by now to reach a clear superiority.

It is therefore natural that also in the military field the imperialist attempt is made in space, where there are still "virgin" possibilities to be verified and experimented.

This is the real truth of "Star Wars", and of the enticing and terrible plans that have already introduced us into the future.

The "military" race in outer space appears almost an episode of the Hegelian "shrewdness of reason"; i.e. the artifices that the universal Spirit devises in order to enable mankind to proceed along the path of progress and write its dramatic and very exciting history.


According to Hegel's epic theory, today we are certainly living in a period of thesis-antithesis of a superior level, albeit necessarily interspersed with human tragedies.

Nevertheless we are certain that, beyond the imperialistic intentions and the yearning for hegemony and power, all Nations share the wish for a synthesis that will give birth to peace, the indispensable condition for real progress in the wonderful vicissitudes of civilization and history.



EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF IMPERIALISM

FROM THE 19TH CENTURY TO THIS DAY



NOTES ON TERRORISM

If we were to enounce a general definition of terrorism, we could consider it the methodical employment of violence at the service of revolution.

This definition goes against the "blind terrorism" cliché, very fashionable in the superficial conversations and in the current statements regarding this phenomenon.

As a matter of fact, terrorism is in its essence, and mostly, a motivated fact aimed at a well defined end, albeit of varied importance and nature. It aims at overthrowing an existing institutional structure, establishing a new order protesting against a situation, drawing public attention on a specific

political, social or ethnical problem. It is therefore a strategic and tactical tool for fight and propaganda.

But even this comprehensive vision does not suffice to define the problem entirely.

In this regard one is reminded that also the definitions of human events have a destiny of their own: *habent sua fata verba*.

The term and the phenomenon have actually at their origin an official character.

A close consideration of this fact leads us to see in the terrorism of the various historical periods also a tool of government.

The frescoes of the Sistine Chapel, currently being restored among international polemics, belong to mankind as a whole.

We take the opportunity of the present reflections on terrorism to reconsider the mirror-like relation between divine creation and human creativity, in the striking images of the "Last Judgement", in the immense human sphere which focuses destinies and hopes in a supreme gesture, as a definite warning to the wicked. The fresco was painted in the fiery years of the Counter-Reformation in an intransigent and exasperated climate of resurfacing radicalism. The illustrations show some details of Michelangelo's frescoes in the Sistine Chapel.



Emperor Nero, the Inquisition, Stalin's bloody "purges" are some of its significant expression that come to an horrifying synthesis in the "Terror" of the French Revolution, in which Charlotte Corday and the "Chouans" were certainly not the actual terrorists, but rather Saint Just, Robespierre, Barras and Fouché with the guillotine, the roll of the drums of Santerre, the infernal columns of the Vendée repression, the harsh majesty of the sword of law.

A suggestive but widely improper comparison has led some to define terrorism as the atomic bomb of the poor.

The comparison may appear attractive but it is not entirely appropriate. The nuclear weapon is an intimidating tool, but is also an explosive tool, capable of causing enormous damages, destroying the adversary's industrial or military potential, causing huge human losses.

Terrorism instead is, and remains, mostly a psychological

weapon, whose material effects are only means – of generally modest consequence – which must not be mistaken for the goals of the operation.

If we were to insist on the value of terrorism as a weapon, we could be led to conventional or contrived distinctions. We could talk about a tactical employment of terrorism, in the sense of selective and limited actions, and of its strategic employment, with reference to wider-range and more general actions.

Nevertheless, we would remain in the realm of apparently logic but substantially false subtleties.

It is in fact quite evident that a bomb is not planted in a cinema in order to kill a few people, but rather to frighten or exasperate those who could have been attending the performance. Similarly, the destruction of a bridge in order to block a military convoy is not real terrorism, but it would be if the aim of the destruction

were that of preventing the local people from going to the market.

In other words, we are in a sphere resembling more propaganda than an armed struggle, even though its consequences are bathed in blood, almost always innocent.

An instrument of critical periods, of times with an uncertain future, terrorism has been rightly considered a cocktail of explosive and psychology, whose consequences actually derive from the dosage of the two components, which must be adapted to the times, places and people.

The psychological component – often the prevailing one – makes terrorism a kind of absolute weapon.

Being a terrorist is first of all a mood, a mental attitude, which presupposes special ethical conceptions as regards both the surrounding reality and human life, class relations, ethnical or national situations.



In order to withdraw from terrorism, one must therefore undergo an actual conversion, which cannot be obtained solely by the police or with the employment of arms. It is easier to kill than to convert a terrorist, but it is precisely this difficulty that must spur those interested in the conversion, keeping in mind that the special mood cannot arise and develop without the support of a climate, an ambience, a base, lacking which terrorism would rapidly become sterile and ineffectual.

The need of a propitious environment is the force and, at the same time, the weakness of the terrorist weapon. This in fact can be employed – at least at the start of an insurrectional movement – only by isolate individuals or small groups. Consequently, the fight against terrorism must tend to eliminate these individuals or groups and this is rather hard, if not impossible, if the authorities cannot count on the positive support of the population.

The problem is not easy because, on the one hand, terrorism develops usually in situations of tension, which makes it difficult for the people to support the established authority; on the other hand, the simple neutrality or the indifference of the population are not sufficient.

With a physiological comparison it can also be said that the fight against terrorism can develop in either a surgical or a medical form. The first tends to be painful and dangerous, the second, slow and uncertain; with the combination of the two forms, one can perhaps – up to a certain point – neutralize the inconveniences of the one with those of the other, but the therapy remains nevertheless very delicate.

The editor of "Il Giornale", in a recent article on terrorism writes: "Clausewitz said that war is nothing but the continuation of politics with other means. If he were alive today, he would perhaps say that terrorism is

nothing but the continuation of war with other means. War, made impossible by nuclear weapons, has found a substitute, which in the end will probably lead us to regret the real thing. Terrorism does not kill so much as war, but its killing is worse. And, above all, it is much more difficult to be fought because there is no target".

These are strong statements and serious considerations, which are nevertheless largely confirmed by statistical data.

First of all, it must be pointed out that the number of terrorist attacks has increased sensibly during the last fifteen years.

The "Risks International Inc.", an American firm which specializes in the study of this phenomenon – mentioned by the "U.S. News and World Report" of June 8, 1985 – recorded 293 major terrorist incidents in 1970.

From that year a slow but continuous escalation has occurred until 1977, followed by



a rapid acceleration in the two following years (with 2585 attacks in 1979), by a slight decrease in 1982 and again by a sudden sharp increase.

In another document, issued at the end of 1984, the U.S. Government reported that:

- 5175 attacks recorded around the world from 1973 to 1983 had caused 3689 dead and 7791 injured;

- of about 500 terrorist attacks made in 1983, about 40% were aimed at U.S. citizens;

- still in 1983, 37.2% of the attacks concerned Western European countries, 25.6% Latin America and 22.8% the Middle East and North Africa, 7.8% Pacific Asia, 3.4% Central and Southern Africa, 2.4% North America and only 0.8% Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

These are statistic data that give a sufficiently clear vision of the phenomenon, but require two appendixes.

The first is due to the realization that, though the percentage of attacks occurred in the U.S. is very low (2.4%), very often the U.S. citizens are the target of terrorism all over the world.

The second is the rather sound evaluation expressed by an American expert (Robert Kuppermann of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University), who in an interview of the autumn 1985 said: "sure, if one compares terrorism with other forms of carnage, be they crimes or road accidents, from the point of view of numbers it represents only a minor problem".

It is this numerical evaluation which – though statistically correct – can cause a detrimental moral confusion. It can happen in fact that, also due to the "show-information effect", owing to which a daily scoop is sought, which should erase the memory of the one occurred the day before, public opinion rapidly overcomes the temporary


emotion caused by any new terrorist action, without giving the antiterrorist fight the necessary importance.

Thus a despicable habit to the phenomenon grows, due to which, on the one hand, the mass media provide terrorism with the amount of publicity it needs and, on the other, the average citizen, at the end, falls prey of a regrettable state of indifference, supported by the ever increasing diffusion of daily violence as well as the meager satisfaction of having personally escaped it.

What we have said up to this point, beyond the statistical findings and the subsequent – and valid – considerations, reconducts the problem of terrorism to its typically dimensions and, more than that, to the political mould that characterizes it.

This essential aspect has found, and still finds every day, creditable and effective supporters.

In a conference at the "Jonathan Institute", in June



1984, George Shultz affirmed: " ... when terrorism cannot produce anarchy, it can try to induce the government to an excessive reaction, such as, for example, the imposition of harsh measures of control and restriction, which ultimately alienate the support of the population ".

This danger exists.

Towards the end of 1985, three cases occurred, which were managed in a harsh manner.

On September 25, 1985, three Israeli tourists are killed at Larnaca by Palestinian terrorists. On October 1, the Israeli air force attacks in retaliation the PLO Headquarters near Tunis causing about 60 dead.

On November 7, the Colombian Army attacks a few guerrillas, who have barricaded themselves inside the Court House of Bogotá and causes the death of about one hundred people, mostly among the hostages held by the guerrillas.

On November 24, a group of Egyptian special forces attacks an hijacked aircraft coming from Athens and forced to land at La Valletta, and kills 57 people, adding them to the three passengers murdered in cold blood by the hijackers.


The democratic countries have accepted the hard reality of these reactions, but the fact remains that retaliation – albeit inevitable – on the one hand does not defuse terrorism, as proved by the attacks at the airports of Rome and Vienna of December 27, 1985, and, on the other, it risks to induce the governments to follow methods that may not always be accepted by public opinion.

As a matter of fact, for a democracy, for a State based on law, it is not easy to comply with the rules of democratic dialectics when the opposite party denies *tout court* the validity of these rules and rejects them. It is true that one cannot talk about pluralism, discussion, negotiations,

compromises with someone who, with totalitarian mind and methods, does not accept a peaceful confrontation, represses individualities, treads on dissension.

But it is also true that with terrorism, as with crime in general, an exclusively repressive response does not solve the problem. The answer must be mainly a political one. If terrorism is to lose ground, if this mixture of situations and forms of violence – which outside any logical meaning is classified as international terrorism – is to be prevented from causing fear and death, we must first of all find out the "political" reason of terrorism; why the Israeli dead intermingle with the Palestinian victims; why, in a world in which tons of explosives are statistically available to each inhabitant, there is this antinomy between reason and justice on one side, and arrogance and killing violence on the other.

This is also what President Reagan affirmed in his message



to Congress of April 26, 1984:
 "... we must admit that terrorism is a symptom of greater problems. We must therefore strive to extirpate the causes of frustration and despair which produce and feed terrorism".

Nevertheless, this stubborn willingness to discover the roots of the evil, this continuous effort to reach clear agreements and constructive negotiations must not be separate from an attitude of coherent resolve in opposing and retaliating – in case of need – any manifestation of unlawfulness and violence.

This is also the undeniable meaning of Minister Spadolini's statement on the occasion of the 327th Anniversary of the "Granatieri di Sardegna".

After mentioning that "... all of Europe is living days of great anxiety and worry" because "for months and months an inhumane and monstrous challenge has repeatedly confronted us in our seas, in our cities, in our airports: the challenge of international

terrorism", the Minister of Defence continued: "... terrorism must be isolated, terrorism must be defeated; this is the imperative of the moment, to which the Old Continent and the West as a whole must answer, in the indispensable partnership between Europe and the United States".

"Defence against terrorism" – Minister Spadolini continued – "is the primary, essential interest of Europe, which cannot be renounced".

And this defence, in order to attain its goals, must be seen not only as a coordinated adoption of measures regarding public order and political provisions. It must instead be considered as a complex operation, that can have a positive outcome also through the solution of a cultural problem.

And it is in this essential aspect of the intricate present reality that Europe – besides its political and military options – can give again deep meaning

and significance to its existence, its function, its responsibilities, in line with the universal contents of civilization.

Modern civilization – as a matter of fact – despite the contradictions that tarnish its image and the serious disorders that affect its essential values, is anxiously and determinedly seeking a reawakening of consciences and a reemphasizing of these values. But – as I wrote in a previous article (*Rivista Militare*, Eng. Ed., no. 1/1986) – the theory of the repetition of the historical phenomena leads to hope that, as the end of the first millennium opened the way to development of a more human conception of the human being in the light of St. Francis' teachings, similarly the end of the second millennium brings about a sharp moral and cultural progress and the consequent advent of the "new man".

It will be this man – engaging all his strength in the construction of a more serene



coexistence among all peoples – the sole antidote against the execrable and absurd manifestations of terrorism. It will also be this man who, to the mentioned cocktail of explosive and psychology, which is the essence of

terrorism, will have the knowledge and the ability to oppose a well balanced mixture of political, military and social measures, introduced and operating in a catalyzing cultural contest, capable of encouraging the civil progress and the

victory of the universal spirit over matter.

NOTES ON TERRORISM



LOGISTICS AND ITS EVOLUTION



One of the preeminent occupations and concerns of a good commander has been, at all times, to provision his forces, in order to enable them to fight under the best conditions.

The needs of the modern armies, grown in terms of quantity and quality of the requirements, have made these concerns more and more strong and urgent, extending them from the technical-military sphere to the political one.

In 1809, Napoleon, in a letter to Prince Eugene, wrote: "the management of the military problems is only half of a general's work; to establish and to secure the lines of communication is one of the most outstanding problems".

Marshal Rommel, in a retrospective view of the battle of El Alamein, stated that the regular supply of arms, ammunition and fuel is an essential condition for any army that wants to conduct a victorious battle.

In modern armies, the sometimes extremely rapid increase of the needs has produced a similarly fast development of the means capable of satisfying those needs. In some cases, nevertheless, these increments have not been coincident, owing to a certain lack of simultaneousness as well as to the non synchronous possible forms of employment.

However, in a broader sense, the problem that had already worried Napoleon, who was the first to try to solve it systematically, has remained unchanged in its essence which – albeit in different proportions and with different means – was, is and will always be that of ensuring that the armed forces live and operate in optimal conditions.

This statement also expresses the most traditional and widely accepted definition of logistics which, in the most important armies of the world, is conceived as the branch of military art which includes all activities aimed at enabling the armed forces to live and

fight in the best of conditions.

The same definition can substantially be found in Zingarelli's "Dictionary of the Italian Language", according to which logistics is "the branch of the military art that deals with the activities meant to secure to the Armed Forces all that is needed to live, move and fight under the best conditions of efficiency".

The "Memory on the Employment of the Major Units" (Publication 900 of the Doctrinal Series) of the Army General Staff, on its turn, at paragraph 2, defines the logistic manoeuvre as "the employment, combined in time and space, of the available logistic organs and resources in order to satisfy the life and combat needs of the units".

Other definitions – more or less appropriate and complete – mention logistics as the whole part of military art not included in strategy and tactics, or they see in it the procedure through which a nation's potential is transferred to the armed forces.

After all, these definitions are of secondary importance. Their different conception is mainly due to the point from which logistics is supposed to start.

Its final goal, instead, is clear to everyone and clearly defined by all.

As for the rest, even in their diversity, the various definitions worked out have another aspect in common: the economic one, in which logistics is rooted, confirming the fact that war cannot be only a military problem.

In a general sense, the logistic function recalls the rather common picture of the "noria".

The containers of the water-wheel fill up in the economic sector and, in emptying, they go through the supply sector and reach as far as the combat zone; on their way back, they carry to the rear lines all that cannot be used in the operations.

Logistics, a real bondage for military operations which the Commanders of all times have tried in vain to escape, imposes

limitations to the intensity and scope of the operations and expresses itself both quantitatively and qualitatively.

As regards the quantitative aspect, the potentiality and the times of action must be expressed in numbers, for it is necessary to estimate for how long a certain number of units can live and fight in a particular area.

From the qualitative standpoint, the logistic bonds may allow a certain operation or they may impose a reduction in its scope and a modification of its main lines.

Logistics therefore influences – with no possibility of exception without risking a failure – all military actions, with undoubted consequences, owing to which it could be said that logistics is the mathematical facet of Military Art, its rigid, scientific component.

LOGISTICS THROUGH THE YEARS

Immutable in its purpose, logistic has undergone with time an ample evolution.

From this point of view the logistics of Napoleon's era is, as regards principles and application, quite different from that of the first world conflict and only a very small fraction of that can be found in the second world war.

Actually the appearance of new materials has always led to new forms of combat and produced new needs. Thus one witnesses a continuous effort aimed at confronting the new demands with an organization appropriately adapted to the new means. Therefore the equilibrium between logistics and tactics is inevitably upset, and all anxiously strive to eliminate the imbalance.

Unfortunately, the problem is a recurring one; the new materials produce new needs and logistics continues to run after tactics.

The whole military history bears witness to it. The problem of supplying the armies of the

Napoleon's troops crossing the Dnieper. The Russian Campaign failed because of an incomplete solution of the logistic problems.

first world war, which were engaged in a war of position with stable fronts, entailing enormous consumption, had just been solved with the massive employment of railroads when the appearance of tanks and airplanes gave war a new aspect, and upset a logistic system that had been labouriously organized and was unable to adapt swiftly to the new reality.

Once the crisis was surmounted and a new logistic organization was achieved, adequate to the requirements of a war made essentially with armour and aircraft, with the advent of the nuclear weapon a new break occurred, followed by the anxious effort to adapt the means to the changed forms of combat.

The course of the much troubled evolution of logistics along the times shows aspects of great interest and is very topical at the present time.

A short outline of the principles of Napoleon's logistics and a quick look at the railway and road logistics, up to the latest demands, marked at first by the appearance of the nuclear weapon and then by the still undefined – but tumultuous – irruption of the unknown space element, will perhaps allow us to bring into light a few forgotten principles, to better understand the difficulty of keeping a balance between tactics and logistics, and to realize the impending danger of upsetting this always precarious equilibrium.

NAPOLEON'S LOGISTICS

The fundamental character of the Napoleonic logistics was that it was basically meant for supporting offensive campaigns always projected outside the national territory.

We deal, therefore, with a conception of war based on



movement, from which some basic principles stemmed which – when fully complied with – produced the flashes of Jena and Wagram and when “pushed” beyond a certain limit, especially as regards distance and natural environment, caused the failure of the Russian campaign of 1812.

Among these principles, the following are considered preeminent:


- the logistic and tactical plans, coordinated and worked out sufficiently in advance;
- the manoeuvre of the logistic means, considered an indispensable condition for fighting a battle;
- the organization's flexibility, as a postulate of the logistic manoeuvre;

- the security of the lines of communication, considered true arteries of the army.

THE 1815-1870 PERIOD

From 1815 to 1870 these principles underwent a remarkable stagnation, a direct, albeit questionable, consequence of the general reaction against all that was linked with Napoleon's image and deeds.

Only one power in Europe – Prussia – was perhaps not so much affected by this phenomenon and was able to use the teachings of Napoleon's campaigns in the establishment of a certainly efficient organization, as was that engaged



The Americans hauling their guns during the coup de main against the Ticonderoga Fort in March 1775.

the framework of some principles of Napoleon's logistics, and decided to solve the problem of transportation with the systematic employment of the railway.

The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 was a probatory test in this regard.

The results were satisfactory, but there were some flaws.

As a matter of fact, the system proved that each Major Unit at Army and Corps level was closely bound to the terminal of the railway on which it relied; it confirmed that the protection and maintenance of the lines require a massive employment of personnel; it reconfirmed – above all – the impending risk of interruption in the continuity of transportation between the long-distance supply means and the transport vehicles available to each Major Unit.

That is to say that in 1870 the Prussian transport system, based on the railway, met very well the requirements of mobilization and satisfied the needs of provision and supply of the units, also because it was helped by the rapidity of the operations and by the rather passive attitude of the French army.

But there were also hindrances and critical moments, whose importance was nevertheless diminished by the satisfaction for the final success.

In short, in the light of what had been observed in the sieges of Metz and Paris, the main lesson learned from the operations indicated that the railway was perfectly suited for a stationary war, while for a war of movement the transportations by wagons, between the rail terminals and the units, turned out to be insufficient.

The General Staffs of the major European powers studied the aspects and events of the Franco-Prussian war with zealous attention.

in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870.

In the 1815-1870 period, the improvement of the war materials, the increased size of the armies, and the development of railroads were the factors that mostly influenced logistics.

The progress in the armaments, regarding especially the small caliber weapons (faster rate of fire: 12 rounds per minute, starting in 1862; automatic weapons capable of firing 100 rounds per minute) entailed a considerable increase in the burdens for the supply of ammunition.

Armies with an up to then unusual number of effectives were established during the American Civil War of 1861-1865 (the North mobilized up to 2.5

million men; the South reached a global strength of 1.2 million).

Finally, in the same conflict, the railway made its first appearance as a transport means of great capability.

Its first employment in the logistic field solved great problems of distance and loads but, on the other hand, showed that the railway is vulnerable and has therefore high security costs, and it sets sometimes serious limits to manoeuvre, owing to its rigidity.

In Europe the teachings of the American Civil War were little applied in the logistic field, with the exception of the Prussian General Staff. The Prussians in fact included certain experiences derived from the abovementioned conflict within



Attractive picture of a railway flanking a road. Today the rail, road, maritime and air lines of communication are exposed, more than ever, to the risk of air attacks. The ordinary road is generally preferred to the railway.

France and Prussia were, of course, the first among them.

The results of this studies were translated into regulations for the logistic organization, in which the transport by rail had a predominant role that lasted up to 1940.

On the other hand, it was also confirmed that the railroad could not in any way push as far as the moving troops, and therefore it had to be considered a link – albeit a fundamental one – in the logistic chain, to be integrated with a complex system of on-road and cross-country transports.

Towards the end of the century (1880-1900), new factors influenced the logistic

organization, which was studied and implemented mostly to tackle the problems arisen during the last conflicts.

First among these factors was conscription, the consequence of which was that the armies of the major countries came to have strength of over one million effectives.

A similar impact was produced by the progress of armaments with the increase in firepower.

Artillery, in particular, with its quantitative and qualitative increments (increase of the caliber and number of guns, faster firing rate) became an insatiable eater of ammunition.

The automatic weapons of the infantry also showed remarkable increases in number, quality and consumption.

The demands, as regards the supplying of victuals, materials and ammunition, reached such a high level that many qualified experts believed that a future war would be of short duration,

because no nation would be able to endure such a huge logistic effort.

THE 1914-1940 PERIOD

At the outbreak of the first world conflict, in 1914, the logistics of the opposing powers is undoubtedly based on the organization studied and implemented between 1870 and 1900. Few are the voices suggesting different and more modern solutions, and the audience is scarce.

The conflict, which was foreseen as characterized by movement, already at the beginning encounters two big obstacles:

- the German advance is very swift, so that it becomes impossible to rely on the railway, which is often damaged and overcome before it can be repaired; meanwhile, the transports by horse and mule prove to be inadequate;



• the consumption of ammunition reaches unforeseen levels. Mistakes in evaluation are repeatedly made and reach their peak in the battle of the Marne, where the lack of ammunition practically prevents the exploitation of the initial success.

Therefore, the "stationary war" makes its appearance already in 1915. A war in which the opponents, on a practically stabilized and continuous front, will lead a gigantic and fruitless combat until 1918.

This type of war marked the triumph of the railroad, the only way capable of meeting the enormous transport needs of the belligerents.

In some stretches of the front a density of 15 artillery guns every thousand men was attained or – even more significant – one piece every six metres.

When, in 1919, the calculation was made of everything that the Allied Forces had

needed in order to live and win, most people thought that the figures had reached levels which could never be surpassed in any way.

For the French army alone, the quantities were verging on 300 million artillery shells and about 6 billion rounds for the infantry weapons. For Italy – from 1916 until the armistice of 1918 – the artillery shells fired reached, alone, the estimated total of 40 million.

The railway had enabled the opposing forces to face, not without difficulties, the logistic situation in a conflict of the type considered, i.e. a stationary war.

But many experts asked themselves whether the acceptance of this kind of organization should still be considered admissible. An organization which downgraded manoeuvre, exactly in the moment when the development of the engine and aviation opened new horizons to tactics and logistics.

A stretch of modern superhighway which, in case of destruction, could cause the paralysis of the lines of communication. Logistics must therefore avail itself of a varied range of transportation.

On the other hand, the engine – in the form of transport or combat vehicle – had already made its appearance on the battlefield and in 1918 the allied armies could avail themselves of 200,000 trucks and 1,500 tanks.

Despite the rays of modern light perceived in the battle of the Altopiani of 1916 (over 15,000 men were transported from the Julian to the Trentino front aboard 1,000 trucks in addition to 214 train convoys), in 1917, with the employment of the tank in the battle of Cambrai (see Rivista Militare, It. Edition, no. 4/85), and in 1918, with the transportation by truck in a single day to the zone behind the Soissons-Epernay front of 120,000 men

and 7,000 tons of ammunition, at the end of the conflict the road transport remained only a complement – albeit an essential one – of the railway transport, just as the tank continued to be considered mostly a support weapon for the infantry.

Between 1920 and 1930, the technical advances increased the range, speed and power of the motor vehicles and tanks. Again manoeuvre became a necessity, to which the modern means granted again concrete possibilities, on a scale larger than in the past.

1940

When the hostilities of the second world conflict started, the logistics of the belligerents was mostly that of 1918, with the sole exception of Germany which, having planned a swift war of movement, could avail herself of a more flexible and composite logistic system.

The campaigns of 1939 and 1940 mark the success of motorization and the full reinstatement of manoeuvre.

Thus in most of the countries at war, once again one faces one of those periods of "imbalance" between logistics and tactics.

Starting from 1942, the imbalance risks to become more serious because the logistic system is burdened with the more and more widespread motorization of the armies, the constant increase of the fire-power, the ever more incisive effects of the air force on the lines of communication, the progressive worldwide spreading of a conflict that involves millions of men, from Europe to Africa, Burma, the Pacific islands.

The logistic needs reach unheard-of levels. Fuel becomes an essential element of logistics; it is estimated that in a year of conflict approximately 5 million tons of fuel are required.

For the sole Vistula-Oder operation of the Soviet First Armoured Army (12 January-3 February 1945), the units'

vehicles had to be filled up three and a half times with Diesel oil and six times with petrol; on the whole, 3,200 tons of fuel had to be transported.

On the average, the logistic requirements are about 30 kilos of weight per man-day.

At the same time, while on the one hand the lines of communication – rail, road, sea, air – are increasing, on the other they are more and more liable to attacks from the air. Among them, the one that appears to be the most vulnerable is obviously the railway, which as a consequence loses its priority, to the advantage of the road.

The belligerents' logistic effort occurs along these lines of communication and, in short, translates in terms of weight, volume, flowing of materials and transports.


The whole system often finds itself squeezed between the Major Units – erratic and mostly unsatisfied consumers –

A CH 47 helicopter flying with hanging loads. In modern warfare, it is an excellent logistic carrier.



that want more and more of everything, and faster – and the commander, who in the logistic requirements sees serious obstacles and demands an ever increasing commitment to the success of the manoeuvre.

The system, anyway, thanks to an impressive employment of means, allows success, especially when the manoeuvre develops according to pre-established plans. It is affected instead – owing mostly to its weight – by possible variations in the plans envisaged, precisely as it suffers limitations, sometimes unbearable when the lines of communication, along which its transport flows, are not protected from air and guerrilla offences.



A telecommunications satellite. The absurdity of nuclear confrontation leads to new creative efforts and it does not seem wholly science fiction to think about the possibility that traditional logistics could be gradually replaced by space logistics.

A typical example of this is the defeat of Von Paulus' 4th German Army in the battle of Stalingrad.

The strategic mobility which was taken for granted comes again into question. The progressing speed of the motorized and armoured masses suffers an inevitable logistic restraint and is reduced to 10 km per day.

Not only that. After advancing for 30-40 days, the Major Units, in general, must stop, in order to allow the supply bases to move forward.

Thus the balance between strategy, tactics and logistics, which had been so laboriously reestablished, in the '50s becomes shaky again.

ATOMIC LOGISTICS AND...

The studies on the effects of the atomic and nuclear weapons lead to the conclusion that logistics must be adapted to a hard-to-foresee form of war, in which the forces would have to live and fight in conditions that we can barely imagine.

The impact of a possible atomic offence, in fact, immediately influences also the logistic sphere. With the destruction of the Commands at all levels, with the separation of the forces, with the instantaneous annihilation of bases and depots and with the paralysis of the communication lines, due also to radioactive fallout, logistics, which in the second world conflict had attained a high degree of centralization, must necessarily be ready for decentralization.

According to some, every Major Unit should own the means it needs. Others favour a totally independent logistic organization,


with its own equipment, able to act according to the instructions given by the Commander and the results of the first nuclear exchange.

Some also consider it convenient to rely on multi-service depots and stores, smaller than the ones used in the past, but numerous and spread widely along the front and in depth.

Nevertheless, the immanent danger of interruption of the lines of communication remains, with the consequent asphyxiation of the entire system.

Thus we come to envisage a massive employment of the aircraft, which is considered the only solution capable, at least partially, of doing without a land road system.

As the railroad had been the preeminent means of transportation in the trench war, as was the truck in the motorized and armoured war, so the helicopter appears as the logistic vehicle of nuclear war, together



An intervention at a station in orbit. Studies are already under way to evaluate the analogies, differences, integrations and difficulties of space logistics vis-à-vis traditional logistics.

with, and as a complement of, the air transportation carried out with fixed-wing aircraft.

This short survey of the logistic evolution of the past years should be useful to understand how the new forms of combat, due to the introduction of new weapons or to the updating of the existing ones, were always faced by logistics with the means already at its disposal.

As a consequence, logistics usually had a delayed start, and succeeded in redressing the imbalance it suffered vis-à-vis tactics, and therefore in performing its essential function, only

when it made recourse to new equipment and more up-to-date procedures.

It is therefore in this direction, in this innovative task, that logistics must operate, within the framework of its fundamental principles. Now that the absurdity of an armed nuclear confrontation has promoted new, more or less futuristic visions, and prompts new imaginative and creative efforts, it does not seem "science fiction" at all to think that the logistics of the horse, the railway, the road and that of the aircraft could be gradually and partially replaced by "space" logistics.

What will be its dimensions, its analogies, its differences, its integrations with the current systems? What about difficulties and possibilities?

All forecasts move between reality, imagination and fantasy. But the history of mankind

reminds us that these problems have always marked and characterized the progress of man and his civilization.

It is what a well-known writer of military history, Nicola Marselli, indirectly recommended already in 1875, in his work "War and its History":

- "a logistics closely connected with strategy is the vehicle through which the General's mind reaches the tactical action of the troops"; and, further on:
- the study made by logistics must consist in "realizing that every principle should be understood in its essence, and that every rule has its exceptions; teaching, through historical and assumed examples, the skill of bending the abstract through the concrete".



STRATEGY AND HIGH COMMAND



Everything has been said about strategy, or almost everything. The definitions of this "Art" (or is it a "Science"?) have followed each other starting from the Greek era, in which the term "strategy" was mostly understood as "military campaign".

To recall the numerous expressions formulated along the times, or the most significant at least, would prove a mere academic exercise if from the succession of the various definitions one could not remark the evolution of the concept itself.

First of all we must underline that "strategy" has always been distinguished from "tactics", the latter being the art of executing an action on the battlefield. Considered by some the science of the Commanding Generals, in the 18th Century strategy

appeared as the combination and synthesis of all military knowledge. That is, a kind of collection of experiences which, in epochs lacking in significant innovations (XVII and XVIII centuries) was the only matter that one generation could hand down to the next. At the times of the French Revolution and Napoleon's Empire, strategy was elevated to the rank of science of movements and plans and defined by Clausewitz as battle management, as compared with tactics, which concerned only the employment of troops in combat.

Moltke, who could not fail to be among those interested in the problem, with most appropriate terms attributed to strategy the power to indicate "where" and "when" to fight, leaving to tactics the "how", i.e. the methods of combat.

As much as the innovations in the field of armaments – and therefore in that of doctrine – progress, so does strategy become increasingly the leading line which indicates the conditions most suitable for conducting a battle, and strives to make those conditions more and more complementary and closely linked together.

Nevertheless the choice of this line and its adaptation to the events are more or less influenced by political considerations. This determines overlaps, in which politics and strategy intermingle, so as to make a clear distinction almost impossible.

Also Winston Churchill was of the same mind in 1945, as he maintained that it was practically impossible to extricate the irritating question of making a clear delimitation between the



political problems and all other problems.

A more modern position is held by General Beaufre, a well-known French student of high-level military problems, according to whom strategy is the "art of a dialectic of wills, with the employment of force to resolve the conflicts" or also "the art of obtaining a decision through the determination and exploitation of a situation which entails the moral disintegration of the adversary, to the point of making him accept the conditions that are imposed on him". It is certainly a more comprehensive vision which, within the development of the war of subversion and of nuclear deterrence, it ensures to the psychological aspect a centre-stage position. A definition coined in 1963 in the United States, which belongs to the same line of thought, sees strategy as a "science or art of employing the economic, psychologic and military means in the most suitable manner for attaining the political goals, increasing the possibilities of success and diminishing the risks of defeat".

The concept just outlined is clearly expressed in the work "The Great Strategy of the Roman Empire" by Edward Luttwak. In Luttwak's words "only starting from 1945, has the sprouting of new techniques of mass destruction invalidated the fundamental assumptions of the post-Napoleon, Clausewitzian conceptions of great strategy".

Like the Romans, what confronts us today is not the prospect of a decisive conflict, because the escalation has produced a lasting, absurd condition of extremely risky stability, but a permanent, though limited, state of war. Like the Romans we must protect an advanced society from a number of different threats and, above all, considering the nature of modern weapons, we must restrict their use and exploit instead their political potential.

The revolutionary implications of these fundamental changes have been only

confusedly perceived.

Nevertheless it must be desumed that, "paradoxically", the revolutionary transformation of the nature of modern warfare has managed to approach very much the strategic thought of the Romans to our own.

The in-depth study of the concept of strategy and the determination of its various facets lead, through logical derivations, to the organization of command at the highest levels.

In fact, a general strategy must, first of all, aim at harmonizing the various individual strategies so that all concur in producing an effective unity of efforts. Among the various strategies, the military ones (those of the three Services) assume a predominant importance in case of conflict, but this, of course, never excludes the also essential functions of the other strategies (economic, industrial, psychological, etc.).

No wonder therefore that a widespread and largely shared opinion should contend that the political management of a conflict should pertain exclusively to the Government, while the conduct of operations should be under the responsibility of the military authorities.

But such a precise line of demarcation, albeit supported by convincing elements, is usually opposed by the democratic governments, which, in practice, prefer to have in their hands both the responsibility of the general policy and that of managing the conflicts.

That conception was concretely and effectively expressed by the British War Cabinet during the Second World War. This peculiar body had the task of defining the objectives of the War and dividing the said objectives in successive stages and goals.

Winston Churchill, as Head of the Government, accomplished within the War Cabinet that unification of efforts which must not fail when the future of a nation is at stake.

The political and military decisions where unified with

the participation in the Cabinet of the most representative political personalities, the Chiefs of Staff (members – in their turn – of the Council of the Chiefs of Staff) and even the leaders of the political parties.

In the War Cabinet's "system" also other organizations were involved, and were requested to cooperate on a case-by-case basis, for routine problems or for questions of particular moment. These were:

- National Defence Committee, for the organization and administration of the Armed Forces; it met once a week, and its members were the Ministers of the Armed Forces and other members of the Government;
- National Defence Board, for major problems, which held ad hoc meetings, and included the Prime Minister, two members of the War Cabinet, the Ministers for the three Services and the Chiefs of Staff, who had consultive functions;
- Council of the Chiefs of Staff, which controlled the Armed Forces and supervised the conduct of the war on the strategic plane and the operations on the tactical plane.

The British solution of entrusting the elaboration of the operational plans to the Chiefs of Staff, who were charged with the organization of the forces and the relevant logistic support, had the merit of ensuring that those plans had the guarantee of realism.

In our epoch, marked by the "nuclear" and by "subversion", we must perhaps find a different solution. In fact, there is an increasing necessity to place, next to the military strategists, on one side those responsible for internal security and, on the other, experts able to assess the national scientific and technical capabilities, comparing them with those of the potential adversary.

With the advent of the nuclear factor and with the diffusion of deterrence, we have in fact come to live in a world where the opposing parties, in

COMPAGNIE GUARDIE REALI DEL PALAZZO ED ALABARDIERI GUARDIE DEL PALAZZO IN SARDEGNA

(Carnata-Sarda)



order to avoid a reciprocal holocaust, tend to protract the feinting game indefinitely. The decision is no more to be found in active combat, but rather in the obscure and laborious preparatory stage.

In other words, a new form of strategy has come into being, a sort of "genetic" strategy, which consists in exploiting and employing the technical and scientific resources of a nation in order to surpass, or at least, match the accomplishments of the adversary.

This is a difficult art, because the limitation of resources often imposes difficult choices and conscious and unavoidable renunciations.

A difficult art, also because the potential of "experts" does not always succeed in producing "on request" and within the desired time, what is wanted of them.

As we have said, the concentration in the hands of

the Executive not only of the political, but also of the military control of the war, is the prevailing trend in the democratic countries.

But in the conduct of war, a performance in terms of military "professionalism" is required. In practice, this leads to assign the Major Commands the tasks and means necessary to implement the decisions taken by the supreme political leadership of the conflict.

To this end, the Supreme Command, having ensured its advice to the Government, devises the operational plans and — by delegation of the political authority — exerts its powers of command and control on the various operational theatres and on the specialized Commands.

The arguments advanced here permit to form a relatively comprehensive opinion about the political and/or military responsibility as regards the

management of crises and the conduct of a possible conflict. Nevertheless a more precise reference to the Italian situation seems at this moment quite appropriate and useful, considering that the problem was recently brought to the attention of public opinion.

The Italian Constitution, at art. 78, states: "the Chambers decide the state of war and confer the necessary power on the Government".

The drafting of this article reached its final formulation only after a heated debate within the Committee (1).

An agreement was reached when Mr. Ruini, Chairman of the Committee for the Constitution, sharing the opinion of those affirming the necessity to consider that wars were not declared anymore, indeed they exploded without forewarning, stated that although the state of war was to be managed by the Executive, Parliament had



the duty to intervene as soon as possible. Proceeding from this conception, Ruini concluded: "We are going to have these stages: immediate defence with government actions; decision of the state of war by Parliament; formal declaration of war, which pertains to the Head of the State (ref. 9th Comma, art. 87). Parliament will then have a further task: to give the necessary powers to the Government.

The already mentioned 9th Comma of art. 87 of the Constitution states that the President of the Republic "has the command of the Armed Forces, presides over the Supreme Council of Defence constituted according to the law, declares the state of war decided by the Chambers". What concerns our survey is the part concerning the command of the Armed Forces.

A lot has been written on this subject. Among others, there are two works worth mentioning, owing to the modern and realistic approach to the problem: "The Organization of Defence" by Mario Ristori and "Institutes of Military Law" by Angelo Longo.

In the first of the two volumes, the author contends that the function of the President of the Republic as Commander of the Armed Forces must be related to other constitutional norms, such as:

- Art. 89, which states: "No act of the President of the Republic is valid if it is not countersigned by the proposing ministers, who assume responsibility for it";
- Art. 90, according to which the President of the Republic is not responsible for the acts done in performing his functions, except for high treason or for

acting against the constitution;
• Art. 95, which states: "The Prime Minister directs the general policy of the Government and is responsible for it".

As regards how, in practice, the President of the Republic was to exercise the command of the Armed Forces, there was much discussion within the Constitution Committee of the Constituent Assembly.

Two members, Terracini and La Rocca, proposed a formula according to which the President of the Republic was to have the Command of the Armed Forces and, in wartime, was to exercise it through the military leaders appointed by Parliament. In this regard the Russian and Yugoslav examples were also considered, but the proposal was rejected. The discussion on this subject, taken up again by the Assembly, took the form

ALCUNI CORPI DI FANTERIA SOPPRESSI
(Alzata Sarda)



of several statements and proposals.

Mr. Azzi suggested the following formulation: "The President of the Republic has the command of the Armed Forces and exercises it through the Ministry of Defence in peacetime, and in wartime through the Defence Chief of Staff".

Also this proposal, which gathered a good number of assents and even today seems to have a certain logical value, was rejected. As a matter of fact, it was said that - while it was quite clear that in peacetime the exercise of command, pertaining to the President of the Republic, had to be carried out under the responsibility of the Government and, in particular, of the Minister of Defence, in time of war the question had to be regulated according to the

solution given by the law, but always in keeping with the identical principle of non-responsibility of the President.

In the already mentioned work by Longo "Institutes of Military Law", the subject, handled with an ample and retrospective vision, is summed up recalling that "up until the end of the XIX Century the royal prerogative of command of the Armed Forces" - defined by Pierandrei (2) as "the share of those powers which are historically in the hands of a monarch and have not been modified, abrogated or regulated by formal laws" - was deemed to include an actual power to control and to guide. Afterwards, after many contrasts, the prerogative took the shape of a real power to influence and participate in the formation of the defensive trend, excluding

the actual command. During the Fascist period it had a completely formal value, since the powers of setting the political course and the deployment of the Armed Forces, as well as their direction, were in the hands of the Head of the Government. In September 1943, the King took temporarily the actual command of the Armed Forces, but this was based more on principles of necessity than on constitutional rules.

A prevailing trend of thought and doctrine excludes that the presidential command entails powers and attributions of a technical-military character.

V. Bachelet, in his work "Military doctrine and the State Juridical System", wrote that the presidential command is a merely formal, or better symbolic, attribution. Predieri, in "Defence and the Armed Forces"



maintains that "the operations will always be directed by the Supreme Commander or Chief of Staff".

In reality, the President of the Republic represents the national unity and the bodies entrusted with external defence and internal order – the Armed Forces and the Judiciary – rightly refer to him (10th Comma, art. 87). According to Motzo, the joint responsibility of the President of the Republic and the Government for the activities of high command should also guarantee that the Armed Forces do not get involved in politics.

From this point of view, one can also presume that the power to command the Armed Forces does not place the President of the Republic at the top of the military hierarchy. As a matter of fact, the positive law does not include any norm

that suggests a possible insertion of the Head of the State in the Organization of the Armed Forces. In substance, the presidential function of command must not be understood as the implementation of initiatives substituting those of the constitutional bodies, but as a necessary cooperation with the government for what concerns the organization and efficiency of the Armed Forces. Moreover, it must be interpreted as a verification and an incentive for Parliament and Government to ensure that the essence and constance of the government action are in keeping with the interests of defence in relation to the situation, both internal and external. The President's function of command of the Armed Forces must moreover be seen in the framework of the Atlantic Pact and NATO.

The NATO organization, in fact, entails limitations in the technical-military activities of the Italian authorities and, particularly, it interferes between the functions of the Supreme Allied Command in Europe and those of the Defence Chief of Staff in peacetime. In case of conflict the same interferences would arise with the National Supreme Commander (Defence Chief of Staff?).

The Bill (no. 1482) regarding the reorganization of the central military structure of Defence, recently submitted by the Government, contains a more precise attribution of prerogatives and responsibilities, and should moreover permit to enhance the position of hierarchic pre-eminence, in addition to the functional one, of the Defence Chief of Staff over the Service Chiefs, emphasizing the prin-

(Armata Sarda)

NOVARA CAVALLERIA

REGGIMENTI

AOSTA CAVALLERIA



1829.

1852.

1859.

1845.

1851.

1852.

1859.

1845.

(Carlo Felice)

(Carlo Alberto)

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(Carlo Alberto)

(Professione di Fiancheggiamento)

(Nuova Cavalleria)

(Aosta Cavalleria)

ciples and directions already expressed in the Presidential Decree of November 18, 1965, no. 1477.

This Bill should bring about a more defined tendency to entrust, in case of emergency, the high command of the operations to the abovesaid authority, who – on the other hand – could not exercise it in the best possible way without the support of the consensus on the main decisions, ensured by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and by the irreplaceable technical-operational contribution of the individual Chiefs of Staff to solve the problems (there are many!) typical of their respective Services. It is in fact needless to remark that the figure of the Supreme Commander who, on top of a hill, on horseback, directed in person the movements and

actions of the forces under his command, is light-years from the reality of our times.

In conclusion, this short survey of strategy and command can be summarized in a few concise considerations, such as:

- the increasing complexity of the concept of strategy, in whose composite multiplicity the purely military aspects vanish in a much wider context of all-around defence;
- the absolute necessity that – in the democratic countries that strive for progress – it should be the political leadership that manage, as a whole, a matter which, like defence, includes numerous components of civil and military character and which would be hard to distinguish and separate into different levels and scopes;
- the expence that also

the military organization – although necessarily applying the irreplaceable hierarchical/disciplinary principle up to the military summit – ensure the Defence Chief of Staff, who embodies this summit, the support and encouragement of a concert of technical-military voices, which in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and in the particular sphere of each Service Chief find their most appropriate and convincing expression.


NOTES

(1) See "La Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana illustrata con i lavori preparatori" (The Italian Constitution and its preparation) by Falzone, Palermo, Cosentino. Ed. Mondadori.

(2) "La prerogativa regia di comando delle Forze Armate e il suo esercizio" (The royal prerogative of command of the Armed Forces and its exercise). Ed. 1942.







RIVISTA MILITARE

IN THE WORLD

Algeria - Argentina - Austria - Belgium - Brazil - Bulgaria - Canada - China - Costa Rica
 Czechoslovakia - Denmark - Dominican Republic - Ecuador - Egypt - El Salvador
 Ethiopia - Federal Republic of Germany - Finland - France - Greece - Guatemala
 Haiti - Netherlands - Honduras - Hungary - India - Iran - Israel - Japan - Jordan - Korea
 Morocco - Mexico - Nicaragua - Norway - Panama - Paraguay - Poland - Portugal
 Rumania - Saudi Arabia - Senegal - Somalia - South Africa - Soviet Union - Spain
 Sudan - Sweden - Switzerland - Thailand - Tunisia - Turkey - United Kingdom
 United States of America - Uruguay - Venezuela - Yugoslavia